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A B S T R A C T 
Thi s t h e s i s concerns B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Kuwait 
between 1890 and 1921. The f i r s t notable r u l e r i n t h i s period was 
Sheikh Mubarak who assumed power i n 1896 through the assassination of 
h i s b r o t h e r s . At f i r s t he faced d i f f i c u l t i e s from the Turks, and he 
the r e f o r e signed a secret agreement w i t h B r i t a i n i n 1899 f o r p r o t e c t i o n . 
By t h i s agreement he undertook not t o s e l l , lease or contract w i t h any 
f o r e i g n power except B r i t a i n . 
At the same time Russia and Germany were t r y i n g t o secure a port 
or c o a l i n g s t a t i o n on the Gulf. This of course threatened B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s i n the area, e s p e c i a l l y proposals t o make Kuwait a terminus 
o f the Baghdad Railway. 
Turkey i n t u r n endeavoured t o strengthen her p o s i t i o n by attempting 
t o e x i l e Sheikh Mubarak and by occupying Umm Qasar, Bubiyan and Safwan. 
B r i t a i n denounced t h i s as a disturbance o f the "status quo", and appointed 
a p o l i t i c a l resident t o Kuwait i n 1904. 
I n 1913, a f t e r two years of ne g o t i a t i o n s , B r i t a i n and Turkey 
f i n a l l y reached agreement about Kuwait but the F i r s t World War prevented 
i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n . B r i t a i n thus declared Kuwait an independent p r i n c i p a l i t y 
under B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n . 
Mubarak was succeeded by Sheikh Salim i n 1917, b r i n g i n g a great 
change i n Anglo-Kuwaiti r e l a t i o n s . Salim s e c r e t l y gave active support 
to the Turks i n the War, causing the B r i t i s h d i f f i c u l t i e s i n enforcing the 
blockade they i n s t i t u t e d . Salim also suffered from s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Ibn Sa*ud over t r i b a l matters and boundaries, culminating i n a war 
f o r which Kuwait paid d e a r l y , and i n B r i t i s h a r b i t r a t i o n t o end the c o n f l i c t . 
2. 
Sheikh Saiim's r e i g n l a s t e d from 1917 to 1921 and was a c r i t i c a l 
p e r i o d f o r Kuwait i n her r e l a t i o n s both w i t h B r i t a i n and w i t h Sa»udi 
Arabia. 
Developments i n Kuwait during t h i s period i l l u s t r a t e the 
growing i n t e r e s t and i n f l u e n c e of the European Powers i n the area as 
the Ottoman Bmpire d i s i n t e g r a t e d . 
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P R E F A C E 
European power and trade had come to the I n d i a n Ocean when the 
Portugese rounded the Cape at the end of the 15th Century. Dutch, French 
and B r i t i s h had f o l l o w e d the Portugese, and by the middle o f the 18th 
Century B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e had become predominant i n the Arabian Gulf. I n 
1763 the B r i t i s h Residency was set up i n Bushire under a firman from Karim 
Khan Zand which gave the East I n d i a Company a monopoly o f the import of 
woollens i n t o Persia and exemptions from a l l taxes. The B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n 
was consolidated during the 19th Century by a series o f agreements w i t h 
l o c a l c h i e f s d i r e c t e d against p i r a c y and the slave trade. These agreements 
had the e f f e c t o f p r o t e c t i n g l o c a l c h i e f s against T u r k i s h or Persian 
e f f o r t s t o t u r n t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l suzerainty i n t o d i r e c t r u l e . Thus 
the Treaty w i t h the Sheikh o f Bahrain i n 1861, by which he renounced 
p i r a c y and s l a v i n g , protected h i s independence from the Turks when they 
occupied a l Hasa i n 1871. This occupation was part o f the continuing 
process, begun by Sultan Mahmud I I , intended t o modernise the ramshackle 
T u r k i s h Empire and t o assert d i r e c t c o n t r o l over the provinces which had 
long enjoyed p r a c t i c a l independence. I n p r a c t i c e , i n Arabia and on the 
shores o f the Gulf, Turkish power was weak and had to be exercised mainly 
i n d i r e c t l y by p l a y i n g o f f one l o c a l c h i e f t a i n against another. 
During most of the 19th Century the s t r a t e g i c reason f o r B r i t i s h 
p o l i c y i n the Gulf was f e a r of the expanding power of Russia i n c e n t r a l 
Asia and the t h r e a t i t presented t o the Indian Empire. But by the end 
o f the century a new t h r e a t t o B r i t i s h predominance was developing. This 
was the German d r i v e f o r trade and influence based on the concession, 
obtained i n 1899, f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a r a i l w a y from the Sea o f 
Marmora t o the Gulf. 
Cii) 
I t was against t h i s background t h a t Anglo Kuwaiti r e l a t i o n s 
were developed. Sheikh Mubarak, known t o Kuwaitis as the great Mubarak, 
aimed at r e t a i n i n g the power which he had seized from h i s brothers i n 
1896 and preserving the independence o f Kuwait from outside interference 
from Turk or Arab. To achieve t h i s he had t o defeat the attempts o f 
the sons of h i s b r o t h e r s , whom he had dispossessed and k i l l e d , t o assert 
t h e i r claims t o the sheikhdom. This brought him i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h the 
T u r k i s h governor i n Basra and w i t h Arab chiefs whose help h i s nephews 
t r i e d t o o b t a i n . His determination t o keep Kuwait independent i n p r a c t i c e 
brought him i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h Turkish power at another l e v e l and the 
normal r i v a l r i e s of Arab c h i e f t a i n s gave scope t o h i s t a l e n t f o r diplomacy. 
I n a l l these tasks he was able t o o b t a i n valuable, though sometimes 
h e s i t a n t , help from the B r i t i s h Government i n t h e i r concern t o defend and 
extend t h e i r i nfluence against other European powers and t o o b t a i n a 
measure o f c o n t r o l over the so - c a l l e d Berlin-Baghdad Railway whose l i k e l y 
terminus seemed t o be Kuwait. 
This t h e s i s describes i n some d e t a i l the successes and f a i l u r e s 
of Mubarak*s p o l i c i e s which e v e n t u a l l y r e s u l t e d i n the d e c l a r a t i o n at the 
outbreak of World War I t h a t Kuwait was an independent p r i n c i p a l i t y under 
B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n . The t h e s i s c a r r i e s on the s t o r y through the decline 
o f Kuwait, which set i n a f t e r Mubarak's death i n 1917, and the d e t e r i o r a t i o n 
o f Anglo-Kuwait r e l a t i o n s under h i s successor, Sheikh Salim. 
Chapter One gives the general h i s t o r y of Kuwait from 1890-1899 
and describes the atmosphere and the p o l i t i c a l circumstances at t h a t time 
i n the countries surrounding Kuwait. I t also describes the problems 
which face Sheikh Mubarak during the f i r s t two years of h i s r e i g n from 
h i s nephews and the T u r k i s h a u t h o r i t i e s at Basra. F i n a l l y , i t shows the 
c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Kuwait which obliged Mubarak t o ask f o r B r i t i s h 
p r o t e c t i o n and i n d i c a t e s the p a r t played by the Baghdad Railway p r o j e c t . 
( i i i ) 
Chapter Two deals w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n Kuwait, 
i n c l u d i n g the German and Russian Railway p r o j e c t s and plans to make 
Kuwait a coaling s t a t i o n , the opposition o f the B r i t i s h Government t o 
these proposals and t h e i r attempts t o make Basra the end of the rai l w a y 
instead of Kuwait. 
Chapter Three describes Turkish r e l a t i o n s w i t h Kuwait from 1900-
1906. These r e l a t i o n s depended on the Turkish a u t h o r i t i e s at Basra, 
whose a t t i t u d e towards Kuwait was not stable and va r i e d w i t h changes i n 
the Walis o f Basra. 
F i n a l l y , Chapter Four deals w i t h the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Kuwait from 1904-1921, a f t e r the establishment of a B r i t i s h Agent 
there. 
I t was thought necessary t o throw some l i g h t on Sa*udi-Kuwaiti 
r e l a t i o n s w h i l e discussing t h a t period, owing t o the relevance of t h i s 
t o B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Kuwait. 
C H A P T E R O N E 
GENERAL HISTORY OF KUWAIT FROM 1890-1899 
Kuwait was founded on the Arabian Gulf shore about 250 years 
ago by the ancestor of the present r u l i n g Sheikh Sabah, when a number 
of the f a m i l i e s of famous t r i b e s of 'Anaiza migrated from Central Arabia. 1 
These t r i b e s included such important f a m i l i e s as AL-Sabah who are Sheikhs 
of Kuwait at the present time, AL-Khalaifa the Sheikhs of Bahrain, AL-
Jalahima, the Sheikhs of Qatar, AL-Zayid and AL-Ma'awida. From these 
(2) 
f a m i l i e s the present Kuwaitis are descended. 
The i n h a b i t a n t s l i v e d by t r a d i n g , f i s h i n g , and p e a r l i n g . The 
Kuwaitis were dependent on the sea, and the p r i n c i p a l l o c a l i n d u s t r y was 
f i s h i n g , the most important f i s h being Zibaidy, Naqraur and Subaur. The 
second most important i n d u s t r y was p e a r l f i s h i n g , al-ghaus, and extended 
(3) 
from May 15th to September 15th. I n these months the divers lef t -
Kuwait and headed towards the Arabian Gulf pearl banks. On t h e i r r e t u r n 
they s o l d the pearls t o the t a j i r , (merchant). The p e a r l dealers i n 
t h e i r t u r n exported the pearls to Bombay, where they were c l a s s i f i e d f o r 
despatch to European and other markets. Some of the pearls were sent 
(4) 
t o Baghdad, e s p e c i a l l y the white p e a r l s . There were two types of 
pearl merchants; one of them was the t a j i r , who stayed i n h i s shop or 
hi s house. The d i v e r s came to s e l l the pearls to him. The other 
merchants were tawash ( p e t t y merchants). The tawash always waited f o r 
the d i v e r s when they returned from t h e i r t r i p i n order to buy the pearls. 
Mostly, however, the valuable pearls were taken d i r e c t to the t a j i r . 
There used t o be a number of Indians i n Kuwait who dealt i n pearls, 
but l a t e r the Kuwaiti t a j i r m u l t i p l i e d r a p i d l y , and i t i s estimated 
2. 
t h a t eventually a quarter of the income from the p e a r l trade was i n 
Ku w a i t i hands. 
I n 1904 Kuwait possessed 461 vessels, and the divers numbered 
9,200. The average number of the div e r s per boat was 20 men. The 
p e a r l banks themselves were mostly between Kuwait and Ras-Tanaunora i n 
Sa'udia Arabia and here such as: J i l a i ' a h , Ghamaitha, Duhat-el-Zuffq:, 
Ras-el~Zur, Khairan, Khafj'i, Khalalu, Sufan, Fashaitat, Duhat el-Musawi, 
(5) 
Wajh~el-Jazaina and Ras-el-'Aqraf. 
The main source o f revenue i n Kuwait besides the d i v i n g was the 
carrying t r a d e , as a r e s u l t of which the trade of Kuwait was c h i e f l y 
confined t o the upper and the western part of the Arabian Gulf and Shatt 
al-*Arab. I n autumn the vessels l e f t Kuwait i n the d i r e c t i o n of Basra 
t o buy dates, then turned d i r e c t l y to the T r u c i a l Coast t o s e l l the dates 
i f they found good markets. When they had taken on supplies of water 
and made other preparations, they s a i l e d down the East A f r i c a coast as 
f a r as the R a f j a i r i v e r c a l l i n g at Malibar, Zanzibar, Mumbasa and other 
countries on the coast. There, they sold the dates and bought spices, 
ropes, timber i n c l u d i n g teak, a jack wood and everything they needed, 
e s p e c i a l l y the ma t e r i a l s connected w i t h b o a t b u i l d i n g . I n f a c t Kuwait-
was the centre of the b o a t b u i l d i n g industry. The b u i l d e r s , however, 
were o r i g i n a l l y from MasqaJ. The materials necessary f o r boatb u i l d i n g 
are timber, c o i r rope and f i b r e . Annually the boats returned b r i n g i n g 
these materials from Calcutta. The cargo boats at that time were 
s a i l i n g boats such as Baghlah, Bum, Shyu'ai, Sambuk, B a t i l , Zaruq and 
H u r i . Each year the s a i l i n g boats made two or more t r i p s to I n d i a , 
Zanzibar and the R a f j a i r i v e r . 
Having looked at the l i f e of Kuwait at t h a t time, and the 
sources of income, l e t us now t u r n to the inh a b i t a n t s of Kuwait; the 
o r i g i n a l t r i b e s who migrated from Central Arabia and s e t t l e d down i n 
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Kuwait, and who are the townsmen of today. The great m a j o r i t y o f the 
tribesmen are from the 'Anaiza t r i b e , the greatest and noblest t r i b e 
i n Central Arabia, from whom al-Sabah, a l - K h a l a i f a , al-Zayid and 
- (7) 
Jalahima are descended. There are a number of t r i b e s who s e t t l e d 
i n Kuwait besides the 'Anaiza t r i b e s , f o r instance the 'Ajrnan, Bani 
K h a l i d , Dawasir, 'Awazim, Dhufair and Mutair tribes'. There are also 
wandering bands of non-noble t r i b e s , l i k e the §ulubait who s e t t l e d out-
side Kuwait. They are more a community than a t r i b e , and there are 
also non-noble t r i b e s l i k e the Rashayda who became the supporters of the 
sheikh of Kuwait. The Dhufair and Mutair t r i b e s who are f r i e n d l y t r i b e s 
from Nejd, entered the confines of Kuwait i n c e r t a i n seasons, and 
encamped at Jahra, which l i e s about 15 miles outside Kuwait. They 
supplied the population w i t h ghahi o i l , m i l k and other goods. The 
Sheikh of Kuwait c o l l e c t e d al-zakat money from the t r i b e s , and eventually 
the sheikhs of Kuwait c o l l e c t e d al-zakat from each member of the Bedouin 
who came t o the o u t s k i r t s of the town. 
This i s a summary of the l o c a l background of KuwMt. We have 
seen how the s o c i e t y was d i v i d e d i n t o t r i b e s , and these t r i b e s are 
d i v i d e d i n t o branches; f o r instance i n the 'Anaiza t r i b e the 'Amarat 
are descended from the 'Attaubi t r i b e s , the noble and a r i s t o c r a t i c 
t r i b e s ... and so on. 
When Al-Sabah migrated from Central Arabia and s e t t l e d i n 
Kuwait, the s e t t l e r s of Kuwait decided t h a t Sheikh Sabah should be the 
head, and should administer t h e i r a f f a i r s , hence Sheikh Sabah became the 
Sheikh of Kuwait, and l a i d the foundation of the present p r i n c i p a l i t y i n 
(9) 
1756. The throne of Kuwait has remained i n the Ibn Sabah f a m i l y 
from that time u n t i l the present day. 
The most famous of a l l the sheikhs of Kuwait was Mubarak 
Ibn Sabah, the t h i r d son of the l a t e Sheikh Sabah, who was among 
4. 
the greatest men that Arabia has produced. Mubarak was i n t e l l i g e n t , 
s e n s i t i v e , decisive and t h o u g h t f u l . Fie would l i s t e n a great deal, and 
when the person t a l k i n g t o him had f i n i s h e d h i s conversation, would 
r e t a i n a v i v i d r e c o l l e c t i o n of what had been sa i d . I f he saw a person 
once he would never f o r g e t him f o r the remainder of h i s l i f e . He was 
p a t i e n t , yet ambitious, and whenever he wanted t o do a t h i n g , he would 
do i t when the occasion presented i t s e l f , not looking f o r fame. He was 
fo r b e a r i n g r a t h e r than quick i n temper; he was courageous and b r i l l i a n t 
i n p o l i t i c s , a brave person who needed a strong hand t o conquer h i s 
enemies. I n s h o r t , he was i n t e l l i g e n t , had great wisdom and considerable 
knowledge of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s i n order t o fend o f f the bad and t o 
(11) 
encourage the good things by h i s s k i l l and t a c t f u l n e s s . 
Mumbarak xvas a be l i e v e r i n u n i t i n g the Arabs. He had a d r i v i n g 
ambition t o govern a l l the countries round him, but conditions were always 
against him. Therefore he broke w i t h family t r a d i t i o n i n h i s methods, 
(12) 
by s e i z i n g power f o r h i m s e l f . I n May 1896, Mubarak usurped the 
throne by the assassination of h i s two step-brothers, Muhammad and Jarrah, 
w i t h the help of h i s f o l l o w e r s from the 'Ajman t r i b e . The reason f o r 
the assassination was t h a t Mubarak's brother Muhammad, who succeeded h i s 
brother 'Abdullah i n 1892, was weak, i n e f f i c i e n t and unpopular w i t h the 
people. During h i s tenure of power, he xvas dependent on Yusif el~Ibrahaim, 
who was r e l a t e d to him by marriage and had acted as treasurer t o h i s 
predecessor. Yu s i f el-Ibrahaim came from Durah a short distance south 
of 'Abadan on the r i g h t bank of Shatt-el-'Arab. He was a wealthy man, 
and the same time was pro-Turkish; he always hoped to see the Turks one 
day depose Al~S,abah and place himself and h i s people i n h i s p o s i t i o n . 
(13) 
He hated Mubarak, and urged Muhammad t o seek revenge. 
Muhammad's brother, Jarrah, also hated Mubarak because Mubarak 
was a man of strong, active personality,, Jprrah was very weak, and was 
5. 
dependant on Yusif el-Ibrahaim i n a l l matters. For these reasons 
Mubarak hatched a conspiracy to get r i d of both h i s brothers and Yusif 
el-Ibrahaim. He succeeded i n k i l l i n g h i s br o t h e r s , but un f o r t u n a t e l y 
f o r h i s plans Yusif el-Ibrahaim was not i n Kuwait that n i g h t . I f he 
had been t h e r e , Mubarak would have k i l l e d him; but i t was f a t e that 
helped him t o be away from Kuwait, or perhaps he knew of Mubarak's 
i n t e n t i o n and so f l e d from the danger. 
Yusif el-Ibrahaim's escape and his subsequent r e t u r n i n strength 
t r o u b l e d sheikh Mubarak. The l a t t e r , t h i n k i n g t h a t i t would be best i f 
he t r i e d being good t o Yusi f el-Ibrahaim i n order t o entice him back t o 
Kuwait, sent messengers t o him asking him to r e t u r n i n order t o regain 
h i s p o s i t i o n and property, and sai d t h a t he would be as safe as he had been 
during the. r e i g n of sheikh Muhammad el-§abah, Yusif el-Ibrahaim, however, 
was not deceived by these promises, and knew what sheikh Mubarak was 
hid i n g behind them. He knew very w e l l what would happen i f he ever 
stepped i n t o the country, so he pretended t h a t he accepted the message 
and promised t h a t he would r e t u r n t o Kuwait as soon as possible. He also 
promised t o be very obedient and f a i t h f u l l to Mubarak, as he had been t o 
hi s two brothers, i f he was t r e a t e d w e l l . When the messengers had gone, 
Yusi f el-Ibrahaim, r e a l i s i n g t h a t he was i n great danger, decided t o stay 
at Durah, h i d i n g there and keeping clear of the hands of his enemy. 
On the morning f o l l o w i n g the assassination of sheikh Muhammad 
and h i s br o t h e r , Mubarak addressed a meeting of the heads of the prominent-
K u w a i t i f a m i l i e s t o announce h i s succession t o the throne. The announce-
ment was accepted unanimously. Their acceptance of him as t h e i r sheikh 
d i d not prove t h a t the Kuwaitis accepted his unnatural act of murder, 
(14) 
but was granted under t h r e a t of the sword. The people knew that 
Mubarak, being a r u t h l e s s and ambitious man, would k i l l anyone who 
opposed h i s succession t o the throne. Therefore sheikh Mubarak's 
nephews, the sons of Muhammad and Jarrah, could not reclaim t h e i r r i g h t s . 
Sheikh Mubarak at the beginning of h i s r e i g n t r i e d t o do h i s 
best t o take care of h i s two broth e r s ' sons and to lessen t h e i r g r i e f . 
He showed them love, tenderness and generosity, but i n vain. They 
decided not t o stay i n Kuwait, e s p e c i a l l y i n view of Yusif el-Ibrahaim's 
(35) 
departure. ' B e l i e v i n g t h a t Yusif el-Ibrahaim would do h i s best to 
conquer t h e i r uncle Mubarak, they s e c r e t l y l e f t Kuwait f o r Basra, 
accompanied by 'Abdullah e l - T u b t i b a i , and sheikh Muhammad Ben Ruwayilj. 
I n Basra they met Yu s i f , and l e f t w i t h him fo r Durah where they would be 
w e l l out of Mubarak's reach. 
Before attempting t o describe the r e a c t i o n of Mubarak's 
nephews and Yusif el-Ibrahaim to the assassination, we s h a l l give a 
general idea of the atmosphere and the p o l i t i c a l circumstances at that 
time i n the countries surrounding Kuwait. 
Both the s t r i v i n g s of the new nationalism i n I r a q and the 
r i v a l r y between I b n Rashaid and Ibn Sa'ud i n c e n t r a l Arabia played a 
part i n shaping the course of events during the nine or ten years 
immediately preceeding the f i r s t World War, as d i d the B r i t i s h influence 
and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the T r u c i a l Coast. As a r e s u l t o f 
these f a c t o r s Kuwait's r e l a t i o n s w i t h her neighbours were sometimes good 
and sometimes bad, depending on the p o l i t i c a l circumstances of each 
country at a given moment. We s h a l l now proceed w i t h a summary of 
events i n each country i n the area of the period 1890-1899. 
Under the new Turkish Reforms " (el-Tanzimat), I r a q was 
div i d e d i n t o three provinces, the w i l a y a t of Baghdad, "the old one", 
w i l a y a t of Basra, founded i n 1884, and w i l a y a t of Mu s i l , founded i n 1897. 
The w i l a y a t of Musil comprised sanjaq e l rukn on which Karkuk and the 
Sulaimaniyah were dependent. The w i l a y a t of Baghdad consisted of 
El-Diwaniah and Kerbalah, w h i l s t the w i l a y a t of Basra comprised El-'Emara, 
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Basra i t s e l f , and al-Muntafiq. Each w i l a y a t was d i v i d e d i n t o governorates, 
sinjaqaya or mutasarifya. Each singaqaya was d i v i d e d i n t o qaza or 
suburbs and the qaza: i n t o aahia or d i v i s i o n s . Each w i l a y a t was r u l e d 
by a w a l i and each §ingaqaya by a mutasarif. A l l of these o f f i c i a l s were 
appointed by the Sultan. W h i l s t the i n f e r i o r ranks were appointed by the 
w a l i h i m s e l f . The w a l i was the representative of the Sultan and had 
dealings on h i s behalf w i t h f o r e i g n consuls and the Sheikhs of t r i b e s , 
i n a d d i t i o n to supervising the w i l a y a t Revenue, w i t h the help of the 
daftardar "House of Registry". 
Every w i l a y a t had an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e Council composed mainly of 
the employers and e l e c t e d members representing the Christians and the 
Jews. S e c u r i t y was entrusted t o a small m i l i t a r y force c a l l e d the 
dabtiya policemen which was under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the Turkish 
M i n i s t r y of Defence. The I s l a m i c l e g a l system was replaced by a number 
of c i v i l codes and by French commercial law. 
The p o l i c y of reform was extended also to the sphere of every-
day l i f e , e s p e c i a l l y when Medhat Pasha became Governor of Baghdad. Areas 
a f f e c t e d by i t included education, the quarantine system and h o s p i t a l s . 
However, perhaps one of the greatest achievements of Medhat Pasha was the 
tabu system, or r e g i s t r y of land management, which was aimed at s e t t l i n g 
(17) 
the t r i b e s on a g r i c u l t u r a l lands. At t h a t time the t r i b e s played 
an important r o l e i n the economic and s o c i a l l i f e of I r a q s e t t l i n g 
separately i n small groups among the I r a q i population., They surrounded 
both the b i g c i t i e s and the v i l l a g e s , and had c o n t r o l of the roads i n 
and out of I r a q . Although s i m i l a r t o each other i n t h e i r mode of l i f e , 
these groups d i f f e r e d i n t h e i r b e l i e f s , since the Arabs are di v i d e d i n t o 
two d i s t i n c t sects, the Sunna and the Shai'a. Despite t h e i r r e l i g i o u s 
d i f f e r e n c e s , however, these t r i b e s d i d not o f t e n come i n t o armed c o n f l i c t . 
A good example of the modus v i v e n d i achieved by them i s provided by the 
Muntafiq t r i b e s , who, though themselves Shai'a, were r u l e d by Sunna 
dynasty, w h i l s t i n Kurdistan, though the Shai'as were r a r e , the Sunna 
were s t i l l l o y a l to the Ottoman Sultan. The habits of the t r i b e s 
d i f f e r e d i n t h a t the Kurds customarily moved from place to place i n 
search of good grazing f o r t h e i r c a t t l e , w h i l s t the Arab t r i b e s l i v e d 
f o r the most part on the desert borders of I r a q i n areas such as Dhufair 
on the south west f r o n t i e r of I r a q , Anaiza on the grazing area along the 
Syrian border, and Shammar at the n o r t h of West I r a q . 
I t was not easy to apply the new Ottoman a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
procedures among these t r i b e s i n s i d e I r a q , nor d i d the t r i b e s themselves 
f i n d i t easy to obey the new l e g i s l a t i o n , i n v o l v i n g , as i t d i d , the 
abandonment of the t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l way of l i f e and the adoption of 
a new c i v i l code. For t h i s reason, Medhat Pasha introduced the tabu 
system, which e n t i t l e d the Registry Management to s e l l Government lands 
f o r sums repayable by small instalments, on condition t h a t the owners 
remained f r e e to dispose of i t . This r i g h t was granted p a r t i c u l a r l y 
to the sheikhs of t r i b e s , on c o n d i t i o n t h a t the t r i b e of each p a r t i c u l a r 
sheikh was under h i s c o n t r o l . As a r e s u l t of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h i s 
system many sheikhs became great feudal landowners, a phenomenon which 
had already appeared among the Muntafiq t r i b e s . 
Despite the reforms o f Medhat Pasha, and the plans f o r c e n t r a l -
i z a t i o n i n I r a q , the scheme f o r c e n t r a l i z a t i o n was not as successful i n 
I r a q as had been hoped. There were a number of reasons f o r t h i s f a i l u r e : 
F i r s t l y : The d i f f i c u l t y of developing s a t i s f a c t o r y means of transport 
i n I r a q , combined w i t h the mountainous nature of much of the 
t e r r a i n meant t h a t the country had r e a l communications problems. 
I n a d d i t i o n the widespread dispersion of the t r i b e s made 
d i f f i c u l t the establishment of a c e n t r a l government. There 
was always f i e r c e r i v a l r y between c i t y and t r i b e , between the 
Sunna and the Shai'a, and the Arabs and the Kurds. 
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Secondly: The general circumstances and atmosphere of I r a q discouraged 
'the Turks from service i n the country„ 
T h i r d l y : To strengthen h i s own i n f l u e n c e i n I r a q the Sultan, used t o s t i r 
up the Sunna and the Shai'a sects against each other, although 
he p r e f e r r e d the Sunna because of t h e i r l o y a l t y to the Calaiphate. 
The foregoing i s a summary of the Turkish p o s i t i o n i n I r a q , and of Turkish 
p o l i c i e s and methods. 
We s h a l l now t u r n out a t t e n t i o n to the i n t e r e s t s of the f o r e i g n 
powers. O r i g i n a l l y these i n t e r e s t s were r e l i g i o u s , but they l a t e r became 
p o l i t i c a l - For example, B r i t i s h i n terferance began w i t h a mission 
es t a b l i s h e d by the Church Missionary Society i n Baghdad where a church 
and h o s p i t a l were opened i n 1899 and l a t e r the work of the society was 
extended t o M u s i l , but by the time the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between B r i t a i n and 
I r a q had been es t a b l i s h e d i t was obvious that B r i t i s h r e l i g i o u s i n t e r e s t s 
had become p o l i t i c a l , , 
Although commercial considerations had o r i g i n a l l y a t t r a c t e d 
the B r i t i s h power i n t o the Arabian Gulf by the 19th Century, the routes 
around A f r i c a f o r commercial exchange between South East Asia and Europe 
s t i l l formed the backbone t o the a c t i v i t i e s of the B r i t i s h East I n d i a 
Company. Rather, B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n the Gulf was prompted by a desire 
t o secure a c o r r i d o r f o r speedy communication between London and the 
B r i t i s h Government' i n I n d i a . Besides t h i s consideration, there was of 
course the m i l i t a r y importance of the Arabian Gulf f o r I n d i a - although 
t h i s m i l i t a r y importance d i d not a c t u a l l y become apparent u n t i l a f t e r the 
French expedition t o Egypt i n 1797. Because of these f a c t o r s , B r i t a i n 
e s t a b l i s h e d a consulate i n Basra where a s t a t i o n was t o be established 
f o r the t r a n s f e r of m a i l and messages from the Gulf v i a Basra and the 
Euphrates to Syria and as f a r as Aleppo* Hence the B r i t i s h established 
the consulate w i t h a consul responsible to the B r i t i s h Government i n 
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I n d i a . This s i t u a t i o n occasioned an approach between the Wilayat of 
Baghdad and the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s i n Bombay, as a r e s u l t of which 
the Walis agreed t o apply the p r i n c i p l e of p r i v i l e g e s granted by the 
Ottoman Government t o the Europeans, which was 3%. This r e s u l t e d i n 
increased B r i t i s h commercial a c t i v i t y i n the Gulf. 
Russia was also i n t e r e s t e d i n I r a q . I n 1889 the Russian 
Consulate was refounded at Baghdad, both t o p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n 
I r a q , and at the same time t o prot e c t the Orthodox community there. 
Besides the B r i t i s h and the Russians there were the French, who claimed-
(19) 
to be the prot e c t o r s of the Catholics. At the same time they were 
conducting archaeological excavations i n the country. This was the 
s i t u a t i o n of Tur k i s h I r a q at t h a t time v i s - a - v i s the f o r e i g n r i v a l s . 
Meanwhile the r e l a t i o n s h i p betiveen I r a q and Kuwait depended on 
the Walis, e s p e c i a l l y during the period between 1899 and 1902. The 
Turk i s h a u t h o r i t i e s i n I r a q were p e r s i s t e n t i n t h e i r e f f o r t s t o incorporate 
Kuwait i n t o the Ba§ra Wi l a y a t . We s h a l l , however, reserve discussion of 
these events u n t i l l a t e r , when B r i t i s h a c t i v i t y tvas d i r e c t e d towards.Iraq 
and B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s were concentrated on the Oman Sultanate and the 
T r u c i a l Coast. This Sultanate had been f l o u r i s h i n g under the Bau-S'aid 
Dynasty since 1762. Oman was i n f a c t able to exert influence on the 
south east of Central Arabia as w e l l as on the Indian Ocean coast. She 
could occupy Hermez region on the East A f r i c a coast, and the Arabian 
c o a s t l i n e and became, i n f a c t , a maritime power of some standing i n the 
re g i o n , e s p e c i a l l y where pi r a c y was concerned. 
The region prone t o piracy was centred on what i s c a l l e d the 
Piracy Coast, which was the inner shore of the Gulf of Oman. This was 
l a t e r c a l l e d the T r u c i a l Coast. I t was inhabited by many t r i b e s under 
the leadership of El~Qwasim, and i t s chief headquarters were i n El-Sharqa 
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and Ras-El-Khaimah. 
The Qwasim, a powerful tri.be occupying Ras El-Khaimah and Khur-
Faqan on Cape Mussendom, were engaged p r i n c i p a l l y i n f i s h i n g . They were 
a branch of the great Ma»awal t r i b e who occupied the Arabian Gulf coast 
from Z u r d i s t a n t o Bander Abbas, on the G u l f . ^ ^ ^ 
The in f l u e n c e of the Qwasim has spread over the whole area 
known as the " P i r a t e Coast". Their armed dtays scored the Gulf and i t s 
approaches. They had become formidable opponents to peaceful s a i l o r s . 
As the p i r a t e r a i d s i n the region increased against both l o c a l and B r i t i s h 
s h i ps, the B r i t i s h a l l i e d themselves w i t h the Sultans of Oman i n an endeavour 
t o destroy the centres of p i r a c y . The p i r a t e f l e e t was large. I t 
consisted of some hundreds of armed boats, estimated at one time t o be 
s i x t y - t h r e e b i g ships and eight hundred small vessels eraploying nineteen 
(21) 
thousand men w i t h long s a i l i n g experience i n the Arabian Gulf. The 
B r i t i s h Government now took upon i t s e l f the task of suppressing piracy i n 
the Gulf because i t was a danger t o B r i t i s h trade w i t h I n d i a . 
Many clashes had already occurred between the B r i t i s h and the 
p i r a t e f l e e t s , so the B r i t i s h Government mounted three expeditions against 
the p i r a t e coast. The most important expeditions were those of 1809 and 
1819. The expedition of 1819 was under the c o n t r o l of Major S i r Grant 
K e i r , who s t r u c k a deadly blow against El-Qwasim and destroyed t h e i r 
town of Ras-El-Khaima. Despite t h i s , however, the Qwasim continued 
to plunder i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y the merchant vessels of a l l n a t i o n s . A f t e r -
wards n e g o t i a t i o n s were commenced w i t h the aim of securing peace. As a 
r e s u l t , every sheikh on the p i r a t e coast was required to sign a general 
peace t r e a t y , which was concluded on the 8th January, 1820. I t s t i p u l a t e d 
(22) 
t h a t p i r a c y i n the Gulf should cease. 
However, i t soon became apparent that the general peace t r e a t y 
of 1820 would not b r i n g permanent peace i n the area because the agreement 
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d i d not s t i p u l a t e t h a t the sheikhs should avoid l o c a l wars among them-
selves. Hence, i n 1835 the sheikhs signed a maritime a r m i s t i c e , the 
conditions of which s t i p u l a t e d t h a t under no circumstances would the 
sheikhs engage i n maritime wars among themselves f o r a pe r i o d of s i x 
months. Meanwhile, the B r i t i s h Government undertook not t o i n t e r f e r e 
i n the sheikhs' land wars. This agreement was renewed annually u n t i l 
1843, when the sheikhs agreed to a ten years e x t e n t i o n , at the e x p i r a t i o n 
(23) 
of which i t was decided t o prolong the agreement i n p e r p e t u i t y . The 
reason f o r t h i s decision was tha t the various sheikhs (the sheikh of Ras-
el-Khaima, Sultan Ben Saqar, the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh S*aid Ben 
Tahnaxtn, the sheikh of Dhabi S'aid Ben Butye, the sheikh of 'Ajman 
Hamid Ben Rashaid, the sheikh of Umm-el-Quwain Abdullah Ben Rashid) 
having t a s t e d the b e n e f i t s r e s u l t i n g from a maritime truce w i t h the 
B r i t i s h under the mediation of a resident i n the Gulf, r e a l i s e d at l a s t 
t h a t nothing was to be gained by prosecuting a maritime feud against the 
B r i t i s h . Another agreement intended t o stand i n p e r p e t u i t y was signed 
i n May, 1853. The terms of t h i s l a t t e r agreement were not d i f f e r e n t 
from those of the previous one, but an important item was added to i t 
confirming t h a t the Oman coast was a B r i t i s h sphere of influ e n c e . The 
chi e f s t i p u l a t i o n was tha t any maritime attack from one of the t r i b e s on 
another should not be re c i p r o c a t e d , but reported to the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s 
i n the Arabian Gulf. 
These agreements dealt generally w i t h measures concerning the 
r e s t o r a t i o n of peace i n the waters of the Gulf and the p r o t e c t i o n of 
B r i t i s h vessels and property i n the ports of the Oman coast, and at the 
same time r e s t r i c t e d the a u t h o r i t y of the sheikhs of the T r u c i a l coast 
w i t h i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s when dealing d i r e c t l y w i t h matters which might 
expose them to the influence of f o r e i g n powers. I n 1892 the B r i t i s h 
Government signed another agreement w i t h the Sheikhdoms. This agreement 
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f o r the f i r s t time conferred on the B r i t i s h Government a u t h o r i t y over 
the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the T r u c i a l Sheikhdoms. The l a t t e r were not to 
enter i n t o any agreement or correspondence, save through the B r i t i s h 
Government, and not to allow the residence w i t h i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s of 
(24) 
any f o r e i g n agent without the consent of the B r i t i s h Government. 
The B r i t i s h increased t h e i r influence i n the Gulf during the 
l a s t part of the 19th Century by de c l a r i n g protectorates over the 
p r i n c i p a l i t i e s and over the lands of the more important sheikhs. I n t o 
the l a t t e r category f e l l Masqat, Bahrain Qatar and Kuwait. I n 1854 
B r i t a i n took over from S'aid Ben Sultan, Emir of Masqat, the.-Is land of 
Kuria Muria, which became dependent on the B r i t i s h Crown. In 1856 
S'aid Ben Sultan died and was succeeded by h i s sons Saueni and Majed. 
I n 1861 they agreed, a f t e r B r i t i s h a r b i t r a t i o n , t o di v i d e the Sultanate 
of Masqatand Zanzibar between them, Saueni t a k i n g Masqat and Majed the 
Sultanate of Zanzibar. 
By t h i s time France had restored her influence i n the Gulf, and 
e s p e c i a l l y i n Masqat, where French a c t i v i t y had ceased since 1811. During 
the r e i g n of Sultan Saueni, France and B r i t a i n signed a dec l a r a t i o n i n 
support of the independence of both the Masqat and the Zanzibar Sultanates. 
Doubtless the i n t e n t of t h a t agreement was t o prevent B r i t a i n from 
completely dominating Masqat, yet despite t h i s , B r i t i s h influence i n t h a t 
(25) 
Sultanate increased s t e a d i l y . I n 1864 B r i t a i n l e n t assistance t o 
the Sultan of Masqat when h i s p r i n c i p a l i t y was under pressure from the 
Second Wahabis i n Central Arabia. The Wahabis renewed t h e i r attack on 
Oman i n t h a t year, and the B r i t i s h forces now intervened h u r r i e d l y under 
the command of Colonel Lewis P e l l y , the B r i t i s h Resident i n the Gulf. 
The B r i t i s h a c t i o n was d i r e c t e d against Q a t i f and Buraumi, which were the 
Wahabi centres i n the region of Oman. As a r e s u l t of the B r i t i s h 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , the Wahabis r e t r e a t e d . I n 1866 they promised not to repeat 
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t h i s a ttack on the Arab Sheikhs a l l i e d w i t h B r i t a i n and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the Emirs of Oman. From t h a t time on Wahabi pressure on the Arab 
p r i n c i p a l i t i e s of the Gulf dwindled. 
One of the signs of the increase of B r i t i s h influence was the 
s i g n i n g of an agreement w i t h the Emir of Masqat by which he granted the 
B r i t i s h a concession f o r e r e c t i n g telegraph l i n e s on h i s lands. I n 1873 
Turky, the Governor of Masqat, signed an agreement f o r b i d d i n g the slave 
t r a d e . I n the same year, B r i t i s h subjects were granted a p r i v i l e g e d 
status by being placed under B r i t i s h consular l e g i s l a t i o n . 
I n 1880, the B r i t i s h Agency i n Masqat was granted the r i g h t to 
have a B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y guard, and at the same time the B r i t i s h agent 
was granted complete freedom o f movement i n the Sultanate. 
On the 10th March, 1891 during the governorate of F a i s a l ben 
Turky, the famous t r e a t y , which e x p l i c i t l y declared a B r i t i s h p r otectorate 
over Masqat, was signed. This was known as the "Friendship, Trade and 
Navigation Treaty". I n t h i s agreement the Sultan Faisal ben Turky 
promised and bound himself, h i s h e i r s and successors never to cede, s e l l 
or mortgage h i s t e r r i t o r y t o any f o r e i g n powers. The agreement provided 
f o r f u l l co-operation between B r i t a i n and Masqat i n the p o l i t i c a l , 
m i l i t a r y and economic f i e l d s . ^ 2 6 ^ I n 1895-97 loans were granted t o the 
Sultan by the Government o f I n d i a on the s e c u r i t y of the Zanzibar 
subsidy, f o r i t was held t h a t t o require him to place h i s customs 
department under B r i t i s h Management would be a v i o l a t i o n of the declaration 
of 1 8 6 2 . ( 2 7 ) 
I n 1898 v i s i t s were paid t o Masqat by French gunboats, and i n 
the course of the year, disregarding h i s agreement of 1891 w i t h the 
B r i t i s h Government, the Sultan made a grant of a coaling s t a t i o n to 
France, although he d i d not assign a p a r t i c u l a r place. The place most 
l i k e l y t o be u t i l i s e d was Bander Hissah, a harbour not f a r from Masqat. 
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Accordingly, naval d i s p o s i t i o n s were made there by the B r i t i s h Govern-
ment t o a n t i c i p a t e , i f necessary, a French attempt at occupation. 
The second p r i n c i p a l i t y which was taken as a B r i t i s h zone of 
inf l u e n c e was Qatar. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n and Qatar began 
when Sheikh Muhammed ben Thany signed a peace t r e a t y w i t h Colonel Lewis 
P e l l y , the B r i t i s h Resident i n the Gulf, on 12th September 1868. By 
the terms of t h i s agreement, the sheikh promised not t o commit any breach 
of maritime peace. He also acknowledged the a u t h o r i t y of the B r i t i s h 
Resident i n s o l v i n g any misunderstanding r e l a t i n g from the enforcement 
of the Maritime T r u c e . T h e agreement stated, i n connection w i t h 
Qatar's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Bahrain t h a t the Sheikh of Qatar would maintain 
f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Sheikh of Bahrain. 
This agreement of 1868 marked a change i n B r i t a i n ' s a t t i t u d e 
to Qatar, f o r formerly the l a t t e r had been regarded as a dependency of 
Bahrain. I t acknowledged, although i n d i r e c t l y , the t i t l e of Sheikh 
Muhammed ben Thany as Sheikh of Qatar, and established a basis f o r the 
(31) 
emergence of a dependent town, owing no allegiance t o Bahrain. 
Meanwhile the Turkish Government warned B r i t a i n not to i n t e r f e r e 
i n Qatar a f f a i r s . I n f a c t , Turkey made several attempts t o occupy Qatar 
(32) 
i n 1872. These warnings were u s u a l l y ignored by the B r i t i s h 
Government. Respect f o r the a u t h o r i t y i r r e g u l a r l y exercised by the 
Turks i n Qatar came to an end among the inhabitants of the peninsula as a 
(33) 
consequence of the successful r e b e l l i o n of 1893. I n 1894 a Turkish 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e at Duha was murdered, and i n 1898 there was a r i s i n g there, 
i n which several Turks were k i l l e d . 
I n 1898 the Sheikhs of Qatar sought B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n s i m i l a r 
to that enjoyed by the T r u c i a l coast, which had previously entered i n t o 
an agreement w i t h the B r i t i s h Government. However, no response was 
forthcoming from the B r i t i s h , 
16. 
Bahrain was the t h i r d p r i n c i p a l i t y included i n the B r i t i s h 
zone of i n f l u e n c e . The Bahrain Islands i n t h i s period were valuable 
c h i e f l y f o r t h e i r p e a r l f i s h e r i e s . B r i t i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h Bahrain 
began when Bahrain was a partner i n the general t r e a t y of 1820, f o r 
the suppression o f p i r a c y and the slave trade. Subsequent compacts 
i n 1856 and 1868 progressively increased B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e . 
By-the f o l l o w i n g instrument the Sheikh *Lsa ben •Ali-al-Kha.laifa 
surrendered h i s e x t e r n a l sovereignty, thus v i r t u a l l y p lacing the Islands 
under the B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n . 
On the 22nd December, 1880, Sheikh 'Isa signed an agreement 
w i t h the B r i t i s h Government by which he bound himself and h i s successors 
i n the Government of Bahrain t o abstain from entering i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n 
or making t r e a t i e s of any s o r t w i t h f o r e i g n powers without the consent 
of the said B r i t i s h Government, and to refuse permission t o any other 
Government than the B r i t i s h t o e s t a b l i s h diplomatic or consular or depots 
(35) 
i n the Bahrain t e r r i t o r y , unless w i t h the p r i o r consent of B r i t a i n . 
I n 1892, the Sheikh of Bahrain signed another agreement w i t h the B r i t i s h 
Government. This was the exclusive agreement of 13th March, 1892, by 
which the Sheikh r e a f f i r m e d i n more e x p l i c i t terms h i s o r i g i n a l surrender 
of e x t e r n a l sovereignty i n 1880, and added a general non-alienation 
clause. This clause stated t h a t the Sheikh bound himself and h i s h e i r s 
and successors to the f o l l o w i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s : 
1„ He would not be allowed to enter i n t o any agreement or 
correspondence w i t h any power other than the B r i t i s h 
Government. 
2. He could not, w i t h o u t B r i t i s h approval, permit the agent of 
any other Government t o reside w i t h i n h i s t e r r i t o r y . 
3. That he could not cede, s e l l , mortgage or otherwise give f o r 
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occupation any p a r t of h i s t e r r i t o r y , save to the B r i t i s h . 
17. 
We must now t u r n our a t t e n t i o n t o Kuwait, whose geographical 
p o s i t i o n and f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s were already being discussed by the B r i t i s h 
w h i l s t Sheikh Mubarak-el-§abah was strengthening h i s own p o s i t i o n i n 
1396-97. At t h a t time B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s were expressing various views 
(37) 
as to the a c t u a l status of Kuwait. Mr. Stavrides ( l e g a l adviser 
to the B r i t i s h Embassy at Constantinople) expressed the f o l l o w i n g view 
i n a memorandum of 30th June, 1896: "The country of Kuwait, i n s p i t e of 
her f u l l independence, appears on the map as i f i t were part of the 
Ottoman Empire. The r u l i n g f a m i l y i n i t , own vast lands i n Basra, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the province of Fao„ This l a t t e r f a c t o r made the sheikh 
accept the t i t l e of qaimaqam, granted by the Sultan, together w i t h the 
(37) 
t i t l e of Pasha, of which the Sheikh i s proud". A copy of t h i s 
memorandum was forwarded t o the Government of I n d i a and sent by them to 
Colonel Wilson, P o l i t i c a l Resident at Bushire. 
I n J u l y the B r i t i s h warship "Sphinx", w i t h Commander Baker on 
board, v i s i t e d Kuwait. His report confirms the usurpation of Mubarak, 
but he thought i t had been done w i t h the concurrence of the people. He 
added t h a t "the presence of an English man-of-xvar f r i g h t e n e d Sheikh 
Mubarak considerably. Kuwait i s nominally an independent Arab t e r r i t o r y , 
but i n r e a l i t y the Turks exercise great influence over i t , more e s p e c i a l l y 
since the new c h i e f acceded to power, he f i n d s i t necessary t o play i n t o 
( 38 ) — t h e i r hands". . Sheikh Mubarak would not come out to the ship and 
Commander Baker n o t i c e d t h a t the Sheikh flew the Turkish f l a g and taxed 
him w i t h i t . 
W h ilst the B r i t i s h man-of-war was v i s i t i n g Kuwait, Mubarak's 
nephews appealed to Hamdi Pasha, the Wali of Basra, f o r redress, and f o r 
the r e s t i t u t i o n of the landed property which should have come to them, but 
which had been appropriated by Mubarak. At f i r s t i t appeared l i k e l y 
t h a t t h e i r p e t i t i o n might be taken i n t o consideration, as i t was st r o n g l y 
18. 
supported by the Wali Hamdi Pasha, who urged on the Porte the convenience 
of the occasion f o r the e f f e c t i v e occupation of Kuwait by Turkish troops. 
Mubarak, however, spent money l a v i s h l y i n e n l i s t i n g on h i s side the 
mushair of Baghdad, Rajab Pasha, and other high o f f i c i a l s , whose influence 
at Constantinople f i n a l l y p r e v a i l e d . H e n c e , at the end of 1897, 
Mubarak xvas, at l a s t , o f f i c i a l l y recognized. I n f a c t , the incident 
which had occurred between Sheikh Mubarak and h i s brothers was very 
common and happened f r e q u e n t l y among the Arab t r i b e s . 
Mubarak r e a l i z e d t h a t the reappointment of Hamdi Pasha as Wali 
of Basra might have some e f f e c t on h i s p o s i t i o n , even though the Porte 
had f o r g o t t e n the i n c i d e n t . Besides Hamdi Pasha, the chie f supporter of 
Mubarak fs nephews was Yusif el-Ibrahaim of Durah, t h e i r maternal uncle. 
At the same time, Sheikh Mubarak also feared l e s t the Ottoman government 
should be roused by the incitements of Yusif el-Ibrahaim. He t r i e d , 
t h e r e f o r e , t o win over the Constantinople a u t h o r i t i e s . A statement, to 
which wtas attached a complaint, was submitted t o the Ottoman a u t h o r i t i e s 
at Basra, s t a t i n g t h a t Yusif el-Ibrahaim had k i l l e d h i s two brothers 
Sheikh Muhammad and Sheikh Jarrah. That statement contained the testimony 
of a l l the people of Kuwait, w i t h a few notable exceptions, such as Sheikh 
Muhammad e l - F a r i s , Sayid Sulyman-el-Sayid, Abdulla-el-Rashid and Jab i r 
el-Ghanim. Sheikh Mubarak assumed that the statement would under-
mine the p o s i t i o n of Yusi f el-Ibrahaim, would stop h i s aggressive 
a t t i t u d e and p l o t s , and t h a t he would ask t o be allowed to r e t u r n t o 
Kuwait. When some of the n o b i l i t y of Kuwait, at Mubarak's i n s t i g a t i o n , 
asked Yu s i f t o stop h i s p l o t t i n g , he:.;answered that he was not p l o t t i n g 
(4 
against Kuwait, and tha t he had never wished t o do any harm to i t s people. 
Reassured by t h i s statement he sent delegates, headed by h i s 
b r o t h e r , Sheikh Humaud-el-Sabah, to Durah, where Yusif was r e s i d i n g , t o 
ask t o make peace and to t r y t o persuade him to r e t u r n t o Kuwait. The 
19. 
delegates went and met Yusif-el-Ibrahaim and, during discussions w i t h 
him, pressed him to r e t u r n . At f i r s t he l i s t e n e d to t h e i r arguments 
i n s i l e n c e , but when they continued t o press him, he brought to them 
a copy of the statement i n which Sheikh Mubarak had accused him of the 
murder of Sheikhs Muhammad and Jarrah. Then he began to reproach them 
saying, " a f t e r you have seen t h i s , do you want me to believe what Sheikh. 
Mubarak says, and do you want me to r e t u r n t o Kuwait w i t h you, when you 
have f a l s l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t I had k i l l e d Sheikhs Muhammad .and Jarrah. 
Do you expect me t o t r u s t your f r i e n d who accused me of that b r u t a l 
(42) 
deed, whereas you are a l l q u i t e sure I am innocent". 
The delegates were unable to argue w i t h t h i s statement, so 
they returned t o Kuwait and t o l d Sheikh Mubarak. 
Now tha t there appeared t o be no hope of h i s persuading Yusif 
el-Ibrahaim to r e t u r n , Sheikh Mubarak sent a message to Abd-al-Azaiz-el~ 
Ibrahaim, who was i n Bombay w i t h Abd-al-Azaiz-el-Sumait, begging him t o 
contact Y u s i f el-Ibrahaim and to ask him to give up h i s aggressive a t t i t u d e , 
since he d i d not hate him. Abd-al-Azaiz-el-Ibrahaim answered that he was 
extremely s o r r y , but that he was unable to i n t e r f e r e i n the p r i v a t e 
(43) 
a f f a i r s o f Yusif el-Ibrahaim. 
Mubarak's nephews now sought B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n from Captain 
Whyte, who was B r i t i s h Consul at Basra at that time. I n r e t u r n they 
promised him tha t they would be w i l l i n g t o carry out B r i t i s h orders when 
t h e i r p r i n c i p a l i t y was restored and t h e i r uncle e x i l e d . A f t e r promising 
to help them, Captain Whyte l e f t Basra f o r England. On h i s a r r i v a l at 
Constantinople he placed before S i r P h i l i p Currie, the B r i t i s h Ambassador 
to Turkey, a memorandum which he had drawn up on the 22nd March, 1897, 
and which throws much l i g h t on the p o l i t i c s of Kuwait at t h a t time. I n 
the memorandum he said, "Mr. Stavrides describes Kuwait as being e n t i r e l y 
independent, but i t seems t o me t h a t the acceptance by the Sheikh of an 
20. 
appointment from the Sultan as qaimaqam precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of any f o r e i g n power recognizing under present conditions h i s independence. 
I was assured at Basra th a t Sheikh Mubarak's sole object i n k i l l i n g h i s 
two b r o t h e r s , was to usurp the sheikhdoms, and to possess himself of 
t h e i r wealth. ' I n assessing t h i s point of view, Currie requested 
the opinion of the B r i t i s h M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , who r e p l i e d 
f r a n k l y t h a t "Kuwait i s now under the Ottoman sovereignty that i s a 
( 4 s ) 
f a c t which cannot be denied". 
The r e s u l t of these d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion as to the status 
of Kuwait was t h a t the request of Mubarak's nephews f o r B r i t i s h support 
was r e j e c t e d . 
I n September, 1897, Sheikh Mubarak's p o s i t i o n was i n danger 
because Sheikh Jasim ben Thany was r e c r u i t i n g the Bedouin t r i b e s and 
making other preparations t o go to the assistance of Yusif el-Ibrahaim 
and Mubarak's nephews, His i n t e n t i o n was, i n f a c t , t o make a combined 
a t t a c k on Kuwait by land and by sea. Realizing the danger t o h i s 
p o s i t i o n , Sheikh Mubarak now sought r e c o g n i t i o n by the Turkish a u t h o r i t i e s , 
spending considerable sums i n h i s endeavour t o secure h i s a i m . ^ H e 
wrote t o h i s f r i e n d S r a i d Pasha, the w a l i of El-Hasa, and sent him g i f t s 
i n order t o strengthen the f r i e n d s h i p between them. I n h i s l e t t e r he 
explained t o him t h a t Sheikh Jasim intended t o attack Kuwait. S'aid 
Pasha now looked i n t o the matter and learned about the proposed 
expedition from one of h i s men. He immediately sent a formal l e t t e r t o 
the w a l i of Basra informing him that Sheikh Jasim ben Thany was a danger 
(4?) 
to the s e c u r i t y of the people and t h a t he intended to attack Kuwait. 
The response came i n November, 1897, when the w a l i of Basra despatched 
Sayid Rajab and a number of high ranking o f f i c i a l s , together w i t h a 
m i l i t a r y detachment, to Qater t o negotiate w i t h Sheikh Jasim and t o 
arrange a settlement between the two Sheikhs. They succeeded i n av e r t i n g 
21. 
trouble and r e t u r n i n g t o Basra i n safety. 
A f t e r t h i s i n c i d e n t Yusif el-Ibrahaim remained i n Qatar f o r 
some time. Later he l e f t f o r H a i l , r e a l i z i n g that Muhammed Ibn Rashaid, 
the Emir of H a i l and Jabal Shammar, feared that Sheikh Mubarak intended 
to extend h i s power over Central Arabia. The chief reason f o r Ibn 
Rashaid*s f e a r s was th a t Sheikh Mubarak had given refuge t o h i s r i v a l , 
Ibn Sa'ud, and there was a danger t h a t the l a t t e r might at some time 
r e t u r n t o h i s country w i t h h i s supporters and reclaim the r i g h t s which 
Ibn Rashaid had usurped. This r i v a l r y endured f o r a long time. 
Before we embark on a d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
Kuwait and Central Arabia at t h a t time, i t may be u s e f u l to give a short 
summary of the background of C e n t r a l Arabia. 
I n t h i s area the influence of the Wahabism had spread over 
Central Arabia and the Coast of the Arabian Gulf. The present era of 
Central Arabian h i s t o r y began w i t h the r i s e of the Wahabism, by which 
the course of events i n Nejd has since been l a r g e l y determined. 
Consequently, i n dealing w i t h the area, i t i s necessary f i r s t of a l l 
to enquire i n t o the o r i g i n of Wahabism. Wahabism was o r i g i n a l l y a 
purely r e l i g i o u s movement, founded by Muhammad ben Abdal'wahab, who 
devoted himself t o the task of p u r i f y i n g Islam from the e r r o r s and l a x i t y 
of f a i t h and p r a c t i c e which had crept i n during the course of t i m e . ^ ^ 
His leadership s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d the subsequent development of Wahabism. 
I n i t i a l l y , Wahabism was a reformation of Muhammad's doctrine 
of Islam. I t took the form c h i e f l y of a protest against s u p e r s t i t i o n 
(49) 
and luxury i n the Muhammadan world. Later, through the force of 
circumstances, the movement acquired a secular and p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n . 
This was to serve the personal ambitions of the Emir of Nejd, Ibn Sa'ud 
who adopted the movement. 
At the same time, a new power emerged. This was the town of 
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H a i l which was already considered, i n a sense, as the c a p i t a l of Jabal 
Shammar, p a r t l y because of i t s size and wealth, and p a r t l y because of 
i t s c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n . 
The Al-Rashaid f a m i l y was of the clan of Ja'afar, the noblest 
branch of the Shammer t r i b e s . About 1891, a great i n t e r n a l r e v o l u t i o n 
had taken place i n Central Arabia, by which the whole, of Nejd had been 
(5' 
brought i n t o subjection; t o Ibn-Rashaid, the 'Northern' or Shammer Emir. 
The t e r r i t o r y which Ibn Rashaid included even the lands of Ibn Sa'ud, the 
'Southern* or Wahabi Emir, h i s former overlord. At t h a t time the Turkish 
a u t h o r i t i e s at Hasa were the c h i e f supporters of Ibn Rashaid, hoping, 
through him, to cut o f f the Wahabi movement at i t s r o o t . Accordingly, 
a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n , Emir Nejd Abdulrahman ben F a i s a l ben Sa'ud was 
e x p e l l e d from Nejd by Muhammad ben Rashaid. He sought refuge i n Kuwait, 
but was refused admission by the Sheikh of Kuwait, Muhammad ben Sabah, 
and a f t e r wandering f o r a while w i t h h i s men from the 'Ajman t r i b e s , he 
(52) 
found a temporary refuge at Qatar. He negotiated f o r a time w i t h the 
Turks, seeking permission to reside i n Kuwait, and, at length, i n 1897, 
the T u r k i s h a u t h o r i t i e s f i n a l l y consented t o allow him to stay there, and 
(53) 
p a i d him a monthly allowance. 
Consequently, Abd-al-Ruhman ben F a i s a l ben Sa'ud and his f a m i l y 
had been l i v i n g i n Kuw.ait under Sheikh Muhammad's p r o t e c t i o n f o r some 
years. The r e l a t i o n s between Sheikh Mubarak and Ibn Rashaid were 
s t r a i n e d , both because of the former's a t t i t u d e to Ibn Sa'ud i n granting 
him refuge i n Kuwait and because Ibn Rashaid r e a l i s e d t h a t Mubarak was 
ambitious and would, given the chance, extend h i s power i n t o much of 
Central Arabia. Hence, Ibn Rashaid was w a i t i n g f o r a convenient 
occasion t o conquer Sheikh Mubarak. Realising Ibn Rashaid*s i n t e n t i o n s , 
Sheikh Mubarak awaited the opp o r t u n i t y of thwarting him. At f i r s t 
Sheikh Mubarak put a l l h i s e f f o r t s i n t o p o l i t i c a l plans t o separate Ibn 
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Rashaid and Yusif el-Ibrahaim, b e l i e v i n g t h a t Yusif e l Ibrahaim was the 
more dangerous enemy, and that he exercised a powerful influence over 
Ibn Rashaid. For t h i s reason he was ca r e f u l not to give them the 
chance f o r concerted a c t i o n . He began w r i t i n g l e t t e r s to Ibn Rashaid, 
advising him to keep clear of Yusif el-Ibrahaim, and not to l i s t e n to him, 
because Yusif was i n t e n t on causing t r o u b l e and enmity between the two 
(55) 
r u l e r s . These l e t t e r s achieved nothing, however, and Yusif e l -
Ibrahaim continued to s t i r up Ibn Rashaid against Mubarak. 
At the end of 1897, some traders from H a i l were k i l l e d and t h e i r 
money s t o l e n near Kuwait. Immediately Ibn Rashaid accused Sheikh Mubarak 
of being behind the massacre. Sheikh Mubarak t r i e d i n vain to prove that 
he was innocent. He apologised t o Ibn Rashaid, explaining that he knew 
nothing about the matter, but Ibh Rashaid refused t o behlieve him. Yusif 
el-Ibrahaim now seized h i s opportunity and kept on encouraging him to 
make war on Sheikh Mubarak f o r the welfare of Kuwait. I n t h i s year, 
however, Muhammad ben Rashaid died a f t e r a r e i g n of twenty-eight years. 
( 
Thus Sheikh Mubarak and h i s people escaped from a very d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n . 
Before Muhammad Ibn Rashaid died, he advised h i s successor, 
Abd-al-'Azaiz ben Mit'ab, to r e f r a i n from any int e r f e r e n c e i n . a matter which 
d i d not concern him. Though Abd-al-'Azaiz was u l t i m a t e l y l u r e d w i t h g i f t s 
i n t o disregarding t h i s good advice, i t was f o r the moment from the Turks 
(57) 
t h a t Mubarak had most t o f e a r . The new r u l e r , Abd-al-'Azaiz, was 
already aware of the ambition of Mubarak t o extend his a u t h o r i t y over 
most o f Central Arabia, and his r e l a t i o n s w i t h the r u l e r o f Kuwait were 
s i m i l a r t o h i s predecessor's. Accordingly, as tension mounted, Mubarak 
became sure that the only s o l u t i o n would be the sword. The troubles 
between Ibn Rashaid and Sheikh Mubarak w i l l be discussed l a t e r . 
By the end of the year.1897, Sheikh Mubarak had begun to despair 
of o b t a i n i n g the Sultan's r e c o g n i t i o n of h i s independence. Since a l l 
24. 
h i s e f f o r t s towards t h a t end had so f a r proved f r u i t l e s s . Consequently 
(58 ) 
he turned t o the B r i t i s h Government w i t h a request f o r p r o t e c t i o n . 
He v i s i t e d Colonel Meade, the p o l i t i c a l Resident i n Bushire, w i t h h i s 
formal request, and the l a t t e r promised t o contact h i s Government about 
the matter. When Colonel Meade informed the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s of 
Sheikh Mubarak's request, the M i n i s t e r of Foreign A f f a i r s sent a telegram 
to the Government of I n d i a , s t a t i n g t h a t i n the Mini s t e r ' s opinion, 
B r i t a i n should not i n t e r f e r e i n the l o c a l a f f a i r s of the Arabian Gulf 
p r i n c i p a l i t i e s , and t h a t i t would be preferable mot to grant protectorate (..59 
status to Kuwait. 
Owing t o the c o n t r a d i c t o r y d e c l a r a t i o n s , the B r i t i s h Ambassador 
i n Constantinople, S i r P h i l i p C u r r i e , now asked h i s Government's opinion 
concerning the Tu r k i s h pretensions. The Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s 
r e p l i e d t o t h i s enquiry confirming that the M i n i s t r y had never recognized 
Tu r k i s h sovereignty over Kuwait, but p o i n t i n g out th a t i t would be 
i l l o g i c a l t o completely ignore the f a c t that Kuwait was under Ottoman 
i n f l u e n c e . 
The In d i a n Government wished t o recognize T u r k i s h sovereignty 
over Kuwait, i n order to give substance t o t h e i r view t h a t i t was Kuwaiti 
ships which had attacked the I n d i a n ship "Haripasa" which belonged t o a 
subject t o the Jamnagar State. This ship had been attacked and robbed 
near Fao by about 30 p i r a t e s on the 22nd August 1895, w h i l s t on i t s way 
to Basra to c o l l e c t a cargo of dates. The p i r a t e s k i l l e d four members 
of the crew, wounded four more, c a r r i e d o f f about Rs3,400 i n c a s h . ^ ^ 
The B r i t i s h Government d i d not doubt that the Sheikh of Kuwait knew w e l l 
who the c u l p r i t s were, because almost a l l the land i n the v i c i n i t y of 
Fao belonged to him. For t h i s reason the B r i t i s h thought t h a t the 
c u l p r i t s were from Kuwait. 
The Kuwaiti case became more prominent from autumn 1897, when 
25. 
Sheikh Mubarak requested B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n a f t e r he had f a i l e d t o 
o b t a i n Turkey's r e c o g n i t i o n of his independence. The B r i t i s h 
Government r e p l i e d t o Sheikh Mubarak's request w i t h a cable sent t o the 
Viceroy, recommending t h a t there should be no i n t e r f e r e n c e i n Kuwait 
other than the minimum necessary t o maintain peace i n the Gulf and that 
the question of p r o t e c t o r a t e status f o r Kuwait should be l e f t f o r 
consideration at another, more convenient time. 
On the 6th December, 1897, Colonel Meade sent a telegraph 
concerning a projected movement of Turkish troops from Baghdad to Fao, 
and on the 22nd three b a t t a l i o n s of T u r k i s h " i n f a n t r y l e f t Baghdad i n 
(63-) 
two steamers f o r Basra, e v i d e n t l y threatening an attack on Kuwait. 
This i n f o r m a t i o n was telegraphed on the 22nd and 23rd December, 1897 
by Colonel Meade t o the Government o f I n d i a , a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h 
the i n s t r u c t i o n of the Secretary of State, who t o l d Colonel Meade that 
no a c t i o n should be taken t o a s s i s t the Sheikh of Kuwait without special 
OS) 
sanction,, 
The B r i t i s h M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s a l t e r e d i t s a t t i t u d e 
to the question of applying p r o t e c t o r a t e status to Kuwait, and Bahrain, 
because of the i n t e r e s t shown by the Government of I n d i a i n the Arabian 
Gulf. Colonel Meade, the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l Resident at Bushire wrote 
a c o n f i d e n t i a l memorandum on Kuwait s t a t i n g : "Kuwait owns an excellent 
harbour, and i f i t comes under our p r o t e c t o r a t e , i t would become 
undoubtedly one o f the most important positions i n the Arabian Gulf. Add 
t o that the p o s s i b i l i t y of rendering i t , .in f i i t u r e , the end of the ra i l w a y 
from Alexandretta or Port S'aid, there we would be i n a p o s i t i o n t o 
pr o t e c t t h a t l i n e . I t s trade w i t h Basra i s successful, as i t i s w i t h 
Nejd and S y r i a . Slave trade and also piracy w i l l receive a f a t a l blow 
i f Kuwait becomes under our p r o t e c t o r a t e . Thus i t can be said t h a t the 
B r i t i s h p r o t e c t o r a t e over Kuwait means the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of our p o l i t i c a l 
26. 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n the waters o f the Gulf and on i t s shores". 
Gradually, p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s now began to favour Sheikh 
Mubarak, who was admired f o r h i s strong p e r s o n a l i t y , warm d i s p o s i t i o n 
and p o l i t i c a l sagacity. The B r i t i s h believed t h a t a r e f u s a l to grant 
p r o t e c t o r a t e status t o Sheikh Mubarak would d r i v e him back i n t o the arms 
of the Turks. The opinion of the new B r i t i s h Ambassador at Constantinople, 
S i r Nicholas O'Connor, was requested on the matter, but before h i s answer 
was received, a c o n f i d e n t i a l cable reached the Viceroy from the Minister 
of Foreign A f f a i r s , s t a t i n g t h a t , i f the Indian Government considered that 
i t would be easy to exercise a protectorate over Kuwait without new 
m i l i t a r y arrangements i n the Arabian G u l f , then Lord Salisbury would 
accept such a step, and would be ready t o support i t d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and 
p o l i t i c a l l y i n case o f any p r o t e s t against the d e c l a r a t i o n by the Ottoman 
Government. 
A f t e r a short time, the M i n i s t e r of Foreign A f f a i r s received 
0 ,Connor ,s r e p l y , i n which he c a u t i o u s l y expressed h i s support f o r the 
idea of a B r i t i s h p r o t e c t o r a t e over Kuwait; but i n s i s t e d on the necessity 
o f considering the matter f u r t h e r . There i s an important memorandum 
w r i t t e n by Mr. Sandison, the O r i e n t a l A f f a i r s attache at the B r i t i s h 
Embassy i n Constantinople, concerning a meeting which he had i n July 
1899 w i t h the Turkish Prime M i n i s t e r . At t h i s meeting the Turkish 
Prime M i n i s t e r i n s i s t e d t h a t Turkish sovereignty i n the Arabian Gulf 
region extended as f a r south as Q a t a i f , and warned Sandison t h a t any 
such pretensions by the B r i t i s h would lead to p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
on both the p r o v i n c i a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r o n t s . He refused t o condone 
the B r i t i s h i n t e r f e r e n c e i n Kuwait, which was ostensibly intended to put 
an end t o piracy and the slave trade, s t a t i n g that the Ottoman Empire 
was q u i t e ready t o patronize any humanitarian idea which would lead t o 
the suppression of such e v i l p r a c t i c e s , but that the occupation of Kuwait 
27. 
was not necessary i n order t o achieve the desired end. 
I n 1898 there was a rumour that the Russian Government had 
obtained, from the Sublime Porte, a concession f o r b u i l d i n g a railway 
from T r i p o l i to Kuwait, and f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a coaling s t a t i o n on the 
Arabian G u l f , possibly at K u w a i t . ^ ^ 
Meanwhile, the Germans were t r y i n g t o secure from the Porte 
a concession f o r the constru c t i o n o f a railway from Baghdad to the head 
of the Arabian Gulf. 
A short time l a t e r the Turkish Government took p o s i t i v e action 
f o r , at the end of 1898, a Turkish gunboat l e f t Basra f o r Kuwait, 
claiming t h a t Sheikh Mubarak had become an outlaw. The reason f o r 
t h i s a c t i o n was t h a t the Turkish a u t h o r i t i e s i n Constantinople doubted 
h i s l o y a l t y . Mubarak himself v/as t o blame f o r t h i s since he had 
encouraged acts of piracy against Turkish d h o w s . T h e Turkish 
a u t h o r i t i e s r e a l i s e d t h i s and acted accordingly. Because of t h i s 
t u r n of events Mubarak renewed h i s request f o r B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n . 
As a matter of f a c t , Sheikh Mubarak's request f o r protectorate 
status marked the end of the p o l i c y of f r i e n d l y n e u t r a l i t y which he had 
t r i e d t o pursue i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . He t r i e d t o maintain f r i e n d l y 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h both B r i t a i n and Turkey, but t h i s proved d i f f i c u l t i n 
view of the constant s t r u g g l e between the powers f o r sovereignty i n 
Kuwait. Eventually, Mubarak found t h a t he had to throw i n his l o t 
w i t h one side or the other and chose B r i t a i n . The B r i t i s h Government 
(71) 
now agreed to consider Mubarak's a p p l i c a t i o n f o r p r o t e c t i o n . 
According to S i r W. Lee Warner, who wrote a memorandum concerning 
the c o n t r o l of Kuwait, the gr a n t i n g of protectorate status t o the 
p r i n c i p a l i t y o f f e r e d B r i t a i n the f o l l o w i n g advantages: 
1. I t had a very f a i r harbour. 
2. I t was a p o l i t i c a l r a i l w a y terminus. 
28. 
3. I t was favourably s i t u a t e d on a trade r o u t e . 
4. I t would give to B r i t a i n c o n t r o l over piracy and the slave 
trade. 
5. I t would enable B r i t a i n t o exclude Russian and other f o r e i g n 
. ~. (72) infl u e n c e s . 
I n view of t h i s , the Viceroy of I n d i a , Lord Curzon, suggested t o Colonel 
Meade tha t he should t r y t o reach a c o n f i d e n t i a l agreement w i t h Sheikh 
Mubarak, s i m i l a r t o the B r i t i s h agreement with Musqat of the 20th March, 
(73 ) 
1890, but on clearer l i n e s . He also suggested to him t h a t action 
should be taken immediately i n complete secrecy i n order t o circumvent 
the suspicions which would be r a i s e d by an open d e c l a r a t i o n of a 
pr o t e c t o r a t e i n Kuwait. 
Accordingly, on the 21st January, 1899, Colonel Meade proceeded 
to Kuwait aboard H.M.S."Lawrence" On h i s a r r i v a l he found that the Turkish 
(74) 
c o r v e t t e , Zahaf, was i n Kuwait habour, but i t l e f t on the f o l l o w i n g day. 
On the 23rd January, Mubarak signed an agreement by which he 
bound himself, h i s h e i r s , and h i s successors not to receive any agent or 
repr e s e n t a t i v e of any f o r e i g n power or government i n Kuwait, or i n any 
other place w i t h i n the l i m i t s of h i s t e r r i t o r y , without the previous 
sanction of the B r i t i s h Government. Further, he undertook not to cede, 
s e l l , mortgage or give f o r occupation any of h i s t e r r i t o r y t o any 
government or t o the subjects of such a government. I n r e t u r n f o r t h i s 
undertaking, the B r i t i s h Government promised t o support Mubarak and to 
pr o t e c t him, his h e i r s and h i s successors from any f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e . 
They also paid to him Rs.15,000 (about £1,000) and consented to the use 
of B r i t i s h naval forces i n the Gulf i n order t o protect Kuwait i f i t 
(7 3) 
should be threatened w i t h f o r e i g n invasion. 
I t appears that t h i s agreement provided an opening f o r B r i t a i n 
to i n t e r f e r e not only i n Kuwait's a f f a i r s , but also i n the a f f a i r s of 
29. 
Nejd and South I r a q . Further, i t aided the d e c l i n i n g influence of 
the Lynch Company over the r i v e r t r a f f i c of the T i g r i s and Euphrates. 
On the other hand, the agreement created problems i n connection w i t h 
Sheikh Mubarak's p o s i t i o n i n the Ottoman Empire. Sheikh Mubarak owned 
vast a g r i c u l t u r a l lands and palm gardens i n Fao, which was considered as 
Ottoman t e r r i t o r y . As soon as he accepted B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n , however, 
h i s ownership of these lands was annulled i n accordance w i t h Turkish law. 
The B r i t i s h promised Sheikh Mubarak that they would do t h e i r utmost to 
(76) 
p r o t e c t h i s r i g h t s i n South I r a q . 
I t was not easy to enter i n t o secret and important negotiations 
w i t h o u t knowledge of them reaching Sheikh Mubarak's brothers who were 
opposed to Mubarak's idea of requesting protectorate status from the 
B r i t i s h . They were i n favour of maintaining r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Ottoman 
Government, both because they had no wish to lose t h e i r property i n Basra 
and i n Fao, and because they remained unconvinced of the a d v i s a b i l i t y of 
abandoning a p o l i c y of f r i e n d l y n e u t r a l i t y i n favour of one p o l i t i c a l 
commitment and submission t o a f o r e i g n power. Humud refused t o sign 
the agreement w i t h Sheikh Mubarak, and when a l l endeavours to persuade 
him t o agree f a i l e d , Sayid Agha Muhammad Rahaim, the B r i t i s h Representative 
(77) 
i n Bahrain, t e s t i f i e d to the agreement on the 23rd January, 1899. 
Colonel Meade on behalf of h i s Government and Sheikh Mubarak 
] 
on behalf of h i m s e l f , h i s h e i r s and h i s successors, d i d each i n the 
presence of witnesses, a f f i x t h e i r signatures to i t . 
I t was supposed t h a t as long as the British-Kuwait agreement 
remained secret, few d i f f i c u l t i e s would a r i s e , but a l l the h i s t o r i c a l 
evidence i n d i c a t e s that the Turks were aware of t h i s development of 
B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e i n Kuwait. The Sultan had expressed his deep anxiety 
about Sheikh Mubarak's p o l i c y , and the l a t t e r n a t u r a l l y feared l e s t the 
Turks should t r y to gain. For t h i s reason he sought from Colonel Meade 
30. 
a s p e c i a l promise t h a t the safety of the lands of the Sabah f a m i l y at 
Fao would be granted. The objectives of Sheikh Mubarak and Colonel 
Meade could not e a s i l y be achieved since Sultan Abdul Hamid had given 
wide ranging powers t o Hamdi Pasha, the Wali of Basra, who had become 
w e l l acquainted w i t h the Sabah f a m i l y since he had become w a l i . Hamdi 
Pasha sided w i t h Mubarak's' nephews i n opposing the l a t t e r ' s pretentions 
to the gardens of Fao and the lands of the Sabah i n Fao. I n a d d i t i o n , 
Hamdi Pasha was t r y i n g to induce the emirs, who had taken refuge i n Basra, 
to enter i n t o p o l i t i c a l conspiracies w i t h a view to removing Sheikh 
— ( 78 ^  Mubarak and r e s i s t i n g the idea of the B r i t i s h p r o t e c t o r a t e i n Kuwait. 
I n May, 1899, Sheikh Mubarak issued new customs regulations 
i n Kuwait, which r a i s e d the import duty on a l l goods a r r i v i n g at the 
port by 5%. These included goods from Basra and other Turkish ports 
which had pre v i o u s l y been exempted from duty on presentation of a 
c e r t i f i c a t e from the Turkish custom houses. I n r e t a l i a t i o n f o r 
t h i s a c t i o n , the Turkish harbour-master w i t h f i v e s o l d i e r s a r r i v e d i n 
Kuwait at the end of September t o take charge of the customs house and 
to open a telegraph l i n e from Fao t o Q a t a i f , which would pass through 
Kuwait. Sheikh Mubarak declined to receive the harbour-master, and he 
had t o r e t u r n t o B a s r a . I n s t r u c t i o n s there reached Basra from 
Constantinople t h a t the matter should not be dropped, and a Turkish 
expedition l e f t Baghdad destined f o r Kuwait v i a Basra. Noting these 
i n d i c a t i o n s of an aggressive Turkish p o l i c y , the B r i t i s h Government now 
issued a warning to the Turkish Government s t a t i n g t h a t , while the 
B r i t i s h themselves had no designs on Kuwait, they had f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h the Sheikh and t h a t inconvenient and disagreeable questions would 
be r a i s e d i f an attempt were made to e s t a b l i s h Turkish a u t h o r i t y or 
customs c o n t r o l i n the port w i t h o u t the p r i o r consent of the B r i t i s h 
( SI") 
Government. At the same time the B r i t i s h sent a ship t o Kuwait t o 
31. 
Kuwait t o pro t e c t the Sheikh against any overt acts of aggression by 
the T u r k i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . I n f a c t , however, the B r i t i s h ship, Sphinx, 
was ordered merely to c a l l at Kuwait and proceed without staying f o r 
any length of time. 
On the 13th September, O'Connor reported t h a t he had c a r r i e d out 
h i s Government's i n s t r u c t i o n s , and had received an assurance from the 
T u r k i s h M i n i s t e r of Foreign A f f a i r s t h a t no f u r t h e r attempt would be 
made to i n s i s t upon the appointment of the harbour-master; t h a t the 
Ottoman Government had no i n t e n t i o n of e s t a b l i s h i n g a custom house at 
Kuwait; and that the despatch of a m i l i t a r y expedition was not 
contemplated, since, though such an expedition had been proposed by the 
W a l i of Basra, Hamdi Pasha, the Sultan did not consider i t worth the r i s k 
( 82 ) — or expense. F i n a l l y O'Connor succeeded i n convincing the Sultan 
t h a t the Wali Hamdi Pasha, who was renouned f o r h i s enmity to the B r i t i s h 
and t o the Sheikh of Kuwait, was an obstacle t o any Anglo-Ottoman 
('83') 
agreement concerning Kuwait's a f f a i r s . 
The Sultan therefore dismissed him i n order to prevent him 
from undertaking any personal ventures i n Kuwait without h i s knowledge. 
By the end of 1899 T u r k i s h standing i n Kuwait had g r e a t l y 
improved as a r e s u l t of the replacement of Hamdi Pasha by Muhsin Pasha 
as Wali of Basra, and i t was clear t h a t i t was Turkish influence which 
had averted the c r i s i s . Muhsin Pasha professed t o be a f r i e n d of 
Sheikh Mubarak, and dropped a l l the designs of h i s predecessor of which 
the Sheikh disapproved. These were: 
1. The establishment of e f f e c t i v e quarantine r e g u l a t i o n s . 
2. The establishment of a Customs house. 
3. The appointment of a harbour-master. 
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C H A P T E R T W O 
INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN KUWAIT 
By the end of the 19th Century, German i m p e r i a l i s t a c t i v i t y 
had s t a r t e d i n the Ottoman Empire, while at the same time, the Ottoman 
Empire i t s e l f was r e l y i n g on the support of France and B r i t a i n against 
the approaching Russian t h r e a t to the Black Sea and Balkans. Mean-
w h i l e , both France and B r i t a i n were paying close a t t e n t i o n to o r i e n t a l 
a f f a i r s , wishing as they d i d to prot e c t the Ottoman Empire, and t o 
safeguard i t s p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r i t y . This p o l i c y began t o change a f t e r 
the B e r l i n Congress of 1878. Indeed, they had even s t a r t e d to be 
an t a g o n i s t i c towards the Ottoman Government when i t began to consider 
an a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany. 
The p o l i c y of rapprochement from Turkey was welcomed by 
Germany i n view of her expansionist aims. These aims were necessitated 
by the economic s i t u a t i o n at t h a t time, f o r the increasing population 
of Germany was aggravating her need f o r food, while her growing i n d u s t r i e s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y spinning and weaving i n d u s t r i e s , needed e s s e n t i a l raw 
m a t e r i a l s . Despite t h i s need, however, Germany became a c o l o n i a l 
power somewhat l a t e , and her c o l o n i a l gains were not of v i t a l importance, 
( w i t h the exception of German East A f r i c a , which was comparatively poor 
i n raw m a t e r i a l s ) . 
The German Government considered Turkey as a f l o u r i s h i n g 
and geographically w e l l - s i t u a t e d market f o r German merchandise. Hence 
they welcomed the Tur k i s h approach, w i t h a view t o making the Turkish 
Empire a f i e l d f o r economic expansion. The signs of German influence 
i n the Ottoman Empire were these. 
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F i r s t there was the p o l i t i c a l influence of Germany i n 
Constantinople. Another sign of t h i s influence was seen i n the 
German mission which t r a i n e d the Ottoman army, foremost amongst which 
was the De Goltze mission. Germany also broadened her p o l i c y towards 
the East by the c a r e f u l l y stage-managed and much p u b l i c i s e d v i s i t s of 
the Emperor W i l l i a m I I t o the Ottoman Empire i n 1889 and 1898. 
As a r e s u l t of the l a t t e r v i s i t , the Baghdad railway pr o j e c t 
came i n t o existence, prompted by the German desire f o r a base on the 
Arabian G u l f . ^ 
However, a concession was issued by the "I m p e r i a l Irade" 
(2) 
f o r the eventual extension f o r the l o c a t i o n of the German terminus. 
The exact s i t e was t o be s e t t l e d a f t e r completion of the survey then 
under way. I t was estimated that the l i n e would reach the Gulf i n 
about 8 years. Thus the German Government took.the f i r s t step towards 
demolishing the basis of B r i t i s h trade and towards making Turkey a 
(3) 
c o r r i d o r f o r the expansion of German influence i n t o South-West Asia. 
I n response to these moves, the B r i t i s h Government claimed 
t h a t the new German involvement i n the area was threatening B r i t a i n ' s 
economic i n t e r e s t s i n the East. The: Germans however, were obstinate 
i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e and continued to pursue t h e i r p o l i c i e s f o r the 
penetrati o n of new zones of i n f l u e n c e , f o r the establishment of a 
commercial s i t u a t i o n which the Turkish Government considered t o be of 
speci a l importance. 
The Germans were u n w i l l i n g to await the outcome of the 
discussions w i t h the Porte before choosing a terminus, and on January 
5 t h , 1900, the German commission which was engaged on a preliminary 
survey of the proposed railway l i n e from Constantinople through Baghdad 
(A) 
a r r i v e d i n Basra. This commission consisted of Herr Stemrich, the 
German consul general i n Constantinople, and Herr Von Kapp, the Chief 
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Engineer o f the Anatolian r a i l w a y , and an i n t e r p r e t e r . While the 
Germans were i n Basra, Mr. Wratislaw, the B r i t i s h Consul the r e , had 
several conversations w i t h Herr Stemrich, from whom he learned that 
the r e s u l t s of t h e i r journey so f a r had been f a r from e n c o u r a g i n g . ^ 
I n the opinion of Herr Stemrich the proposed l i n e should have a terminus 
on the Gu l f , and f o r t h i s the Germans proposed t o select a s i t e i n 
Kuwait Port. Herr Stemrich spoke f r a n k l y t o Mr. Wratislaw and seemed 
to have no idea t h a t B r i t a i n might raise any objection to the German 
plan. He was, however, c e r t a i n t h a t Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait would 
oppose the r a i l w a y scheme and would l i k e l y refuse them t h e i r chosen 
s i t e because the German Government had dealt d i r e c t l y w i t h the Sultan 
and had not consulted the Sheikh. 
The B r i t i s h Government was worried by the German Commission, 
but could not warn e i t h e r the Turks or the Germans against i n t e r f e r i n g 
i n the a f f a i r s of Kuwait. This was because they had signed a secret-
agreement w i t h Sheikh Mubarak i n 1899. Eventually B r i t a i n decided t o 
inform Sheikh Mubarak of the plans f o r a railway and t o give him 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . These were t h a t before coming t o any arrangement 
whatsoever w i t h the German Commission, he should inform d i r e c t l y the 
B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident i n Bushire, so t h a t Mr. Gaskin the Assistant 
Resident at th a t time could go t o Kuwait to determine exactly what had 
happened. 
On the 19th and 20th January, the German Commission reached 
Kuwait. Before t h e i r a r r i v a l they sent two l e t t e r s to Sheikh Mubarak 
informing him of t h e i r coming, w i t h the r e s u l t that when they a r r i v e d 
the Sheikh received them i n h i s palace and treated them very hospitably. 
On the second morning Herr Stemrich had a secret meeting w i t h Sheikh 
Mubarak at which he explained t o him the purpose of the Commission. 
He emphasised t h a t Kuwait would b e n e f i t by being developed as an important 
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naval and commercial s t a t i o n , and added that the German Government was 
prepared t o purchase, f o r any price he might care t o name, a large 
t r a c t of lands of Kathima as the s i t e f o r the r a i l w a y s t a t i o n . Moreover, 
the Government was ready t o rent twenty square feddans of the lands 
surrounding the place. ^  Herr Stemrich also asked Mubarak to use h i s 
f r i e n d l y i n f l u e n c e w i t h the other Arab Sheikhs whose t e r r i t o r y lay i n 
the Euphrates V a l l e y , because he believed that Sheikh Mubarak had a u t h o r i t y 
(7) 
and influence amongst them. I n r e t u r n he promised that Germany would 
recompense him and h i s people. Kuwait would be an important t r a d i n g 
c e ntre, f o r , when the terminus of the Baghdad ra i l w a y was established 
at Kathima Bay, a considerable q u a n t i t y of commercial shipping would c a l l 
at the port t o supply the r a i l w a y w i t h cargo and passengers. Further, 
i f the Sheikh agreed to the company's proposal, the Germans promised to 
support him by land and sea by the establishment of a m i l i t a r y post f o r 
the p r o t e c t i o n of Kuwait. 
I n accordance w i t h B r i t i s h advice Sheikh Mubarak refused a l l 
these proposals, de c l a r i n g that he d i d not know whether the Germans came 
— ( 8) 
on t h e i r own behalf or on behalf of the Sultan. 
I f the l a t t e r was the case, he would l i k e t o give them a l e t t e r 
t o the Sultan to inform him that he acknowledged the Sultan of Turkey only 
as the head of the Muslim world. He also made the excuse that the 
suggested p r o j e c t would r e s u l t i n the extension of the Ottoman a u t h o r i t y 
over Kuwait. The Turks had t r i e d hard to dethrone and t o degrade him 
but he considered himself to be independent of the Turkish a u t h o r i t y . 
He added th a t any orders concerning Kuwait issued by the Sultan himself 
(9) 
would be r e j e c t e d . I n t h i s way Sheikh Mubarak made i t p l a i n to Herr 
Stemrich t h a t neither he nor the other sheiks would accept any f o r e i g n 
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . For t h i s reason, he said he could 
not guarantee the safety of the proposed l i n e , and he would not be 
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responsible f o r any damage which might b e f a l l i t . He added t h a t h i s 
a u t h o r i t y was l i m i t e d to the neighbourhood of Kuwait, and that he 
exercised no r e a l a u t h o r i t y over the other sheikhs. Thus the German 
Commission f a i l e d and Herr Stemrich and his commission l e f t Kuwait 
do) 
a n g r i l y . 
The r e a l reason f o r the Sheikh of Kuwait's r e j e c t i o n of the 
German proposals was t h a t he had bound himself and h i s successors by 
a secret agreement w i t h B r i t a i n not t o allow any f o r e i g n power to 
i n t e r f e r e i n h i s t e r r i t o r y . Prominent among those whose inter f e r e n c e 
would be unwelcome were the Turks and t h e i r a l l i e s . 
Sheikh Mubarak now hastened to inform Colonel Meade, the B r i t i s h 
P o l i t i c a l Resident i n Bushire, of a l l that had t r a n s p i r e d between him 
and the German Commission. The news worried Colonel Meade, who considered 
the German Commission t o be part of a Turkish p l o t to a t t r a c t the Germans 
i n t o the Arabian Gulf, as a r e s u l t of which, they hoped B r i t i s h influence 
there would be weakened. I t also appeared t o him that the Ottoman and 
German Governments were taking advantage of B r i t i s h involvement i n the 
war i n South A f r i c a t o complete t h e i r domination of Kuwait. He was 
t r o u b l e d by the f a c t that the Germans had nominated a consul-general i n 
Constantinople and remarked t h a t the l a t t e r should be responsible f o r 
other important matters i n a d d i t i o n t o the Anatolian railway p r o j e c t . He 
s a i d , "We have to safeguard our p o s i t i o n i n the Gulf and be ready t o defend 
our p o s i t i o n against any power, also the presence of the Turkish, Russian, 
and German s t a f f w i l l be d e t r i m e n t a l t o our i n t e r e s t s i n the Arabian Gulf 
,,(12) r e g i o n . " 
Sheikh Mubarak's r e j e c t i o n of German proposals strengthened h i s 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n , but was by no means the end of h i s t r o u b l e s . The 
t h r e a t of overwhelming pressure from Germany and Turkey remained, and Russia 
was also i n t e r e s t e d i n developments i n Kuwait. Since she might f i n d i t 
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necessary t o seek a counterpoise, she was rumoured t o be t r y i n g to obtain 
an important r a i l w a y concession from Alexandretta to the Arabian Gulf, 
w i t h a coaling s t a t i o n at Kuwait, 
The Russians were considering means of impeding B r i t i s h 
expansion i n the Gulf and they r e a l i s e d that the best way of achieving 
t h i s aim would be to gain a f o o t h o l d there themselves. Accordingly, 
i n 1900, a group of fananciers represented Count Kapnist, a Russian 
businessman and the nephew of the Russian ambassador i n Vienna, supported 
by the Russian ambassador i n Constantinople applied f o r a concession f o r 
a r a i l w a y from Alexandretta t o the Gulf, w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of e s t a b l i s h i n g 
(13) 
a coaling s t a t i o n i n Kuwait. Russia's aim i n seeking t h i s concession 
was t o thwart German design, and t o prevent B r i t a i n from exercising 
complete c o n t r o l over Kuwait. 
While Russia was b u s i l y engaged, the B r i t i s h Government was 
(14) 
discussing the best means of avoiding trouble i n the Gulf. Hamilton, 
Secretary of State f o r I n d i a , proposed a new p o l i c y of rapprochement w i t h 
(15) 
Germany, because B r i t a i n needed German support against Russia and Turkey. 
This proposal was supported by the B r i t i s h ambassador i n Constantinople, 
on account of the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y d i f f i c u l t y which B r i t a i n was 
having, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n South A f r i c a . Hence the B r i t i s h Government now 
agreed to inform both the T u r k i s h Government and Marschall von Bi e b e r s t e i n , 
the German ambassador i n Constantinople of the secret agreement w i t h 
(1 r ^  
Kuwait. "' Accordingly, on A p r i l 9th, 1900, O'Connor informed the Turkish 
Prime M i n i s t e r , Tawfaik Pasha, that B r i t a i n would not d i s t u r b the "status 
quo" i n Kuwait, nor would she i n t e r f e r e w i t h the Sultan's a u t h o r i t y i n the 
Arabian Gulf. B r i t a i n would not remain i d l e i f any other great power 
disturbed the "status quo", or i f the Turkish Government granted p r i v i l e g e s 
to f o r e i g n powers i n any region belonging t o the Sheikh of Kuwait. The 
reasons f o r t h i s was t h a t Kuwait was t i e d by a special agreement w i t h 
(17) 
the B r i t i s h Government. 
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At the same time Von Bieberstein was given f u r t h e r information 
about the most recent B r i t i s h agreement w i t h Kuwait to the e f f e c t t h a t , 
though not incompatible w i t h the maintenance of the "status quo", i t 
would prevent the Sheikh from g i v i n g up his t e r r i t o r y to any f o r e i g n 
power without B r i t i s h approval. The German ambassador di d not accept 
O'Connor's viewpoint, but i n s i s t e d t h a t Kuwait was part of the Ottoman 
Empire. To t h i s O'Connor r e p l i e d promptly that the sheikh was not 
allowed t o cede or t o lease h i s t e r r i t o r y to any foreigners without 
B r i t i s h permission, because B r i t a i n wished to avoid any disturbance of 
the " s t a t u s quo". The German press and diplomatic corps now reacted 
by p r o t e s t i n g s t r o n g l y against the B r i t i s h agreement w i t h Kuwait and the 
German Government began t o s t i r up trouble over Kuwait. I n June 1900, 
it 
S i r Frank Lascelles, the B r i t i s h ambassador i n B e r l i n , met Herr von Bulov, 
the German M i n i s t e r of Foreign A f f a i r s and discussed w i t h him both the 
f u t u r e of the Baghdad r a i l w a y and the s i t u a t i o n i n the Ottoman Empire, 
(19) 
p a r t i c u l a r l y I r a q and Kuwait. Lascelles put forward the view t h a t 
"Kuwait was only t e c h n i c a l l y dependent on the Sultan", but i n r e a l i t y , was 
fr e e t o pursue her own f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Von Bulov, however, i n s i s t e d 
t h a t Kuwait was dependent on the Sultan. 
At f i r s t the Germans thought that the agreement w i t h B r i t a i n 
was merely some s o r t of p r i v a t e l e g a l arrangement and that i t would be 
possible f o r the German bank to buy the concession from the B r i t i s h 
businessmen. When, however, they came t o understand the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of the agreement, they r e a l i s e d that they were i n danger of l o s i n g t h e i r 
i n fluence i n Kuwait, and, w i t h i t the railway concession. Through fear 
l e s t t h i s should happen, the German Government now i n s t r u c t e d the ambassador 
i n Constantinople t o press the Turks t o reassert t h e i r r i g h t s over Kuwait. 
The German deputy Foreign M i n i s t e r , commenting on the c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n 
w i t h regard t o the Baghdad r a i l w a y , s t a t e d that any f o r e i g n influence 
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over Kuwait would be a t h r e a t t o Germany's plans to extend the Anatolian 
r a i l w a y t o the Arabian G u l f . ^ 2 0 ^ He emphasised t h a t i f Germany succeeded 
i n t h i s matter, i t would be necessary f o r Turkey to exercise proper 
a u t h o r i t y over the whole area from Alexandretta to Kuwait. He i n s i s t e d 
t h a t i t was a matter of great importance to Germany t h a t Sheikh Mubarak 
be made to declare t h a t he would not grant any f o r e i g n concession u n t i l 
he had granted Germany the necessary lands and docks f o r the Baghdad 
r a i l w a y . I n e f f e c t Germany was t r y i n g t o gain the concession which 
B r i t a i n had already acquired from the Sheikh. Accordingly, i n August 
1901, the Germans declared that they d i d not recognise the B r i t i s h 
agreement w i t h Kuwait on the grounds that i t was contrary t o the decision 
(21) 
of the B e r l i n conference of 1878. 
On September 3rd, 1901, Count von Wolff-Metternich, the German 
ambassador i n London, l e f t Lansdowne i n no doubt as to the viewpoint of 
the German Government, s t a t i n g t h a t Kuwait was a part of the Ottoman 
Empire, and th a t i f B r i t a i n stopped the Turks from landing on the shores 
of t h e i r own t e r r i t o r y by f o r c e , then the i n t e r n a t i o n a l balance i n the 
(22) 
region would be d i s t u r b e d . Lansdowne, however, found the argument 
(23) 
useless, as he expressed t o Lascelles. The next day Lansdowne received 
Anathopoulo Pasha, the Turkish ambassador i n London, who came to present 
h i s Government *s p r o t e s t at what had been published i n the B r i t i s h press 
concerning the decision of the B r i t i s h Government to proclaim a protectorate 
over Kuwait, He described the agreement o f 1899 as i l l e g a l . Lansdowne's 
response was t o assure the Tu r k i s h ambassador th a t there would be no 
(25 ) 
p r o t e c t o r a t e "unless our hands are forced by events". Accordingly, 
i n September 1901, the Turkish M i n i s t e r of Foreign A f f a i r s i n s t r u c t e d 
h i s ambassador i n London to inform the B r i t i s h Government that i n view 
of the guarantees given, the T u r k i s h Government would respect the "Status 
quo" i n Kuwait, provided t h a t the B r i t i s h Government d i d not send forces 
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t o Kuwait and r e f r a i n e d from declaring a p r o t e c t o r a t e . Lord Lansdowne 
promised the ambassador t h a t h i s Government had no i n t e n t i o n of occupying 
Kuwait or of declaring a p r o t e c t o r a t e there as long as the Turks respected 
the " s t a t u s quo". I n an urgent telegram despatched to h i s ambassador i n 
Turkey, ' Lord Lansdowne state d t h a t the a f f a i r s of Kuwait required 
caution and that he had t o consider f a c t s l e n i e n t l y , because not a l l 
the p o i n t s of the B r i t i s h agreement w i t h Kuwait were c l e a r , and because 
(27) 
the agreement had been made wi t h o u t the Sultan's knowledge. The 
purpose of t h i s was t o threaten the Turkish Government i n case i n the 
event of the Turks strengthening t h e i r p r e tentions, the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s 
i n the Gulf should have to enter i n t o negotiations w i t h Sheikh Mubarak, 
and h o l d discussions more c l e a r l y expressed than previous ones. 
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n v i s - a - v i s Kuwait, thus depended 
l a r g e l y on the a b i l i t y of B r i t a i n and Turkey t o maintain the "status quo" 
and the degree of independence enjoyed by Sheikh Mubarak. The Turkish 
Government, f o r t h e i r p a r t , promised t h a t they would not send forces to 
Kuwait and they would do t h e i r utmost t o persuade Ibn Rashid, Emir of 
Nejd, t o pursue a peaceful p o l i c y towards Kuwait. As for. B r i t a i n , she 
promised not to declare a p r o t e c t o r a t e or to send forces to Kuwait, and t o 
persuade Sheikh Mubarak t o stop h i s r a i d s on Nejd. The Turkish and 
B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s were both s a t i s f i e d w ith t h i s agreement, the Turks 
because they r e t a i n e d formal sovereignty over Kuwait and the B r i t i s h 
because, i n r e a l i t y Kuwait came under t h e i r c o n t r o l , and as a r e s u l t 
of t h i s agreement, they would be able to p a r t i c i p a t e on equal terms 
w i t h the Germans. I n f a c t B r i t i s h t r a d i n g i n t e r e s t s were probably 
b e t t e r safeguarded by s t r i n g e n t provisions against any p r e f e r e n t i a l 
t a r i f f s or f a c i l i t i e s . 
On March 21st, 1902, Lord Lansdowne, then Secretary of State 
f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , i n a memorandum on the s i t u a t i o n i n Kuwait, remarked 
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t h a t the B r i t i s h o b l i g a t i o n s towards the Sheikh were "as i l l - d e f i n e d as the 
boundaries of h i s p r i n c i p a l i t y . We have d i s t i n c t l y announced t h a t he 
does not enjoy B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n ; on the other hand, we once made him 
a present of £1,000, and promised h i s our 'good o f f i c e s ' , whatever that 
may mean. When we made t h i s promise we were, I f e e l , no doubt t h i n k i n g 
of Kuwait proper, i f there i s such a t h i n g , and not of Bubiyan or other 
o u t s k i r t s over which the Sheikh has r i g h t s of one s o r t or another. We 
might, i t seems t o me, e x p l a i n (1) t o the Porte, (2) t o Sheikh Mubarak , 
(3) to the f o r e i g n powers immediately i n t e r e s t e d , the objects of our 
p o l i c y . I should be i n c l i n e d to say t h a t our engagements to name, and 
to endeavour t o obtain the • adhesion of the Porte and of the Sheikh to 
our approximate d e f i n i t i o n of that d i s t r i c t . I would make i t clear to 
the Turks that we do not stand i n the way of an arrangement under which 
the terminus of the l i n e might be placed at some spot other than Kuwait 
t o t h e i r advantage i f they can make anything out of i t . 
As t o the Foreign powers, 1 have already explained t o most of 
them that we are not going to oppose the railway p r o j e c t , provided 
B r i t i s h c a p i t a l receives a share at least equal to that of any other 
power i n respect of c o n s t r u c t i o n , management and orders f o r m a t e r i a l s , 
and I have added t h a t w h i l e we do not grudge a debouche f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
commerce i n the Gulf, and have no wish t o make i t i n t o a B r i t i s h Lake, 
we s h a l l r e s i s t t o the utmost a l l attempts by other powers to obtain a 
f o o t h o l d on i t s shores f o r naval or m i l i t a r y purposes. This I take i t , 
i s the 'bed-rock' of our p o l i c y i n the Arabian Gulf. We s h a l l pursue 
t h a t p o l i c y , not i n v i r t u e of ambiguous understandings w i t h the l o c a l 
c h i e f s , but as the predominant power i n Southern Persia and the Gulf; 
the power whose commercial i n t e r e s t s i n those regions f a r exceed those 
of other powers, the power t o whose e f f o r t s i n the past i t i s due that 
the waters of the Gulf are open to the trade of the world, and whose 
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duty i t w i l l be i n the f u t u r e t o pro t e c t the new trade routes. I f i t 
i s understood t h a t we have to be reckoned w i t h whoever bu i l d s the railway 
and wherever i t f i n d s a terminus, because we are t h a t power, we can regard 
w i t h i n d i f f e r e n c e the l o c a l i n t r i g u e s of any number of sheiks and emirs". 
Lord Lansdowne's point o f view was conveyed to Tewfaik Pasha, 
who remarked t o O'Connor t h a t B r i t a i n ' s aim was t o possess Kuwait, "which 
i s , i n f a c t , part of the Sultan's p r o p e r t i e s " , and to use i t as a base i n 
(29) 
case of war w i t h Russia. At t h i s time Russia was hoping to b u i l d 
a r a i l w a y from the Caspian Sea to South I r a n , w i t h a possible extension 
to Bandar 'Abbas, and i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r B r i t a i n to oppose t h i s advance. 
On March 28th, 1902, O'Connor reminded Tewfaik Pasha of the 
previous agreement which had been concluded between h i s Government and 
the Ottoman Government t o maintain the "status quo" i n Kuwait, and said 
t h a t h i s country had spared no e f f o r t s t o act i n accordance w i t h the 
s p i r i t o f the guarantees given. The Turkish a u t h o r i t i e s , however, had 
done as much as they could to d i s t u r b Sheikh Mubarak. O'Connor added 
that B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t s lay not only i n freedom f o r a l l nations to trade 
i n the Arabian Gulf, but t h a t she also had p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t s 
i n the area which she had t o safeguard. 
The Viceroy of I n d i a , Lord Curzon, showed no enthusiasm f o r 
diplomatic discussions which were being he l d w i t h the Ottoman Government. 
For him Kuwait was an important s t a t i o n on the route to I n d i a and f o r t h i s 
reason B r i t a i n should be ready t o defend i t at any moment. Hence i t was 
(31) 
l o g i c a l t h a t the B r i t i s h should declare i t a p r o t e c t o r a t e . 
Meanwhile, the upsets to the B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the Gulf increased 
because o f the troublesome s i t u a t i o n i n Qatar and Nejd on the one hand, and 
i n Kuwait on the other. Ibn Rashaid, the,Emir of Nejd, contacted Sheikh 
Jassim, the Emir of Qatar, w i t h a view t o forming a strong a l l i a n c e against 
Abd-al-'Azaiz Ben Sa'ud, who captured Riyadh, but Sheikh Jassim r e j e c t e d 
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the proposed t r e a t y . The a f f a i r s i n Kuwait were much more dangerous. 
I n September 1902, Yusif el-Ibrahaim made his l a s t attempt to invade 
Kuwait, having f i r s t made c e r t a i n t h a t Mustapha Nuri Pasha, the Wali 
of Basra, would not oppose him. Yusif f i t t e d out two dhows, loaded 
w i t h men and arms, and proceeded t o Kuwait. However, a report concerning 
the proposed attack on Kuwait reached the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident at 
Bushire, and he i n s t r u c t e d Lieutenant J.G. Armstrong, the commander of 
(32) 
the 'Lapwing', which was then l y i n g o f f Fao, to proceed t o Kuwait. 
The r e s u l t of t h i s manoeuvre was t h a t when the dhows approached the 
shores of Kuwait, they found the Kuwaitis prepared to meet them. There-
f o r e they turned round and made a run f o r the Persian s i d e , w i t h the 
•Lapwing' i n p u r s u i t . A gun b a t t l e ensued, i n which one English o f f i c e r 
was k i l l e d and two i n j u r e d . The 'Lapwing' captured the two empty dhows 
(33) 
and took them to Bassra f o r f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
Sheikh Mubarak now made a c a r e f u l i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o discover the 
i d e n t i t y of the leader of the campaign. He xvas convinced t h a t i t had 
been mounted at the i n s t i g a t i o n of h i s enemy, Yusif-el~Ibrahaim, working 
i n cooperation w i t h h i s nephews, and he informed Wratislaw that he had 
witnesses t o tha t e f f e c t . I n r e p l y , Wratislaw i n s t r u c t e d him to send 
the witnesses to Basra so that he could hear t h e i r testimony. Sheikh 
Mubarak complied w i t h t h i s request and his witnesses t e s t i f i e d before 
Wratislaw. Flowever, there was no conclusive proof against Y u s i f - e l -
Ibrahaim and no r e a l evidence of h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the campaign. 
I n 1902, however, O'Connor was i n s t r u c t e d to make a protest 
and, at the same time, t o warn the Turkish Government t o desist from 
t h e i r attempts to d i s t u r b the " s t a t u s quo" i n Kuwait. I n a d d i t i o n , 
O'Connor asked Tewfaik Pasha to remove Yusif-el-Ibrahaim and Mubarak's 
nephews from the area. 
Wh i l s t these manoeuvres between Yusif-el-Ibrahaim and Sheikh 
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Mubarak, and between the Turkish and B r i t i s h Governments were taking' 
place, the Russian warship 'Vanyag' a r r i v e d i n Kuwait on December 12th, 
1902. The Russian Consul at Basra and two of the ship's o f f i c e r s 
came ashore and v i s i t e d Sheikh Mubarak. At the meeting the Consul asked 
the Sheikh whether B r i t i s h warships ever c a l l e d at Kuwait. He explained 
t h a t he came t o o f f e r the services of h i s Government should they obtain 
a concession f o r a r a i l w a y from Alexandretta to Kuwait. 
I n r e p l y to t h i s o f f e r , Sheikh Mubarak said t h a t he r e g r e t t e d 
that he would not be able t o make an agreement w i t h the Russians because 
they a l l i e d themselves w i t h the Belgians i n I r a n , and helped them t o 
extend t h e i r a u t h o r i t y over the I r a n i a n customs, e s p e c i a l l y at Muhammara.'' 
At t h i s , the Russian Consul informed the Sheikh t h a t the deeds of the 
Belgians i n Muhammara were no d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r deeds i n other c i t i e s 
of I r a n , such as Bander 'Abbas and Bushire. Sheikh Mubarak pointed out, 
however, that Muhammara was not l i k e any other c i t y of I r a n , since i t was 
independent of Persia and for m e r l y c o n t r o l l e d by 'Athman ben Mumluk. 
The Bani Ka'ab had seized i t and the present r u l e r Sheikh Ka.z »al ben H a j i 
Jabir-Merdaw, was his close f r i e n d . Hence Mubarak could not make an 
agreement w i t h any European power. 
The Russian Consul now promised to reconsider the Belgian 
matter, so Sheikh Mubarak promised i n tu r n t o accept the agreement a f t e r 
the Russians had put an end t o the Belgian a u t h o r i t y over the Muhammara 
customs. The Russian consul l e f t Kuwait on December 14th, Before 
l e a v i n g , he presented the Sheikh w i t h a double-barrelled gun and f i v e 
chambered revolver. Following the Russian Consul's v i s i t to Kuwait, 
three B r i t i s h ships a r r i v e d i n Kuwait, and Colonel Kembell v i s i t e d Sheikh 
Mubarak. He renewed the agreement w i t h him, increasing the guarantees 
of the B r i t i s h Government as t o the independence of Kuwait and t h e i r 
assurance of defence against any f o r e i g n power's agression. I n r e t u r n 
Sheikh Mubarak promised not to allow any f o r e i g n i n t e r e s t s other than 
(39) 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n h i s t e r r i t o r y . Colonel Kemball considered 
that i t was his Government's duty to protect Kuwait and B r i t a i n was 
determined t o put her agreement i n t o f o r c e . Hence, he ordered a party 
of marines t o land w i t h four machine guns to defend Kuwait against the 
harrassment of I b n Rashaid. Kembell was obliged t o land h i s men because 
the T u r k i s h Government had broken i t s promises not t o send forces t o 
Kuwait by supporting Ibn Rashaid w i t h arms and men. 
On March 4th, 1903, the Russian cruiser 'Boyarin' made a c a l l 
at Kuwait which l a s t e d f o r 4 days. The c a l l did not occasion any anxiety 
w i t h regard t o the s i t u a t i o n there. 
As a r e s u l t of the Baghdad railway scheme f i e r c e h o s t i l i t y 
was aroused between Russia and Germany because both Governments were 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the scheme and wanted to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the extension of 
the r a i l w a y i n the Gulf area. 
I n 1903 Lord Curzon was able to tour a l l the Arabian Gulf 
countries i n c l u d i n g Kuwait, where he spent two days as a guest of Sheikh 
Mubarak. This v i s i t , i n d i c a t e d the triumph of the B r i t i s h influence i n 
the p r i n c i p a l i t y a f t e r strong competition w i t h the Turkish. Thus Kuwait 
became openly a zone of the B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e . The purpose of Curzon's 
tour was r e a l l y to show t h a t B r i t a i n was determined to defend her p o s i t i o n 
i n the Gulf, come what may. I n 1904, a f t e r the "Entente" agreement had 
strengthened the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the Middle East, the Government of 
I n d i a i n s t a l l e d a p o l i t i c a l agent i n Kuwait. 
I n November 1904, the Turkish Government protested t o the 
B r i t i s h Government because of the l a t t e r ' s nomination of a pub l i c agent 
i n Kuwait, and described t h i s deed as a clear v i o l a t i o n of the "status 
quo". Meanwhile, Germany decided i t would be b e t t e r to stay i n the 
background and work i n d i r e c t l y by e x p l o i t i n g differences between the 
the B r i t i s h and the Russians on one side, and between the Turkish and 
(43) 
the B r i t i s h on the other. From 1905 u n t i l the outbreak of the 
f i r s t w o r l d war i n 1914, n e g o t i a t i o n s were held between the B r i t i s h , . 
German, Russian and Turkish Governments over the Baghdad railway and the 
" s t a t u s quo" i n Kuwait. The Anglo-Russian o b j e c t i o n was increased a f t e r 
the new agreement i n 1907 between them concerning t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n 
Persia and s e t t i n g out separate spheres of influence i n Persia. This 
subject became an important element separating Germany from England, 
France and Russia. I n August, 1911, the Potsdam conference was held 
between the German Emperor and Russian Emperor to consider the points 
under d i s p u t e . The r e s u l t of the meeting a f t e r much more p o l i t i c a l 
hedging was t h a t Germany undertook not t o i n t e r f e r e i n the Russian 
concession i n Persia,.and Russia undertook not t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the 
(44) 
r a ilway l i n e connecting Baghdad w i t h Europe. 
This s t i p u l a t i o n r e f e r r e d t o Berlin-Baghdad railway proposals, 
which the Russians promised not t o hinder i n any way. I n 1914, the 
Baghdad r a i l w a y proposals were reconsidered i n the l a s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
conference, and a s o l u t i o n was reached through a m o d i f i c a t i o n of the 
agreement between the German and the Turkish banks. 
The French Government obtained a concession from the Sultan 
to e s t a b l i s h a l i n k j o i n i n g t h e i r concession i n Syria and Palestine i n 
Alexandretta and the Baghdad r a i l w a y . French c a p i t a l was f i r m l y committed 
to the Baghdad railway and agreement f a c i l i t a t i n g i t s progress could only 
be welcomed i n France. Thus, the French Government was kept informed of 
the state of n e g o t i a t i o n s . The German government was more closely 
concerned than any other power and was i n d e f i n i t e competition w i t h 
France f o r the arrangement w i t h Turkey. However, these arrangements 
were f o l l o w e d by n e g o t i a t i o n s between the B r i t i s h and Turkish Governments, 
which ended i n the signing of an agreement on J u l y 29th, 1913, concerning 
the a f f a i r s of the Gulf and s p e c i a l l y Kuwait and Baghdad ra i l w a y . 
Under t h i s agreement, i n the items of which the concurrence of the Sheikh 
had been secured, the t e r r i t o r y of Kuwait was recognised as an autonomous 
"Qaza" of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman f l a g was t o be flown by the 
Sheikh, but he was to have the r i g h t t o i n s e r t a d i s t i n c t i v e symbol i n 
the corner, and to be a Qaimaqam appointed by the Turkish Government. 
The boundaries of the Sheikh's immediate t e r r i t o r y and h i s wider t r i b a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n were d e l i m i t e d and the Tu r k i s h Government recognised the 
e x i s t i n g agreement between Sheikh Mubarak and the B r i t i s h Government. 
Regarding the Baghdad r a i l w a y , i n the case of the extension of the railway 
to Kuwait, both the Governments agreed on the arrangement of p r o t e c t i n g 
the l i n e . The B r i t i s h Government undertook on t h e i r p a r t , not t o a l t e r 
the nature of B r i t i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h Kuwait, nor to e s t a b l i s h a protectorate 
there as long as the "status quo", as defined i n the convention, underwent 
(45) 
no change. 
On June 15th, 1914 an agreement was reached between the B r i t i s h 
and German Governments concerning the Baghdad railxvay, i n which B r i t a i n 
recognised the importance of the Baghdad railway f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic development. B r i t a i n also promised to support the German proposal 
to extend the r a i l w a y t o Basra. The German Government accepted B r i t i s h 
c a p i t a l i n the committee of the Baghdad railway company, as a r e s u l t of 
which B r i t a i n possessed c e r t a i n r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s . The two p a r t i e s 
agreed t h a t Basra would be the end of the l i n e , and also the German 
Government would give up her r i g h t to extend a l i n e t o the Arabian Gulf. 
The Germans undertood not t o e s t a b l i s h a port on the Arabian Gulf as 
they thought before, and not to support any f o r e i g n power i n t h i s a c t i o n . 
The two p a r t i e s undertood t o negotiate w i t h the Turkish 
Government concerning the navig a t i o n of the T i g r i s and Euphrates. 
53. 
I t seems th e r e f o r e t h a t the Baghdad ra i l w a y dispute was ended 
when the German diplomacy succeeded i n persuading Russia, France and 
B r i t a i n to accept her i n t e r e s t s . The German's aim,was to expand 
eastwards. However, the outbreak of the F i r s t World War k i l l e d as 
these German hopes, and the German c a p i t a l which had been deployed i n 
the Middle East was a l l l o s t . Meanwhile B r i t a i n declared th a t Kuwait 
was an independent p r i n c i p a l i t y under B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n , and they then 
removed the l a s t Turkish strongholds i n the Arabian Gulf. The B r i t i s h 
troops advanced t o Basra and Baghdad r e a l i s i n g t h e i r h i s t o r i c hopes i n 
the dominating of Mesopotamia, w h i l e the Germans' m i l i t a r y hopes were 
e x t i n g u i s h i n g i n that area. 
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57. 
C H A P T E R T H R E E 
TURKISH RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT 
1900-1906 
There i s no doubt, from the h i s t o r i c a l evidence, that the Sheikh 
of Kuwait recognized the Turkish p r o t e c t o r a t e when he r a i s e d the Ottoman 
f l a g over h i s palace during Medhat Pasha's expedition, which was designed 
to b r i n g about submission of the Emir of Nejd i n 1871. This acknowledgement 
of Turkish a u t h o r i t y was an important f a c t o r which promoted closer contact 
between the Turks and the emirs o f the Arabian Coast. Because of h i s 
importance, and i n r e t u r n f o r services rendered, the Turks bestowed on the 
Sheikh of Kuwait the t i t l e o f Pasha. , He was also given vast lands i n the 
v i c i n i t y of El-Fao, i t appears t h a t during t h i s same period a Turkish 
customs a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was established i n Kuwait. However, a f t e r Mubarak 
became Sheikh i n 1896 r e l a t i o n s between Turkey and Kuwait took a tu r n f o r 
the worse, both because of the secret agreement which Kuwait made w i t h 
B r i t a i n i n 1899, and on account of the h o s t i l e a c t i v i t i e s and schemings of 
Hamdi Pasha, the Wall of Basra. Relations between Kuwait and Turkish 
I r a q d i d , however, improve temporarily when Muhsin Pasha succeeded Hamdi 
Pasha i n B a s r a . ^ 
o 
I n June 1900 i t was reported that Muhsin had been created a Pasha 
and had received an " I r a d e " from the Sultan. I n a d d i t i o n , i t was learned 
t h a t various p r o j e c t s which had been set i n motion by Hamdi Pasha w i t h a 
view to e s t a b l i s h i n g Turkish a u t h o r i t y i n Kuwait and which were d i s t a s t e f u l 
(2) 
to Mubarak, had been dropped. I n August of the same year, several 
attempts were made t o persuade Sheikh Mubarak to v i s i t Basra, but the l a t t e r 
(3) 
made excuses f o r avoiding contact w i t h the Turkish a u t h o r i t i e s . 
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I n the same month, a f f a i r s i n Kuwait were f u r t h e r complicated 
by the connection of the p r i n c i p a l i t y w i t h the disturbances i n the i n t e r i o r 
of Arabia. Sheikh Mubarak, r e a l i z i n g t h a t his r i v a l , Ibn Rashaid, the Emir 
of H a i l , had embraced the cause o f h i s enemy, Yusif el-Ibrahaim and of h i s 
nephews, Muhammad and Jarrah, was not l i k e l y to neglect any opportunity 
he might have o f weakening the a u t h o r i t y and influence of Ibn Rashaid. 
Such an o p p o r t u n i t y presented i t s e l f i n the shape of 'Abd-al-Ruhman ben 
F a i s a l of the Sa'ud dynasty, the former r u l e r s of Riyadh, who had been 
gtispossessed by Muhammad ben Rashaid i n 1892. At the same time Sheikh 
Mubarak f e l t t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n was strong because of h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h 
the B r i t i s h . ^  Accordingly, he made up his mind to a v a i l himself of the 
o p p o r t u n i t y , e s p e c i a l l y when, i n August, 1900, Ibn Sa'ud received a l e t t e r 
from his supporters i n Nejd, expressing t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o espouse h i s 
(5) 
cause should he make a move to recover h i s l o s t a u t h o r i t y . 
I n the meantime, Sa'adun Pasha, Chief of the semi-independent 
Muntafiq. t r i b e s , had raided Nejd from the north w i t h great success, and 
had gained a considerable amount o f booty. He was pursued by Ibn Rashaid 
w i t h a large f o r c e and a f t e r a p e t t y skirmish, he r e t i r e d w i t h h i s men and 
most of h i s l o o t t o Turkish t e r r i t o r y . Sa'adun Pasha wrote t o Sheikh 
Mubarak seeking h i s help against Ibn Rashaid. Meanwhile, Sheikh Mubarak 
was awaiting the r e t u r n of Ibn Rashaid from h i s engagement w i t h the MuntafiQ, 
His i n t e n t i o n was to storm h i s enemy. On re c e i v i n g Sa'adun Pasha's l e t t e r , 
he ordered a force under the leadership:.of h is brother Sheikh Hamud and h i s 
son Salim t o march to Samawah on the road of Gershan, w h i l s t he himself 
marched w i t h another force on the road Zubair, These events occured on 
October 29th 1900. He l e f t at Jahara and Subaihiya 9,000 horsemen and 
3,000 i n f a n t r y t o watch f o r the r e t u r n of Ibn Rashaid, l e s t he should escape. 
Sa'adun Pasha was now at Shatra and Ibn Rashaid near Samawa i n the Wilayat 
of Baghdad. The forces of Mubarak and those of Sa'adun now joi n e d together 
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w i t h o u t much d i f f i c u l t y , and once u n i t e d were equal, i f not s l i g h t l y 
superior i n number, t o the troops which Ibn Rashaid then had on the 
spot. 
I n due coursej however, Muhsin Pasha intervened to put an end t o 
t h i s wa», w i t h the r e s u l t that both the p a r t i e s agreed t o r e t u r n home. Ibn 
Rashaid malting the f i r s t move. Mubarak was accompanied on his homeward 
journey by the Mutassarif of the Nassirya. He intended to meet Muhsin 
Pasha near Zubair. On 17th November, 1900 Sheikh Mubarak a r r i v e d near 
Zubair and took up quarters i n the palace o f the naqaib of Basra at Rafidhiya. 
There he was v i s i t e d by Muhsin Pasha, who endeavoured t o persuade him t o 
t r a v e l t o Basra. The l a t t e r succeeded i n h i s aim, w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t 
on the 18th November 1900, he and Sayid T a l i b e l Naqaib were able t o escort 
Mubarak t o Basra. Thus, Mubarak recognized to some extent Turkish 
suzerainty and i t i s f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t he gave the Sultan and assurance 
of h i s f i d e l i t y , and promised t o cease "coquetting w i t h f o r e i g n powers", 
Mubarak also emphasised th a t he had withdrawn his forces without attacking 
the emir ^ of_Hajl_,_Ibn Rashaid. ^  On the 19th of the same month he returned 
t o Zubair,' and thence t o Kuwait. 
Mubarak had put hi m s e l f t o much expense and trouble i n arranging 
and supporting a large army, and yet, at the VJali's command, he had simply 
returned home without gaining anything. By h i s v i s i t t o Basra he had 
allowed the Turks t o strengthen t h e i r claims to sovereignty over Kuwait, 
which indeed i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the w a l i s and the Sultan since h i s 
(9) 
accession t o the Sheikhship, he had constantly admitted. The aim of 
the Turks i n so ac t i n g was to squash f i r m l y the idea of making Kuwait-
independent of the Ottoman Empire, but the arrangement thus concluded 
lacked substance f o r the Sheikh's submission was feigned, and he was i n 
r e a l i t y on the point of adopting an independent p o l i c y . At the same time, 
however, Sheikh Mubarak was being i n s t r u c t e d by the B r i t i s h Government, 
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through the p o l i t i c a l r esident at Bushire, to keep q u i e t . Mubarak's 
r e t o r t to these i n s t r u c t i o n s was to inform the B r i t i s h t h a t so long as 
Yusi f ~ e l - I b r a h a i m remained w i t h Ibn Rashaid i n Nejd, the former would 
not keep q u i e t , but would urge Ibn Rashaid to attack Kuwait. 
I n view of the intransigence of both sides i t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g 
t h a t the h o s t i l i t i e s between Sheikh Mubarak and Ibn Rashaid were soon renewed. 
As we mentioned before, Abd-al-Ruhman Ibn Sa'ud had received a l e t t e r from 
h i s supporters i n Nejd, expressing t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to espouse h i s cause, 
should he make a move t o recover h i s l o s t a u t h o r i t y . Therefore Ibn 
Sa'ud decided to move out to Kuwait and to appeal to Mubarak f o r assistance. 
The l a t t e r now ordered the Bedouin t r i b e s subject to Kuwait t o support 
I b n Sa'ud i n h i s r a i d s upon Nejd from the East. 'Abd-al-'Azaiz Ibn Sa'ud 
stru c k at Riyadh i t s e l f e a r l y i n 1901. He succeeded i n entering the 
(11) 
town but Ibn Rashaid's g a r r i s o n h e l d out i n the f o r t s . At the same 
time Sheikh Mubarak l e f t Kuwait w i t h a large number of tribesmen, leaving 
h i s son J a b i r i n charge of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n there. Mubarak and h i s 
forces proceeded to Riyadh. However the news from Riyadh reached Mubarak 
informing him tha t Ibn Sa'ud had entered the town on the 15th February. 
A f t e r t h i s 'Abd-al-'Azaiz was i n s t a l l e d as governor there. Some members 
of the f a m i l y of Ibn Rashaid now entered i n t o negotiations w i t h the 
(12) 
triumphant invader, and at the same time Ibn Rashaid's garrison held 
out i n the f o r t s . Mubarak strengthened h i s p o s i t i o n among h i s Bedouin 
adherents, and a f i e r c e and bloody engagement which took place on the 
17th March at S a r r a i f , about 20 miles n o r t h east of Buraida i n Qasaim, so 
a l t e r e d the s i t u a t i o n that Sheikh Mubarak was obliged to beat a hasty r e t r e a t 
from Nejd. The casualties of Mubarak's side are said to, have been very 
heavy, some 2,000 having been k i l l e d i n act i o n or subsequently perishing 
i n the desert. About 400 of Ibn Rashaid's supporters are said t o have 
perished, i n c l u d i n g h i s brother T a l a l . Amongst those l o s t to Mubarak 
were two of h i s cousins, some of h i s p r i n c i p a l c h i e f s , and his brother 
(13) 
Hamud. I t was even rumoured f o r a time that Sheikh Mubarak himself 
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had been k i l l e d i n t h i s a t t a c k . I n the meantime 'Abd-al-Azaia Ibn Sa'ud, 
h i s p o s i t i o n having become untenable, a f t e r the defeat of Sheikh Mubarak 
(14) 
at S a r a i f , r e l u c t a n t l y withdrew from Riyadh. 
As a r e s u l t of t h i s b a t t l e the B r i t i s h were placed i n a d i f f i c u l t 
p o s i t i o n i n view of the agreement of 1899. A warship was i n s t r u c t e d to 
s a i l to Kuwait and t h i s act was fo l l o w e d up w i t h a personal v i s i t by Colonel 
Kemball. I t i s clear t h a t the B r i t i s h were now a f r a i d l e s t a f a m i l y coup 
should occur, to the detriment of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n the Gulf. Colonel 
Kemball found Sheikh Mubarak a l i v e but i n a state of extreme m o r t i f i c a t i o n . 
The astonishing f a c t i s t h a t throughout Kemball fs v i s i t , n e i t h e r he nor 
0 5) 
Mubarak made any reference to recent, events. 
I n f a c t , crushing though h i s defeat had been, Mubarak was able 
to conceal i t s e f f e c t on him from Colonel Kemball, What he wanted t o know 
was whether or not the Turks had heard about h i s defeat and what was t h e i r 
present a t t i t u d e towards him. I t appears that Sheikh Mubarak h i d the news 
of his defeat even from h i s f r i e n d , Khaz'al, Sheikh of Muhammara, w h i l s t 
h i s son, Sheikh J a b i r , was kept i n ignorance of the death of h i s uncle Hamud 
(1 c \ 
during the b a t t l e . 
I t was expected th a t the Turks would now take advantage of Sheikh 
Mubarak's defeat and resume both t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n Kuwait and t h e i r 
influence i n the AraMan Gulf. These expectations were f u l f i l l e d f o r Muhsin 
Pasha, Wali of Basra, became active and received a v i s i t from Qasim Pasha, 
the Commander i n Chief o f the Turkish Forces i n I r a q and nephew of the Sultan. 
That was i n A p r i l 1901. Qasim Pasha came at the head of Turkish Forces, 
which i t was rumoured would be used by the Turks against Mubarak. At the 
same time the Turks sent a warship t o Kuwait. These o v e r t l y h o s t i l e acts 
induced the B r i t i s h M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s t o w r i t e i n haste t o the 
B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Turkey requesting him to draw the a t t e n t i o n of the 
Sultan's Government t o the dangerous s i t u a t i o n t o the north of the Arabian 
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Gulf, and t o remind them of the p o s s i b i l i t y that the B r i t i s h would support 
the Sheikh of Kuwait i n accordance w i t h t h e i r promises to him as set out 
(17) 
i n the convention of 1899. 
The a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y adopted by Mushin Pasha now saved the 
s i t u a t i o n . The Turkish forces remained i n the neighbourhood of the c i t y 
of Kuwait w h i l e Qasim Pasha paid a f r i e n d l y v i s i t to Sheikh Mubarak. The 
w a l i ' s endeavours t o persuade Sheikh Mubarak t o allow Turkish forces t o 
remain i n Kuwait f a i l e d , but he d i d succeed i n persuading the Sheikh t o 
accompany him t o Fao, where he declared h i s allegiance t o the Sultan. 
Afterwards he returned t o Kuwait bound now by a double allegiance. 
A short time l a t e r the Mushir Muhammad Pasha, Commander i n Chief 
of the Turkish forces v i s i t e d Baghdad and Basra, whence he sent a special 
message t o Sheikh Mubarak i n March 1901, proposing that they should meet 
to discuss Muslim a f f a i r s and p a r t i c u l a r l y the t r i b a l disputes which were 
responsible f o r hundreds of deaths amongst the Sultan's Muslim subjects. 
Sheikh Mubarak thanked the Mushir, but he did not commit himself to t r a v e l 
(19) to Basra. . 
So f a r as the emir of Nejd, I b n Rashaid, was concerned, the c r i s i s 
had now passed. The Turkish Government, guided by the advice of Mushir 
Muhammad Pasha, gaVe no encouragement t o Ibn Rashaid. Disgusted by the 
Turk i s h a t t i t u d e , he now sought B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n . Meanwhile Sheikh 
Mubarak asked, through the Commander of the "Sphinx" that the B r i t i s h 
Government should e s t a b l i s h a permanent protectorate over Kuwait as soon 
... (20) as p o s s i b l e . 
I n f a c t the B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the Gulf allowed f o r h o s t i l e 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h some Arab leaders. Early i n June 1901, Fahad Pasha, the 
agent of I b n Rashaid i n Nejd, was seen i n Basra. He sent a sp e c i a l 
message to Wratislaw, the B r i t i s h Consul there, saying that the Emir of 
Nejd had l o s t patience w i t h the Turks, who d i d not give him ma t e r i a l help, 
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though they made considerable demands on him. For t h i s reason, he 
requested t h a t Nejd should be given B r i t i s h protectorate status s i m i l a r 
to t h a t afforded to Kuwait. The c o n d i t i o n set by Faham Pasha was that 
Mubarak should abdicate the throne i n favour of h i s nephews. He added 
that i t was i n the power of Ben Rashaid to do t h i s on condition t h a t the 
B r i t i s h would remain n e u t r a l and would supply him w i t h arms. For h i s 
part he would allow B r i t a i n t o have complete domination over Kuwait and 
would guarantee t h a t the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the proposed railway across 
northern Nejd would be c a r r i e d out i n complete safety. Ibn Rashaid had 
learned of the r a i l w a y p r o j e c t from the previous B r i t i s h Consul at Baghdad, 
Col. Loch. The B r i t i s h Consul at Basra informed Fahad Pasha that h i s 
Government would t r e a t Ibn Rashaid's proposals w i t h respect due to one as 
able and as important as he.^ 2"^ 
Wratislaw now contacted London where he received Lord Salisbury's 
r e p l y i n which the Foreign M i n i s t e r s t a t e d t h a t , w h i l s t he appreciated the 
f r i e n d s h i p o f Ibn Rashaid, yet he was not w i l l i n g t o e f f e c t any p o l i t i c a l 
(22) 
change i n Kuwait. This news was duly passed on to Ibn Rashaid. I n 
f a c t , i t appears from the a v a i l a b l e documents that Fahad Pasha had been 
sent by Ibn Rashaid merely t o meet the Mushir Muhammad Pasha i n Basra, and 
he c r i t i c i s e d the Wali Muhsin Pasha and accused him of dealing too l e n i e n t l y 
w i t h Sheikh Mubarak. But Fahad Pasha f a i l e d i n h i s mission to the Turkish 
Commander i n Basra, and he was authorised to meet the B r i t i s h Consul. He 
met Wratislaw and they held the f i r s t discussions i n the l i g h t of the f a c t 
t h a t Lord Salisbury's r e p l y had closed the door to Fahad Pasha's aims. 
At t h i s time Lord Curzon, Viceroy of I n d i a , was convinced of the necessity 
of e s t a b l i s h i n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Emir of Nejd and of avoiding 
completely any i n t e r f e r e n c e i n h i s a f f a i r s . He suggested sending a 
mission o f B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s from Egypt v i a Aqaba to a l l a y Ottoman suspicion, 
the arrangement f o r t h i s mission being prepared i n co-operation w i t h the 
emir's agent at Basra. Lord Curzon wrote to the Minister of Foreign 
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A f f a i r s i n London: "We can e x p l a i n to the emir the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of dismissing 
Sheikh Mubarak from Kuwait's sovereignty, but that we are ready t o prevent 
him from new h o s t i l i t i e s i n Nejd and t o put a l l our diplomatic power towards 
(23) 
preventing any Turkish h o s t i l i t i e s there. 
I n order t o achieve t h i s end, Lord Curzon ordered Colonel Kemball 
to t r a v e l to Kuwait to arrange some sort of armistice or peace t r e a t y 
between the emir and the sheikh. At the beginning of August 1901, Colonel 
Kemball met Sheikh Mubarak and the l a t t e r suggested t h a t Sheikh Khaz'al 
should act as an intermediary between him and Ibn Rashaid. 
Colonel Kenball i n s t r u c t e d the B r i t i s h Consul i n Basra t o meet 
the emir's agent there. The increasing rumours concerning the railway 
scheme occasioned some f r e s h diplomatic problems i n the r e l a t i o n s between 
the B r i t i s h and the Ottoman Empire and i t was d i f f i c u l t to contact Sheikh 
(24) 
Khaz'al through Basra. Ibn Rashaid who was also aware that the 
s i t u a t i o n was worsening and p r e f e r r e d t o continue i n h i s allegiance t o 
the Turks. The Turkish Government f o r i t s p a r t , put pressure on Ibn 
Rashaid i n August 1901, t o r e s t r a i n him from reaching any accommodation 
w i t h the B r i t i s h Government. 
The Turks, who now seemed to be d r i f t i n g i n t o a pronounced 
p a r t i s a n s h i p f o r Ibn Rashaid began t o concentrate troops upon the Euphrates, 
and on 24th August the Turkish gunboat Zahaf a r r i v e d at Kuwait i v h i l s t the 
(25) 
B r i t i s h "Presens" was there. The Turkish gunboat was warned by the 
B r i t i s h commander to leave the harbour, but the Captain of the Turkish gun 
boat ignored the warning and c a l l e d on Sheikh Mubarak on the 25th„ I n the 
course o f his v i s i t he endeavoured t o persuade the sheikh to recognize 
Turkish a u t h o r i t y over Kuwait. When Sheikh Mubarak refused, the Captain 
assumed a threatening tone and sa i d t h a t he would go to Basra and r e p o r t 
on the s t a t e of a f f a i r s , a f t e r which he would r e t u r n w i t h ships and troops 
to enforce Turkish a u t h o r i t y . 
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A f t e r t h i s f a i l u r e , the Turks t r i e d t o persuade Ibn Rashaid to 
make an attack on Kuwait, p r o v i d i n g him w i t h arms and w i t h men f o r t h i s 
purpose. Accordingly Ibh Rashaid moved towards Kuwait e v i d e n t l y acting 
i n accordance w i t h a plan worked out i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the Turks; and 
i n November, 1901, he occupied Safwan which was w i t h i n 16 hours t r a v e l l i n g 
(27) 
distance of Kuwait. Having got thus f a r he decided t o continue 
besieging Kuwait w h i l s t awaiting a convenient opportunity to a t t a c k . 
Meanwhile Sheikh Mubarak concentrated h i s t r i b a l l e v i e s and 
wrote to Sa'adun Pasha, requesting him to come w i t h h i s tribesmen t o Kuwait. 
At the same time, Shiekh Mubarak wrote t o the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l Resident i n 
Bushire, informing him of Ibn Rashaid's i n t e n t i o n towards Kuwait. The 
B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident responded by sending three B r i t i s h warships to 
Kuwait. The crews of the ships, aided by a large number of the c i t i z e n s , 
dug a d i t c h around the c i t y as a means o f p r o t e c t i o n against outside enemies, 
Ibn Rashaid's o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n was to make his f i r s t r a i d on 
the Jahara, 15 miles d i s t a n t from Kuwait, but he was thwarted i n h i s aim by 
the presence of the Kuwaiti forces. He now turned h i s a t t e n t i o n t o S.ubaihiya 
but i t was empty, so he returned t o Warah where he came across a caravan of 
the Mutair t r i b e which was coming out of Kuwait. He plundered 800 sheep 
and 2,700 camels, a l l belonging to the people of Kuwait. Ibn Rashaid 
eventually reached Kuwait, but was t o l d by one of h i s spies about the forces 
i n the town, together w i t h the ditches and other preparations which had been 
made to h o l d o f f any attack. R e a l i s i n g that the B r i t i s h had probably also 
made naval preparations, Ibn Rashaid moved o f f slowly and r e l u c t a n t l y t o 
H a f a r . ( 2 9 ) 
Sheikh Mubarak had not the s l i g h t e s t idea t h a t the Turkish 
a u t h o r i t i e s were behind Ibn Rashaid. Hence, i n November, 1901, he wrote 
to Mustapha Nuri Pasha, the W a l i of Basra, to inform him of the behaviour 
of h i s enemy, Ibn Rashaid, towards Kuwait, and to complain about h i s attacks 
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on and harassment of the t r i b e s . He s t a t e d that he was sure t h a t the 
Sublime Porte would disapprove of Ibn Rashaid's h o s t i l e acts against his 
l o y a l Kuwaiti subjects. The Wali answered immediately sending a message 
to Sheikh Mubarak i n Kuwait w i t h one of h i s men i n which he s t a t e d ( i n t e r 
a l i a ) t h a t the Ottoman Empire c e r t a i n l y condemned the deeds of Ibn Rashaid 
and had only the strongest disapproval f o r his h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e . • The 
severest punishment would be i n f l i c t e d on him i f he d i d not change his 
a t t i t u d e . On o f f i c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s Ibn Rashaid's fol l o w e r s were driven 
out of Basra. 
On reading the above message Sheikh Mubarak realise'd t h a t the 
Tur k i s h a u t h o r i t i e s were l y i n g . However, he kept s i l e n t , and d i d not 
reve a l h i s suspicions to the Wall's messenger. On the contrary, he 
welcomed him and thanked him. He expressed h i s pleasure t o hear that the 
Ottoman Empire had heeded his complaint and had dealt f a i r l y w i t h him 
against h i s enemy. He gave the messenger g i f t s and presents f o r the Wali. 
Meanwhile he remained a l e r t and took measures t o meet h i s enemy. 
As a r e s u l t , the Turks were concerned l e s t Sheikh Mubarak should 
cause t r o u b l e . Thus, they issued a supreme decree by which he was t o be 
e x i l e d from Kuwait. He was given the option e i t h e r of t r a v e l l i n g t o 
Constantinople, being appointed l e g a l adviser t o the s t a t e , or of dwelling 
i n an Ottoman country where he would be paid a monthly salary by the s t a t e , 
amounting t o 150 Ottoman L i r e , I f he refused t o take one of these courses, 
he was t o be driven out of Kuwait by f o r c e . At the end of November, 1901, 
Mustapha Pasha, the Wali of Basra, informed Sheikh Mubarak i n w r i t i n g of 
(32) 
the Supreme Decree, asking him to inform him promptly of h i s choice. 
Sheikh Mubarak was seemingly unmoved. He wrote a l e t t e r t o Mustapha Pasha, 
p o i n t i n g out the services which h i s f o r e f a t h e r s had rendered t o strengthen 
the a u t h o r i t y of the Ottoman Empire, and expl a i n i n g that he was also 
f o l l o w i n g the same course i n obeying t h e i r orders. For t h i s reason he 
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d i d not deserve t o be e x i l e d from h i s country. 
T h i s attempt was, of course, q u i t e useless since the w a l i had 
no power t o r e s c i n d the decree which had been issued from Constantinople. 
Sheikh Mubarak was f u l l y aware of t h i s , but h i s i n t e n t i o n i n acting t h i s 
way was t o gain time w h i l s t he wrote t o the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident i n 
the Gulf, informing him about the i n t e n t i o n s of the Ottoman Government. 
The B r i t i s h Resident promised Mubarak th a t the B r i t i s h would help him. 
He reported t o h i s Government t h a t i f the B r i t i s h d i d not check and stop 
- (33) the a c t i o n of the Turks, Mubarak would have to j o i n them. The Captains 
of the "Pomone" and "Redbreast" v i s i t e d the Sheikh and informed him th a t he 
would undoubtedly receive B r i t i s h support; but he was much depressed and 
said t h a t although he was i n favour of Kuwait being a B r i t i s h protectorate 
and p u t t i n g i n t o force h i s agreement w i t h the B r i t i s h , he had not yet 
received any d e f i n i t e w r i t t e n assurance from the P o l i t i c a l Resident at 
Bushire t h a t the B r i t i s h Government would protect him. Further, i f he 
d i d not receive an assurance, he would have t o make terms w i t h the Turks, 
(34) 
who were uncomfortably close and of whom he was a f r a i d . 
Mustapha Nuri Pasha knew t h a t Sheikh Mubarak would not r e a d i l y 
leave Kuwait, and t h a t he was already planning t o avoid any enforced 
departure. He thought i t b e t t e r , t h e r e f o r e , to allow him as l i t t l e room 
f o r manoeuvre as possible, so he ordered h i s brother, Mir »Allai Najib Bey, 
and Sayed Rajed Naqaib of Basra t o t r a v e l to Kuwait on one of the b i g 
Ottoman warships, the "Zahaf". He sent w i t h them a detachment of the 
army, together w i t h a copy of the telegram which had been sent from 
Constantinople. The party was under orders t o b r i n g matters t o a head, 
(35) 
and i f Mubarak disobeyed the decree, t o expel him by force from Kuwait. 
On the 1st December, 1901, the party a r r i v e d and the next day the Naqaib 
of Basra and Mir ' A l l a i Najib Bey.presented Sheikh Mubarak w i t h a l e t t e r 
c ontaining telegraphed orders from the Sultan that he must e i t h e r go to 
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Constantinople t o be a member of the Council of State at a high s a l a r y , 
or leave Kuwait and l i v e elsewhere on a state pension. An ea r l y 
r e p l y was requested. The Sheikh was very much upset at t h i s , the second 
threatening telegram which he had received from the Sultan. He decided 
not t o r e p l y at once; but to w a i t f o r some days to consider his answer. 
At f i r s t the Naqaib of Basra agreed to give Mubarak time t o t h i n k , but on 
the 4th December he changed h i s mind on the grounds t h a t he could not stay 
(37) 
i n Kuwait any longer but had t o leave f o r Basra t h a t n i g h t . An 
appointment was therefore made f o r the naqaib t o c a l l that afternoon at the 
Sheikh's house. E a r l i e r on the same day Captain Simons, the Commander of 
the "Pomone" endeavoured to persuade the Sheikh t o give an evasive reply 
u n t i l he received i n s t r u c t i o n s from the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident at 
Bushire. One the same day at 2.10 i n the afternoon, the "Sphinx" a r r i v e d 
w i t h an answer from the Resident t o the Sheikh's l e t t e r of the 30th November. 
I n r e p l y , the Resident asked Captain Simons to inform Sheikh Mubarak that 
h i s country was ready t o support him to prevent the execution of the Ottoman 
(38) 
order. 
The meeting between Mubarak and the naqaib at the Sheikh's house 
was attended by Captain P h i l i p , the Commander of the "Sphinx" and Captain 
Simons. The meeting was s h o r t , f o r Captain Simons would not l e t Sheikh 
Mubarak r e p l y t o the haqaib's question, j u s t i f y i n g h i s action on the grounds 
tha t the Sultan's two threatening telegrams were a v i o l a t i o n of his agreement 
(39) 
w i t h the B r i t i s h Government t o preserve the "status quo" i n Kuwait. 
Such a v i o l a t i o n c a l l e d f o r B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n . Captain Simons demanded 
tha t the fiaqaib should leave immediately threatening t h a t , unless he d i d so, 
he would be compelled to shoot the "Zahaf" and sink her. The ttaqaib l e f t 
Mubarak's house a n g r i l y and w i t h t h r e a t s . The "Zahaf" withdrew at 6 o'clock 
the f o l l o w i n g morning. 
The delegates now returned t o Basra where they informed the '.wali 
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o f the B r i t i s h i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the matter and of the threats of Captain 
Simons. The w a l i ordered the troops t o withdraw and the Ottoman Government-
concentrated on avoiding a c o n f l i c t w i t h the B r i t i s h . As a r e s u l t of the 
T u r k i s h attempt against Sheikh Mubarak, the B r i t i s h Government complained 
t o the Sublime Porte about the riiaqaib's behaviour and warned the Porte 
against b r i n g i n g f u r t h e r pressure upon the Sheikh. Should the l a t t e r 
warning go unheeded, the B r i t i s h Government would f i n d i t necessary to 
take a c t i o n . i n response the Turkish Government disavowed a l l knowledge 
of the naqaib*s mission and the M i n i s t e r of Foreign A f f a i r s s t a t e d t h a t 
Sheikh Mubarak's presence i n Constantinople would be an embarassment, and 
(41) 
t h a t there was no i n t e n t i o n of causing trouble to Kuwait. 
Nevertheless, the Turks, having f a i l e d i n t h e i r attempts to overawe 
the Sheikh of Kuwait by the use of force against h i s town, now made another, 
more p r a c t i c a l attempt t o r e s t r a i n him. This involved the use of the 
t h r e a t posed by Ibn Rashaid, who, w h i l s t i n the v i c i n i t y of Basra w i t h part 
o f h i s forces at the end o f December 1901, planned w i t h the Wali and mushir 
a combined land attack w i t h Turkish support on Kuwait. I n accordance w i t h 
the agreement reached, the Turkish a u t h o r i t i e s at Basra supplied Ibn Rashaid 
w i t h arms and men, and also w i t h a sum of money from the Basra treasury. 
At the same time, the T u r k i s h a u t h o r i t i e s p r o b i b i t e d the export of provisions 
t o Kuwait, which r e l i e d on Basra f o r food supplies, and thus attempted t o 
starve the town.*""^ However, the B r i t i s h warships "Perseus", "Marathan", 
"Sphinx" and "Assuage" were a l l sent t o Kuwait, which they were ordered to 
defend by force i f necessary. Simultaneously, they were t o co-operate i n 
the defence of the town by c a r r y i n g food. 
The w a l i ' s p r o h i b i t i o n of the export of provisions t o Kuwait was 
a f u r t h e r v i o l a t i o n of the undertaking to maintain the "status quo" i n 
(45) 
Kuwait, and the B r i t i s h Government served upon the Turkish Government-
due warning of t h i s f a c t . The Turkish Government announced that the Wali 
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of Basra himself had acted wit h o u t i n s t r u c t i o n s , and t h a t the Sublime Porte 
had been ordered to cancel h i s decree. 
I n January 1902, the s i t u a t i o n i n Central Arabia a l t e r e d , f o r 
important developments vrere t a k i n g place i n Nejd. These served t o draw 
T u r k i s h a t t e n t i o n towards t h a t area instead of Kuwait. Sheikh Mubarak took 
advantage of the opportunity by i n v o l v i n g himself i n the events, though 
s e c r e t l y , i n support of ^bd-al-Azaiz Ben Sa'ud against h i s enemy Inb Rashaid. 
This was e s p e c i a l l y the case when Ibn Rashaid attacked the neighbourhood of 
Kuwait and encamped there w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of attacking caravans t r a v e l l i n g 
to and from Kuwait. Sheikh Mubarak now saw that the time was r i p e f o r him 
to carry out the plan which he had drawn up on h i s f a i l u r e at the b a t t l e of 
S a r a i f . Accordingly, he went to Jahara w i t h a large number of h i s armed 
men t o d i s t r a c t the a t t e n t i o n of Ibn Rashaid, and compel him to remain i n 
areas w e l l away from h i s own p r i n c i p a l i t y . Meanwhile Sheikh Mubarak urged 
Ibn Sa'ud to go and reoccupy the c i t y of Riyadh, so taking advantage of Ibn 
Rashaid and his men. At f i r s t Ibn Sa*ud was mindful of h i s f a i l u r e i n 1901, 
when he had taken the c i t y only to lose i t again to a surprise attack by Ibn 
Rashaid. At the same time he was keen t o take advantage of such an excellent 
o p p o r t u n i t y , and so he decided to take the r i s k . Either he would win and 
so regain the g l o r y of the Sa'ud f a m i l y ; or else he would d i e , s a t i s f i e d 
that he had done h i s utmost t o regain t h a t g l o r y . He set out from Kuwait, 
equipped by Sheikh Mubarak w i t h 40 camels, 30 r i f l e s , 200 r i y a l s , a q u a n t i t y 
of p r o v i s i o n s and 40 men, most of them from the f a m i l y of Sa'ud. I n order 
to mislead h i s enemy Ibn Rashaid, he began by attacking some southern t r i b e s . 
He went t o the *Ajman t r i b e and asked them to a l l y themselves to him. 
Though the ch i e f d i d not consent t o do so, a large number of the men joined 
him. He was j o i n e d by a large number from the Mura t r i b e s , the Subair and 
the Sehoul. With them he invaded the Qahtan and Mutir t r i b e s and took from 
them as plunder a large q u a n t i t y of money. His support increased a f t e r 
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every i n v a s i o n u n t i l h i s f o l l o w e r s numbered 1,500 i n f a n t r y and 600 horsemen. 
He now decided that he was i n a p o s i t i o n to attack the c i t y of Riyadh. 
Perceiving the aim of Ibn Sa'ud's campaign, Ibn Rashaid now hastened 
to a t t a c k the borders of Kuwait i n order t o prove to Sheikh Mubarak th a t he 
d i d not consider Ibn Sa'ud worthy of h i s a t t e n t i o n , nor was he concerned 
about h i s movements i n Nejd. He then submitted a complaint to the Ottoman 
Government, p r o t e s t i n g at the r e b e l l i o u s acts of Ibn Sa'ud. The Turkish 
Government, however, took no a c t i o n t o r e s t r a i n Ibn Sa'ud, but was content 
merely to f o r b i d him to take provisions from Hasa and Q a t a i f , and to 
discontinue the payment of a s a l a r y to h i s f a t h e r 'Abd-al-Ryhman F a i s a l Ben 
Sa'ud. When the tribesmen learned the Turkish Government opposed Ibn Sa'ud, 
where before they had thought t h a t the Turks were encouraging him i n h i s 
u p r i s i n g against Ibn Rashaid, they deserted him almost t o a man. I n f a c t 
only 20 persons remained w i t h him i n a d d i t i o n to the 40 wa r r i o r s w i t h whom 
he had set out from Kuwait. 
Though desparate, Ibn Sa'ud decided to press on w i t h h i s plan, 
hoping e i t h e r t o achieve the g l o r y of regaining Riyadh, despite the odds, 
or else t o perish g l o r i o u s l y w h i l s t carrying out what he saw as h i s duty. 
R e a l i s i n g t h a t Ibn Sa'ud was i n d i r e s t r a i t s Sheikh Mubarak wrote to him 
to r e t u r n t o Kuwait and not t o r i s k himself i n va i n . I n h i s l e t t e r he 
explained the d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t would be involved i n overcoming Ibn Rashaid, 
and f r u i t l e s s since he had the support of the Turks. Mubarak f a i l e d , 
however, t o dissuade Ibn Sa'ud from ca r r y i n g out h i s plan. 
On 15th January, 1902, Ibn Sa'ud made a sudden dash from the side of 
Hasa t o recover Riyadh f o r h i s f a t h e r . He entered the town at n i g h t , 
accompanied at f i r s t by 80 adherents, near Riyadh he had l e f t 30 more of h i s 
f o l l o w e r s beside Zwiloshb W e l l , 2 hours walk from the c i t y , to guard h i s camels 
He took the other men and walked t o the gardens surrounding the c i t y . At 
a place c a l l e d Shamsiah, he ordered h i s brother Muhammad to stay w i t h 23 
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of h i s men t o wait f o r news. He himself went on w i t h 7 men, in c l u d i n g h i s 
cousin 'Abdallah Ben J i l u w i . They climbed the fence of the c i t y at night 
and went t o a house next t o the house of Ibn Rashaid's Governor, ' A j i l a n 
Ben 'Abdalruhman. The house belonged to one of the slaves of the Sa'ud 
f a m i l y , named J u w a i s i r . On entering the house Ibn Sa'ud received a warm 
welcome. He ordered them t o keep q u i e t and they obeyed. Next, Ibn 
Sa'ud climbed the.wall leading t o the house of ' A j i l a n and entered i t , 
at which juncture he sent one of h i s men to his brother Muhammad w i t h 
(49) 
i n s t r u c t i o n s that he was to come t o that house. Muhammad soon ar r i v e d 
w i t h h i s men at dawn. W h i l s t A j i l a n was leaving h i s house f o r the Mosque, 
Ibn Sa'ud f i r e d h i s r i f l e at him, but he missed. A j i l a n t r i e d t o escape 
i n s i d e the house but Ibn Sa'ud ran a f t e r him and seized him. They fought 
together and A j i l a n was about t o defeat Ibn Sa'ud, when Abdallah Ben J i l u w i 
f i r e d h i s gun at A j i l a n and k i l l e d him i n s t a n t l y . Thus Ibn Sa'ud entered 
the house w i t h h i s men without meeting resistance. He proclaimed himself 
Prince of Riyadh without the c i t i z e n s r a i s i n g any ob j e c t i o n . 
Ibn Sa'ud soon sent a messenger to Kuwait t o inform Sheikh Mubarak 
and h i s f a t h e r of the v i c t o r y . Ibn Rashaid's garrisons were now expelled 
from the neighbouring d i s t r i c t s of Kharj and Hariq, and Ibn Sa'ud informed 
the Porte t h a t the country thus recovered would be r u l e d by him as a l o y a l 
- (51) subject of the Sultan. 
W h i l s t Ibn Sa'ud was proceeding to Riyadh to recover the l o s t power 
of the Sa'ud dynasty i n Nejd, the Turks remained determined t o vex Sheikh 
Mubarak by pressing on h i s borders. 
I n January 1902, troops had reached Zubair, 15 miles South West of 
Basra. A week l a t e r they had moved 20 miles South to Safwan, By the end 
of January and beginning of February m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n s were established on 
the I s l a n d of Bubiyan, Umm Qasar and Safwan which were considered to be out-
side the borders of Kuwait. A Turkish post of 40 men was placed at 
Umm Qasar, a large g a r r i s o n at Safwan and an outpost of 20 men on the 
eastern side of B u b i y a n o ^ ^ 
Sheikh Mubarak protested and claimed t h a t the Turks were di s t u r b i n g . 
" s t a t u s quo", adding that they had no r i g h t t o l i m i t h i s boundaries and 
th a t the occupied areas were a c t u a l l y w i t h i n the boundaries of Kuwait. I n 
support of h i s claim t o ownership of these places he said t h a t Umm Qasar 
had received i t s name on account of one of the w e l l known Kuwaiti merchants 
c a l l e d R i z i q i n the time of J a b i r e l Sabah; and th a t Bubiyan I s l a n d was 
annually occupied by fishermen who owed allegiance to the Sheikh and used i t 
(53) 
f o r f i s h i n g purposes during the summer months. As f o r Safwan Well i t 
had been a h a l t i n g place f o r the caravans o f the Kuwaiti people f o r a very 
long time. These places were of no importance f i n a n c i a l l y , but a denial 
of Sheikh Mubarak's a u t h o r i t y and r i g h t s would be a serious blow to h i s 
prestige and influence i n Kuwait i t s e l f . He refused t o accept any Turkish 
o f f i c i a l s under any guise whatsoever i n Kuwait, because he knew from b i t t e r 
experience that the T u r k i s h o f f i c i a l s would destroy xvhatever good the proposed 
agreement might hold. They would weaken his a u t h o r i t y both l o c a l l y and i n 
the adjacent desert, and would cause a constant s t r i f e which i n t u r n , would 
r e s u l t i n the formation of f a c t i o n s among his people. 
The Turkish Government paid no heed at a l l to Mubarak's p r o t e s t , 
but, on the contrary, they ordered the Turkish s o l d i e r s i n the occupied 
areas to deal roughly w i t h the populace, e s p e c i a l l y on the Island of Bubiyan.^ 
Sheikh Mubarak was now compelled t o b r i n g the matter to the a t t e n t i o n of 
the P o l i t i c a l Resident i n the Gulf. The B r i t i s h Government was uncertain 
of Kuwait's boundaries. According to O'Connor, t h i s question could not 
even be discussed unless B r i t a i n declared a protectorate over Kuwait, as 
he had no l e g a l standing. The B r i t i s h , t h e r e f o r e , d i d not protest t o the 
Porte on t h i s occasion and the troops continued t h e i r advance. I n February, 
Mubarak reported that they had reached Qasar Subaihiya, t o the North-East 
of Kuwait Bay, and were beginning t o occupy Bubiyan I s l a n d . O f f i c i a l s i n 
I n d i a and i n the Gulf asked f o r a gunboat to be sent to stop the Turkish 
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advanceo Accordingly "Sphinx" was sent, but only t o r e p o r t on the 
+. (55) s i t u a t i o n . 
The problem was one of ownership. Wratislaw and Kembell d i d 
not t h i n k t h a t the B r i t i s h could object to Turkish occupations of Umm 
Qasar and Safwan, but Mubarak claimed t h a t Kuwaitis had occupied these 
places i n the past. The Foreign O f f i c e did not t h i n k anything u s e f u l 
would be gained by p r o t e s t i n g , since the Porte claimed ignorance of the 
whole s i t u a t i o n . I f necessary, the navy could d r i v e the Turks back from 
the sea.^ 5 6^ The Admiralty, however, was not p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l disposed 
to t h i s idea, since i t meant t h a t they would have to maintain a force i n 
the area u n t i l the matter was s e t t l e d . The o f f i c e r s i n v o lved had l i t t l e 
confidence i n Mubarak, who seemed to be developing a h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e 
towards the B r i t i s h , and t o blame them f o r his d i f f i c u l t i e s . Furthermore, 
the r e p o r t of the gunboat was not encouraging. 300 Turks were at Safwan, 
300 at Subaihiya, 20 and an o f f i c e r at Bubiyan and 40 and an o f f i c e r at 
(57) 
Umm Qasar „ 
There seemed to be nothing to prevent a f u r t h e r Turkish advance. 
Mubarak stressed his claims t o Bubiyan as a f i s h i n g base and Curzon f e l t 
t h a t the claim was j u s t i f i e d , but O'Connor was a f r a i d of the consequences 
of a T u r k i s h r e f u s a l to withdraw i f a p r o t e s t were made. Either B r i t a i n 
would lose prestige or she would have to use f o r c e . He feared f u r t h e r 
that such a course would be the f i r s t step towards B r i t i s h occupation and 
the establishment of a p r o t e c t o r a t e , and that the r e s u l t would be that 
Russia would also f e e l bound to seize an area on the Gulf as a s i t e f o r a 
coaling s t a t i o n . Lansdowne supported O'Connor, and the Indian Government 
was t o l d t h a t Mubarak could only be aided i n Kuwait and the Bay i t s e l f . 
Hamilton explained t o Curzon t h a t the main problem was that of o b t a i n i n g a 
s u i t a b l e railway terminus and t h a t B r i t a i n could not occupy a l l possible 
s i t e s . She must therefore r e c o n c i l e h e r s e l f to the s i t u a t i o n ( i . e . t h a t 
Kuwait was not the only possible s i t e ) . ^ ^ 
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There was also the question of the "status quo". Kembell said 
t h a t although Turkish claims were not easy to prove, the advance of t h e i r 
troops d e f i n i t e l y e f f e c t e d the "st a t u s quo" by weakening Mubarak's p o s i t i o n . 
Moreover, Mubarak had taken B r i t a i n ' s advice not to oppose the Turks, and 
he should therefore be supported at t h i s time i n the hope t h a t he would 
change h i s mind. Meanwhile, the Foreign O f f i c e had already changed 
i t s p o l i c y and O'Connor had issued a p r o t e s t . The Porte o f f i c i a l l y denied 
a l l knowledge of the movements of the Turkish troops, but u n o f f i c i a l l y the 
Foreign M i n i s t e r said the ac t i o n had been taken because the Porte wanted 
any r a i l w a y terminus established i n the area to be under Turkish influence 
f s -| \ 
and p r o t e c t i o n . 
I n B r i t a i n , Lansdowne, Hamilton and S e l b o r n e ^ ^ met to discuss 
the s i t u a t i o n . The p o s s i b i l i t y of a s i t e f or a terminus other than Kuwait 
had not p r e v i o u s l y been considered, f o r Kuwait had been secured and B r i t a i n 
had assured Germany and Turkey th a t she would not v i o l a t e the " s t a t u s quo". 
Now, however, a new approach was needed. Lansdowne refused t o consider 
the establishment of a p r o t e c t o r a t e and the resources of the navy were 
already overstretched i n the Gulf. Therefore, i t was decided: 
(1) To continue Mubarak's defence w i t h as l i t t l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as 
possible. 
(2) To recognize Ottoman sovereignty w i t h i n the "st a t u s quo". 
(3) To i n s i s t on an equal share i n the railway. O'Connor claimed 
t h a t B r i t a i n had opened the Gulf t o trade for Europe and was thus e n t i t l e d 
t o these claims. Gurzon declared that t o adopt the p o l i c i e s o u t l i n e d 
above *vas t o abandon Kuwait t o the Ottoman Empire, and asked f o r a precise 
d e f i n i t i o n of the "st a t u s q u o " . ^ ^ The Foreign O f f i c e wanted to avoid 
such d e f i n i t i o n s and d i d not f e e l that B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n the Gulf should 
depend so h e a v i l y on Mubarak. Curzon, however, objected t o the railway 
altogether since i t gave Germany claims to the Gulf. Curzon f e l t that 
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B r i t a i n should stand by her support of Mubarak, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of 
the f a c t t h a t the Viceroy had troubles i n Aden to contend w i t h , ^ ^ ^ 
W h i l s t the B r i t i s h Government was discussing the p o s i t i o n w i t h 
regard to the " s t a t u s quo" i n Kuwait, the Turkish a u t h o r i t i e s at Basra 
took measures t o harass the Sheikh. The measures taken appear t o have shaken 
him somewhat, f o r i n March 1902, Sheikh Mubarak o f f e r e d the Wali of Basra 
a large b r i b e , amounting t o £10,000, i n an attempt to induce him t o make 
favourable representations t o the Sultan and put a stop t o Turkish 
encroachments on his t e r r i t o r i e s . What Mubarak i n f a c t wanted was 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h the T u r k i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . The Wali, however, refused 
the o f f e r . ( 6 6 ) 
The Turks were determined t o e x i l e Mubarak whatever the cost, 
and on 28th May, 1902, they arrested Mubarak's agent, *Abd-al-'Azaiz e l 
Salim, by order of the Sultan, on the grounds that he had forwarded t o the 
Sheikh .a: p r o h i b i t e d Arabic newspaper c a l l e d "Khelafa". The Turkish 
Government considered the newspaper sed i t i o u s and had, t h e r e f o r e , banned i t s 
import i n t o the country. The paper was seized together w i t h the t i t l e deeds 
t o the Fao estates. Mubarak was informed of the arrest of his agent w h i l s t 
he was at Muhammara dealing w i t h an act of piracy committed against a Kuwaiti 
boat. When he asked the w a l i what was the reason f o r the a r r e s t , he was 
t o l d t h a t i t was the concern of the Sult a n . Sheikh Mubarak then claimed 
t h a t the ar r e s t of h i s agent had occured w h i l s t he was under B r i t i s h 
p r o t e c t i o n ; he therefore requested B r i t i s h a i d i n obtaining the agent's 
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release. The B r i t i s h Government f o r i t s part made a s t r o n g l y worded 
p r o t e s t to the Sultan, i n which i t was urged that the Ottoman Government 
i t s e l f should take the i n i t i a t i v e i n punishing the W a l i . T h e Turkish 
Government ignored t h i s p r o t e s t . ' 
At t h i s j u n c t u r e , Yusuf e i Ibrahaim t o l d 'Abdul 'Azaiz that he 
was prepared t o save him from t o r t u r e and to set him free on condition t h a t 
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he would betray Sheikh Mubarak. •Abdul-'Azaiz refused, and remained i n 
pr i s o n u n t i l he was f r e e d i n 1905, when Mukhlis Pasha became Wali of Basra. 
The above episode marked the end of the serious attempt from 
abroad t o overthrow Mubarak, and the Turks now began to t u r n t h e i r a t t e n t i o n 
t o Central Arabia, and the s t r u g g l e between the two powers of Ibn Sa'ud and 
Ibn Rashaid. On 31st J u l y , 1902 Ibn Rashaid was making energetic prepar-
ations f o r a campaign against Ibn Sa'ud, lamenting, meanwhile, t h a t he had 
delayed the c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r so long that he had given h i s enemy time to 
strengthen him s e l f . 
As f o r Sheikh Mubarak, he never ceased t o support Ibn Sa'ud, 
sending t o him caravans laden w i t h food, weapons and ammunition. He considered 
th a t the defeat of Ibn Rashaid would be ample revenge f o r the losses which 
he had sustained at the b a t t l e o f S a r a i f . I n November, Ibn Sa'ud v i s i t e d 
Kuwait, accompanied by many of the t r i b e s of Nejd, t o f i g h t alongside 
Sheikh Mubarak against Diwaish Ben Sultan, an a l l y of Ibn Rashaid, who had 
camped on the borders of Kuwait w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of harassing Sheikh 
Mubarak. Sheikh Mubarak decided t o seize his chance. He held discussions 
w i t h Ibn Sa'ud as to what a c t i o n should be taken, and showed him l e t t e r s 
exchanged between Ibn Diwaish and Ibn Rashaid concerning the at t a c k on Kuwait. 
Mubarak suggested that they should make a sudden attack before: h i s enemy 
grew i n s t r e n g t h and Ibn Sa'ud agreed. Mubarak mobilised a large army 
under the leadership o f h i s son J a b i r , who also had the support of Ibn 
Sa'ud and h i s men. They attacked Ibn Diwaish and i n f l i c t e d a heavy defeat 
on him causing him t o make a hasty withdrawal i n the course of which he l o s t 
most of h i s possessions, which f e l l i n t o the hands of the enemy. The s p o i l 
included 500 camels. 
During Ibn Sa'ud's v i s i t t o Kuwait, Ibn Rashaid seized the 
o p p o r t u n i t y occasioned by h i s absence to attack Riyadh. A message was 
sent t h a t the enemy be r e p e l l e d and Sheikh Jabir was asked to r e l i e v e 
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the c i t y . I n r e p l y Jabir a p o l o g e t i c a l l y explained t h a t he could only 
undertake such a venture on h i s f a t h e r ' s orders. Ibn Sa'ud accepted 
his excuse and went i n person to Kuwait, t o seek help from Sheikh Mubarak. 
Aware of Mubarak's cunning nature, and r e a l i s i n g he could not a f f o r d any 
delay, Ibn Sa'ud decided very c l e v e r l y t o ask f o r help p u b l i c l y before a l l 
the people of Kuwait, i n order t o force him t o decide promptly and i n 
circumstances i n which a r e f u s a l would be embarrassing. Accordingly, 
when he entered the town he s t a r t e d c r y i n g and pleading f o r help. When 
Mubarak and the people heard the c r y i n g , the thought t h a t t h e i r enemy had 
been defeated and that Ibn Sa'md had come to pleade f o r f u r t h e r assistance 
against Ibn Diwaish, but when Ibn Sa'ud reached Mubarak, he asked him i n 
f r o n t o f h i s people t o help him against Ibn Rashaid who was besieging 
Riyadh. Sheikh Mubarak promised t h a t he would h e l p 0 
Mubarak immediately ordered t h a t ships should be loaded w i t h 
food, ammunition and weapons and t h a t they should s a i l t o Saluf to the 
south of Kuwait. He also ordered the force r e t u r n i n g from f i g h t i n g against 
Ibn Diwaish t o march to Riyadh, t a k i n g the necessary supplies from the ships. 
Ibn Rashaid, perceiving the arrangements made by Ibn Sa'ud i n Kuwait, and 
r e a l i s i n g the s t r e n g t h of the army which he would have to face, now changed 
h i s mind and withdrew from Riyadh. On rec e i v i n g news of Ibn Rashaid's 
withdrawal, Ibn Sa'ud speedily returned t o h i s country. 
At the end of December, 1902, a r a i d l e d by Ibn Rashaid i n person 
was made on some Kuwaiti subjects i n the neighbourhood of Jahara. A 
c e r t a i n amount of damage was done, but the raiders were eventually beaten 
o f f , and Sheikh Mubarak himself moved t o Jahara, where he began t o assemble 
his men f o r defensive or, i f necessary, offensive a c t i o n . The Turkish 
a u t h o r i t i e s at Basra now feared that Mubarak's concentration of forces at 
(71) 
Jahara might herald an attack upon Zubair. The B r i t i s h Government had 
already warned Sheikh Mubarak against such a move, by which he would involve 
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him s e l f i n d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Central Arabia or w i t h the Turkish a u t h o r i t i e s 
(72) 
and had received an assurance t h a t he had no plans f o r such a venture. 
At the beginning of March, 1903, Ibn Sa'ud v i s i t e d Kuwait w i t h 
h i s brother Muhammad t o confer w i t h Mubarak,, I n the same month Ibn Sa'ud 
had an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the Russian Consul-General at Bushire to discuss the 
a f f a i r s of Central Arabia. I t was understood t h a t at the interview w i t h 
(73) 
the Russian, support i n arms and money was o f f e r e d . I n November, 1903, 
during h i s tour of the Arabian Gulf t o determine how best B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n 
there could be defended, Lord Curzon v i s i t e d Kuwait, i n c l u d i n g Umm Qasar, 
Bubiyan I s l a n d and Safwan. At a p r i v a t e interview aboard the "Hardinge" 
Curzon impressed on Sheikh Mubarak the importance of not embroiling himself 
i n the c o n f l i c t s of Central Arabia. The B r i t i s h Government, he said, 
promised to defend Kuwait from e x t e r n a l aggression, but the B r i t i s h would 
be unable t o i n t e r f e r e i f he got h i m s e l f into d i f f i c u l t i e s by meddling i n 
the domestic a f f a i r s i n Central Arabia. At t h i s meeting, Mubarak asked 
Lord Curzon to compel the Turks to evacuate both Bubiyan and Umm Qasar which 
belonged t o him. 
Soon a f t e r Lord Curzon's v i s i t , the B r i t i s h Government decided to 
strengthen t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Kuwait be e s t a b l i s h i n g a new agency there, 
both to improve po s t a l communications and to increase the e f f i c i e n c y of 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l representation w i t h Mubarak. Accordingly, on 24th June 
1904, Kuwait was f o r m a l l y authorised, and on 6th August Captain Knox a r r i v e d 
from Bushire. I n November 1904, the Turkish Government protested t h a t the 
(75) 
appointment of Knox a l t e r e d the " s t a t u s quo". 
By now the s i t u a t i o n i n Central Arabia vias c r i t i c a l as a r e s u l t 
of armed Tu r k i s h i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the struggle between Ibn Rashaid and Ibn 
Sa'ud during the summer and autumn of 1904. I n May, 1904 the Turkish 
Government despatched an expedition from Turkish I r a q to support Ibn Rashaid 
i n the Qasa'im d i s t r i c t of Nejd. The force sent was, however, completely 
80. 
destroyed by Ibn Sa'ud and h i s a l l i e s . At the end of October, 1904, 
Fakhri Pasha, the deputy Wali of Basra, acting on i n s t r u c t i o n s from 
Constantinople, wrote t o 'Abd-al-Ruhman Ibn F a i s a l , Ibn Sa'ud's father 
i n v i t i n g him to s e t t l e the a f f a i r s of Qjasaim at a f r i e n d l y meeting. 'Abd-
al-Ruhman r e p l i e d i n a l e t t e r addressed to M i k h l i s Pasha, the Wali of Basra, 
i n November. I n h i s l e t t e r 'Abd-al-Ruhman professed h i s l o y a l t y t o the 
Sultan, and asked him not t o send troops to Qasaim, because the people of 
Qasaim d i d not want Ibn Rashaid, and any attempt to impose him on them 
would r e s u l t i n bloodshed. At the same time, a telegram was sent from 
*Abd-al-Ruhman, v i a Basra, t o Constantinople, i n which he made the same 
* (77) request. 
I n February, 1905, Ibn Sa'ud had two meetings w i t h Mukhlis Pasha 
and Mubarak, at Safwan on the 8th and at Qashimya Wells on the 13th. At 
these meetings, Mubarak used h i s t i t l e of Ruler of Kuwait and Chief of i t s 
t r i b e s , instead of t h a t of qaimaqam, and i n so doing annoyed the Turks t o 
some ex t e n t . This po i n t d i d not, however, a f f e c t the ne g o t i a t i o n s . 
At the meetings, Ibn Sa'ud t o l d the Wali that he and h i s people had complained 
t o the Ottoman Government about Ibn Rashaid and h i s high-handedness but that 
h i s explanations were always w e l l received at Constantinople. Meanwhile, 
preparations continued i n Mesopotamia f o r sending another expedition t o 
Central Arabia to help h i s enemy, Ibn Rashaid. When he took the law i n t o 
h i s own hands and crushed Ibn Rashaid, the l a t t e r r e t a l i a t e d by preventing 
messengers from Ibn Sa'ud reaching the Sultan. Then when Ibn Rashaid 
decided t o f i g h t him he was aided by the Turks w i t h troops and arms. F i n a l l y , 
•Abd-al-Ruhman Ben F a i s a l asked the W a l i t o prevent Ibn Rashaid from 
i n t e r f e r i n g i n the a f f a i r s of Nejd. He threatened t h a t , should Ibn Rashaid 
enter Nejd, he would s t r o n g l y r e s i s t , but promised l o y a l t y and obedience t o 
the Turks, provided t h a t I b n Rashaid would be kept away0 
I n h i s r e p l y , the w a l i promised Ibn Sa'ud th a t his Government 
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would stop g i v i n g supplies t o Ibn Sashaid, but explained t h a t he himself 
had no a u t h o r i t y f o r dealing xvith a f f a i r s of Nejd. The outcome of these 
meetings was that Ibn Sa'ud was appointed qaimaqam of Nejd under the c o n t r o l 
of the T u r k i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . Any in t e r f e r e n c e by Ibn Rashaid i n the a f f a i r s 
of Nejd was banned, and Turkish garrisons were established throughout Qasaim. 
H o s t i l i t i e s between Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Rashaid were, however, resumed at the 
end of 1905. 
From 1905 onwards there was a considerable improvement i n Mubarak's 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Turks. A f t e r the great f i r e i n Constantinople i n 1904 
he made a donation to a i d the refugees there and received a medal from the 
Sultan f o r h i s help. I n August 1905, Mubarak subscribed £450 towards the 
cost of new Tu r k i s h barracks at Basra. When h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n was c o r d i a l l y 
acknowledged, he professed devotion t o the Sultan's cause and made a f u r t h e r 
donation of £200. I n the course of the same year, many deserters from the 
Turkish forces i n Nejd f l e d t o Kuwait, where Mubarak fe d them before sending 
them on to Basra. Up to March, 1906, these deserters t o t a l l e d 500 or so. 
o 
Their number was g r e a t l y increased i n A p r i l when Ibn Sa'ud made a sudden 
attack on the forces of Ibn Rashaid and h i s a l l i e s . Ibn Rashaid himself 
was k i l l e d i n the course of the att a c k . Encouraged by t h i s success Ibn 
Sa'ud now proclaimed himself"Ruler of Sharq and king of Eastern Arabia". 
A peace was f o r m a l l y concluded between Jabal Shammar and Nejd i n J u l y , 
1 9 0 6 . ™ 
I n 1906 the Turkish g a r r i s o n at Qasaim found i t s e l f i n d i f f i c u l t i e s 
w i t h the l o c a l populace and w i t h Ibn Sa'ud, and consequently withdrew to 
Hejaz. This evacuation r e s u l t e d i n great loss of Ottoman prestige i n 
Arabia. Meanwhile Qasaim was incorporated i n t o the t e r r i t o r y o f Nejd. 
When the Turkish garrison withdrew t o Hejaz, some of the troops made t h e i r 
way t o Kuwait i n c l u d i n g , i n August, Far i q Sadiq Pasha and 150 men. In 
December, 800 troops from the Qasaim occupation force came, but Mubarak 
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refused them e n t r y , f e a r i n g occupation. As pa r t of an agreement whereby 
these 800 men were t o be sent on, the Turks released 'Abdal Azaiz Salim 
a l Badr to Kuwait where he remained under open a r r e s t . 
I n 1906, when the Ottoman Government was preparing t o lay the 
foundations of the Hejaz r a i l w a y , Mubarak contributed the sum of £550. 
The Sumblime Porte wished t o reward him f o r h i s services and to encourage 
him to remain l o y a l i n the f u t u r e and so, i n August 1906, an order was 
issued g r a n t i n g him the Badge of Honour, f i r s t class. Although he 
was f u l l y aware of the weakness and d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the Ottoman Empire, 
and though he be l i e v e d t h a t the Caliphate should be vested only i n an Arab 
leader, Mubarak pr e f e r r e d to keep on good terms w i t h the Ottoman Government. 
This f a c t i s , perhaps, e s p e c i a l l y remarkable since Kuwait was by now a 
B r i t i s h P r o t e c t o r a t e . ^ " 2 ^ 
Appended i s a l i s t of some of Mubarak's important statements:-
" I f a f a t h e r i s sometimes hard on h i s son, i t i s nevertheless the fath e r 
who should be obeyed." 
Although he believed t h a t the Arabs should exercise the ca l i p h a t e , he d i d 
not resent the f a c t t h a t i t r e s t e d i n Turkish hands u n t i l the time was 
r i p e to re s t o r e i t . Referring t o t h i s matter, he s a i d : - "We a l l know 
that every age has i t s time and Empire. The men and empire of t h i s time 
are the Turks. The existence of the caliphate w i t h i n t h e i r hands at 
present strengthens Islam and strengthens the cause of the Muslims." 
Mubarak expected the Ottoman Government to t r u s t him, as i s 
evident from the f o l l o w i n g statement:- " I f the Turks made peace w i t h me, 
I would act accordingly and save her the need f o r the s i x t h army at Baghdad." 
He also new the extent of the bankruptcy which the Ottoman 
Government was s u f f e r i n g , and the d i f f i c u l t i e s that they were experiencing 
i n c o l l e c t i n g dues and i n maintaining t h e i r forces. For t h i s reason he 
of t e n helped the Turks when a convenient opportunity presented i t s e l f . 
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When Ottoman s o l d i e r s were going t o , or re t u r n i n g from, war he would 
sometimes clothe them and provide them w i t h food and other supplies. 
He paid h i s dues, which amounted t o £200, i n advance. Among the other 
states i n the area, the usual procedure was to pay dues by instalments, 
but Mubarak never delayed payment i n t h i s way. He never refused to carry 
out the missions entrusted t o him by the Ottoman Government, no matter 
how important or unimportant they were, and often acted as an intermediary 
between the Ottoman Government and the r e b e l l i o u s Arab Sheikhdoms. 
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C H A P T E R F O U R 
BRITISH POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT 1904-1921 
I 
KUWAIT POSITION BEFORE 1914 
I t may be of i n t e r e s t t o give a b r i e f account of the r e l a t i o n s 
of the B r i t i s h Government w i t h Kuwait. Although from the middle of the 
l a s t century f r i e n d l y intercourse had been maintained w i t h the represent-
a t i v e of the B r i t i s h power i n the Arabian Gulf, nothing of consequence 
(1) 
occurred u n t i l e a r l y i n 1897, when the Germans began to increase t h e i r 
i n f l u e n c e i n the Turkish t e r r i t o r i e s . They were p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d 
i n Kuwait as a l i k e l y s i t e f o r the terminus of the projected B e r l i n -
Baghdad r a i l w a y . I n f a c t the Germans were i n t e n t on gaining c o n t r o l of 
the coasts around the Arabian Gulf, i n c l u d i n g Kuwait p o r t . 
I t was at t h i s point that the B r i t i s h Government woke up t o 
and faced the impending danger which was threatening B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 
i n the Gulf, paramount among which was the s e c u r i t y of the trade routes 
(2) 
t o I n d i a . Hence, when Sheikh Mubarak asked B r i t a i n f o r p r o t e c t i o n 
i n 1899 she agreed to prote c t him and signed an exclusive agreement w i t h 
(3) 
him on 23rd J u l y , 1899. I n 1900 Sheikh Mubarak signed a f u r t h e r 
agreement w i t h B r i t a i n concerning t r a f f i c i n arms, according to the 
conditions of which the export and import o f arms t o and from Kuwait 
was p r o h i b i t e d . Other developments of importance for Anglo-Kuwaiti 
r e l a t i o n s were the v i s i t of Lord Curzon to Kuwait i n course of his tour 
of the Arabian Gulf i n 1903, and the establishment of a post o f f i c e and 
associated medical work i n Kuwait, I n connection w i t h the l a t t e r event 
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i t may be worthy of note that Mubarak undertook not to allow any other 
. (4) 
f o r e i g n power to e s t a b l i s h a post o f f i c e i n Kuwait. 
I n Spring 1904, a plan which had been made i n the previous 
year f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of Mubarak from increasing Turkish influence i n 
the a f f a i r s of Kuwait and of Ibn Sa'ud i n Nejd was revived. I n 
accordance w i t h the plan, B r i t a i n appointed a p o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r at Kuwait 
on 24th June, and on 6th August, the newly appointed P o l i t i c a l Agent, 
Captain S.G. Knox, a r r i v e d from Bushire. The assistant Surgeon j o i n e d 
the Agency, accompanied by a p o s t a l subordinate, but an o f f i c i a l post o f f i c e 
was s t i l l not estab l i s h e d . The i n s t r u c t i o n s given to Knox on ta k i n g up 
hi s appointment were:~ (1) To maintain f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h Mubarak. 
(2) To pr o t e c t B r i t i s h trade i n t e r e s t s . 
(3) To watch Turkish a c t i v i t i e s on the borders of Kuwait. 
(4) To discover the true extent of Mubarak's occupation of 
Khur-el-Subaihiya. 
(5) To repo r t immediately any change i n the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n . 
(6) To pay speci a l a t t e n t i o n t o the areas of Khur Abdulla, Baubiyan, 
Umm-Qasr. 
(7) To c o l l e c t i n f o r m a t i o n about the struggle between Ibn-Rashaid 
and Ibn-Sa fud. 
(8) To i n v e s t i g a t e alleged imports of arms to Kuwait, e s p e c i a l l y 
r i f l e s f o r Ibn Sa'ud. 
He was, however, neither t o authorise nor t o f o r b i d t h e i r arms trade. 
I n November 1904, the Turkish Government protested t o the 
Government of I n d i a concerning the l a t t e r * s nomination of a P o l i t i c a l 
Agent i n Kuwait, describing the appointment as a clear contravention of 
the agreement f o r the maintenance o f the "Status quo" between the two 
coun t r i e s . At t h i s time also, i t appears, the Turks believed that the 
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B r i t i s h were encouraging the Sheikh of Kuwait to support Ibn Sa*ud i n 
o p p o s i t i o n t o the Turkish arms and e f f o r t s i n Central Arabia. I n r e p l y 
the B r i t i s h Government stated t h a t the appointment was not a permanent 
one, but that they reserved the r i g h t t o send an O f f i c e r t o re p o r t on 
the s i t u a t i o n to ensure the continuance of the "modus v i v e n d i " which 
had been reached i n Kuwait. The B r i t i s h Government also i n s t r u c t e d the 
Government of I n d i a , on 24th November 1904, t h a t Major Knox should remain 
i n Kuwait f o r the time being and t h a t he should be withdrawn a f t e r a 
"reasonable time". Before Knox l e f t Kuwait, he informed Mubarak th a t 
he would repeat h i s v i s i t , and t h a t the date of his r e t u r n would depend 
on the course of e v e n t s . ^ However, the plan was c a r r i e d no f u r t h e r 
at t h i s stage, since the B r i t i s h Government feared l e s t i t should have 
an adverse e f f e c t on the negot i a t i o n s which were then taking place i n 
(7) 
Constantinople concerning the evacuation of Bubiyan by the Turks. 
Owing to the problems confronting the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t y i n Aden i n i t s 
endeavours to solve the f r o n t i e r dispute w i t h Yemen, the Min i s t e r of 
Foreign A f f a i r s decided t h a t i t was not the r i g h t time t o nominate Knox 
as P o l i t i c a l Agent i n Kuwait. I t was therefore decided that he should 
be withdrawn, but he returned i n 1905, when he was helped by Dawud'Abd a l ~ 
Ruhman, a Kuwaiti subject. 
During t h i s period, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n and Kuwait 
became stronger, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the appointment of a P o l i t i c a l Agent 
from the S t a f f o f the I n d i a n P o l i t i c a l department. The P o l i t i c a l Agent-
was d i r e c t l y subordinate t o the p o l i t i c a l Resident at Bushire. At t h i s 
time also the B r i t i s h e x p l o i t e d t h e i r favoured p o s i t i o n i n Kuwait and 
began to send out missions to study the o u t l y i n g regions and to compile 
r e p o r t s on t h e i r i n t e r n a l s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s and on t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Sultan. I n the year of Knox's a r r i v a l , he made a 
t r i p t o the Turkish borders and v i s i t e d Jahara at the South-Eastern corner 
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of the Gulf of Kuwait, Safwan, and Umm-Qasar. I n the f o l l o w i n g year he 
v i s i t e d the South of Kuwait, t r a v e l l i n g as f a r as Hafar. He was, i n 
f a c t , the f i r s t European t o t r a v e l i n t h a t region. At the same time, 
the B r i t i s h navy surveyed the e n t i r e coastline of Kuwait. The reports 
of a l l these surveys are s t i l l extant and are kept at the M i n i s t r y of 
C 8) 
Defence and the Admiralty i n London. 
In 1905, the Government of I n d i a suggested to Mubarak th a t he 
should have a s p e c i a l f l a g . I n accordance w i t h the proposal Percy Cox, 
the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident at Bushire , v i s i t e d Kuwait on 16th July, 
1905, to arrange w i t h Mubarak the adoption of a new f l a g t o be flown on 
hi s ships and those o f h i s subjects. At f i r s t Mubarak r e j e c t e d the idea 
on the grounds t h a t h i s people would not know what to make of the change. 
He added t h a t i f he agreed to adopt a new f l a g , i t might w e l l increase 
the h o s t i l i t y of the Turks towards him. When, however, Cox explained 
to him t h a t i t was i n h i s own i n t e r e s t s that h i s dhows carry a f l a g by 
which they could be recognised unmistakably as h i s by customs o f f i c i a l s 
on the Gulf and also o f f e r e d to design a f l a g and other a r t i c l e s of 
(9) 
equipment which might be u s e f u l i n conjunction w i t h i t , Mubarak agreed. 
Once the idea had been accepted i n p r i n c i p l e , Cox began to 
arrange the matter w i t h the P o l i t i c a l Agent, who by coincidance has f a l l e n 
i l l w i t h a p p e n d i c i t i s and l e f t Kuwait. A year l a t e r , Cox broached the 
plan to Mubarak and on the 12th July 1906 Mubarak agreed to adopt the 
f l a g on c o n d i t i o n that the B r i t i s h Government would give him a w r i t t e n 
guarantee t h a t he would be protected i n case of any unpleasantness w i t h 
the Turks which might r e s u l t from h i s use of i t . ^ ^ Cox prepared 
samples and from them Mubarak chose the Turkish red f l a g w i t h the word 
"Kuwait" i n both Arabic and Roman l e t t e r s t o prevent any o f f i c i a l who 
might be ignorant of Arabic from pleading t h a t he d i d not understand. 
The B r i t i s h Government was, however, u n w i l l i n g t o give the guarantee, 
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since t h i s might e n t a i l the p r o t e c t i o n of every Kuwaiti dhow from 
r e p r i s a l i n Turkish waters. The advantages gained would not be worth 
(12) 
the inconvenience which would r e s u l t . 
In 1907, the B r i t i s h Government took up the idea of e s t a b l i s h i n g 
a coaling depot, hoping i n t h i s way to f o r e s t a l l the a c q u i s i t i o n of the 
same place by another power. Therefore, Cox ivas instructed-as a f i r s t -
step t o f i n d out Mubarak's views. Mubarak r e j e c t e d the idea and he 
seemed anxious n e i t h e r to s e l l nor to lease the land. Cox emphasised 
tha t h i s Government would p r o t e c t Mubarak from any danger from the Turkish 
Government. The negoti a t i o n s at Kuwait regarding the establishment of 
the coaling depot were eve n t u a l l y concluded successfully. Sheikh Mubarak 
agreed t o lease i n p e r p e t u i t y to the B r i t i s h Government a p l o t of land 
to the south of Bandar Shuwaikh f o r R.s.60,000 Rupees "per annum", leaving 
them the r i g h t to r e l i n q u i s h the lease at any time should they wish to do 
so. At the same time, the B r i t i s h Government assured Sheikh Mubarak 
th a t they recognised t h a t the town of Kuwait and i t s environs belonged 
to him and h i s h e i r s a f t e r him; th a t a l l h i s arrangements i n c l u d i n g 
customs arrangements would remain i n h i s hands and i n those of h i s heirs 
a f t e r him, and t h a t the B r i t i s h Government would c o l l e c t no customs duties 
i n the Bandar Shuv/aikh lands or i n any other lands that they might t h e r e -
O 3) 
a f t e r lease from him or h i s h e i r s a f t e r him. I n 1911 Mubarak under-
took not t o grant a pe a r l f i s h i n g concession t o any foreigners without 
(14) 
the p r i o r approval of the B r i t i s h Government. 
The Turks, however, were displeased at these developments, 
since they held that Kuwait was r e a l l y part of the Wilayat of Basra and 
t h a t Mubarak had, t h e r e f o r e , no r i g h t t o lease any part of the t e r r i t o r y 
to the B r i t i s h . N a t u r a l l y , t h e r e f o r e , they protested against the new 
advantage gained by the B r i t i s h . 
I n March 1911, the B r i t i s h and Turkish Governments hel d 
n e g o t i a t i o n s concerning a number of matters, i n c l u d i n g the Baghdad 
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r a i l w a y and zones of in f l u e n c e i n the Arabian Gulf. The question of 
Kuwait was prominent i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s . Eventually agreement was 
reached and a convention designed t o give e f f e c t t o i t was signed i n 
London on 29th J u l y , 1913 by Ibrahaim Haqy Pasha on behalf of Turkey, 
and Sir Edward Grey on behalf of B r i t a i n . The terms of t h i s agreement 
as they concerned Kuwait were as f o l l o w s : -
(1) The Tu r k i s h Government recognised Kuwait as an autonomous qaza, 
and acknowledged the r i g h t of the Sheikh of Kuwait t o f l y the Turkish 
f l a g as f o r m e r l y , but w i t h the a d d i t i o n of the word "Kuwait" i n the 
corner. 
(2) The Turkish Government undertook not to i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l 
a f f a i r s of Kuwait, or t o seek t o exercise influence over the succession. 
I n f u t u r e the Turks were merely t o issue Firmans concerning the i n v e s t i t u r e 
of the new Sheikh. I n a d d i t i o n , the Turks undertook not to occupy any 
part of the t e r r i t o r y of Kuwait. The Sheikh of Kuwait was t o have the 
r i g h t t o appoint agents t o look a f t e r h i s i n t e r e s t s i n the Turkish 
t e r r i t o r i e s . 
(3) The Turkish Government acknowledged the agreement made between Kuwait 
and B r i t a i n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y the agreement of January 1899. They also 
acknowledged the concessions which had been granted t o B r i t i s h subjects 
i n Kuwait by the Sheikh. 
(4) I n r e t u r n the B r i t i s h Government declared that B r i t a i n would nei t h e r 
sign,: a new agreement w i t h Kuwait nor seek to occupy i t as long as the 
Turks d i d not break t h i s agreement. 
(5) A r t i c l e s 5 t o 7 b f the agreement had p a r t i c u l a r reference t o the 
boundary surveys on the basis of which i t was agreed that Umm-Qasar and 
and Safwan w e l l s were w i t h i n Turkish t e r r i t o r y , w h i l s t Bubiyan and Warbah 
Jahn bay of Kuwait were recognised as Kuwait. Kur~el~Zubair was recognised 
as the northern boundary and Al-Qarain as the southern boundary of Kuwait. 
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(8) I n case of the e x t e n t i o n of the railway t o Kuwait both Governments 
agreed on arrangements f o r p r o t e c t i n g the l i n e . 
(9) The Sheikh of Kuwait was confirmed i n his possession of gardens and 
(15) 
property at Fao, which were immune from t a x a t i o n . 
However, t h i s agreement was never r a t i f i e d because of the outbreak 
o f the F i r s t World War i n August 1914. 
On the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s between B r i t a i n and Germany, 
Turkey showed signs of her i n t e n t i o n t o intervene on the German side. 
Accordingly the B r i t i s h r e s i d e n t at Bushire proposed to the Government 
of I n d i a t h a t l e t t e r s should be d r a f t e d i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the expected 
d e c l a r a t i o n of war between B r i t a i n and Turkey, ready f o r sending to the 
Gulf Sheikhdoms. I t was also suggested that a l l Muslims should be informed 
t h a t so long as there was no serious interference w i t h Indian p i l g r i m s 
proceeding to Mecca and Medina no h o s t i l e action would be taken by the 
B r i t i s h or I n d i a n Government against the ports of Jeddah or the Holy 
(16) 
places. 
I n 1914 Sheikh Mubarak was informed o f f i c i a l l y by the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident at Bushire that a state of war existed between B r i t a i n and 
Germany. He responded by making a decla r a t i o n of l o y a l t y to the B r i t i s h 
Government on behalf of himself and h i s t r i b e s on the 21st August. In 
h i s d e c l a r a t i o n he placed h i s e f f o r t s , his men, and his ships at Great 
B r i t a i n ' s disposal, together w i t h h i s garrison on the Islands at the 
mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, which he claimed was l a w f u l l y h i s . He 
repeated t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n i n a l e t t e r of the same date to the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident i n the Arabian Gulf, which was formally acknowledged by the 
(17) 
l a t t e r on the 25th August. 
I n view of the increasing l i k e l i h o o d that Turkey would intervene 
i n the war on Germany's side, i t was obvious that the B r i t i s h Government's 
previous undertaking to the Sheikh of Kuwait would have to be renewed and 
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extended to cover a l l contingencies i n the event of a state of war 
a r i s i n g between B r i t a i n and Turkey. Accordingly, a l e t t e r concerning 
these assurances was despatched t o the Sheikh on the 3rd November 1914, 
by the B r i t i s h Resident i n the Gulf. I n the l e t t e r Mubarak was given 
the f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s : ~ 
(1) He was t o attack Umm Qasar, Safwan and Bubiyan and occupy them. 
(2) He should afterwards endeavour, i n co-operation w i t h Sheikh Khaz*al 
Khan, Bmir Ibn Sa'ud, and other r e l i a b l e Sheikhs to l i b e r a t e Basra from 
T u r k i s h possession. 
(3) Should t h i s prove t o be beyond h i s a b i l i t y , he should make arrangements', 
i f p ossible, t o prevent T u r k i s h reinforcements from reaching Basra or even 
Qurnah u n t i l the a r r i v a l of the B r i t i s h troops which were t o be sent as 
soon as possible. He was assured th a t two B r i t i s h men-of-war would a r r i v e 
there before h i s troops. Though i t should be h i s prime aim t o l i b e r a t e 
Basra and i t s people from Turkish r u l e , the B r i t i s h requested t h a t he 
should do h i s utmost, t o prevent h i s troops and others from plundering the 
merchandise belonging t o B r i t i s h merchants i n Basra and i t s dependencies, . 
and to p r o t e c t the European residents i n Basra. 
(4) I n r e t u r n f o r h i s assistance i n t h i s important matter, the B r i t i s h 
Government promised Mubarak that i f he succeeded i n t h i s e n t e r p r i s e , 
Basra would not be returned to the Turks by surrender or otherwise. 
(5) Furthermore B r i t a i n made c e r t a i n promises concerning him personally. 
There were:-
( i ) His gardens would remain i n h i s possession and that of h i s 
descendants and would not be subject to the payment of revenue 
or taxes. 
( i i ) I f h i s attacks on Safwan, Umm Qasar and Bubiyan were successful 
and he occupied them, B r i t a i n would pro t e c t him from any 
consequences a r i s i n g from t h a t a c t i o n , 
( i i i ) Kuwait would be recognised as an independent p r i n c i p a l i t y under 
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B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n . 
A f t e r the B r i t i s h landed and occupied Basra i n November 1914 
the s i t u a t i o n was t r a n s f e r r e d and the Turks were driven out o f Basra. 
Because B r i t a i n had undertaken o b l i g a t i o n s towards Ibn Sa'ud as w e l l as 
towards the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Muhammara t o r e s i s t the Turks, the 
Turks r e a l i s e d i t was beyond t h e i r a b i l i t y t o r e s i s t w e l l equipped troops, 
t h e r e f o r e they declared el-Jehad or Holy war, hoping thus t o s t i r up 
t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o u s , the Arab tribesmen, against the B r i t i s h . Religious 
Agents were sent out amongst the t r i b e s to encourage them to f i g h t under 
the Turkish banner. 
The a c t i v i t i e s o f such men were apparent i n the south of I r a q , 
where, i n J u l y 1915, a force commanded by Muhammed Fadhil Pasha-el-
Daghistani, and accompanied by some r e l i g i o u s men (Sheikh Abbas Buniyan 
and part of h i s t r i b e s , the Bani-Lam) spread i n t o the borders of Ahwaz, 
which was under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the p r i n c i p a l i t y of Muhammara. There 
they asked the tribesmen to r e v o l t . They met w i t h success i n the case 
of the t r i b e s o f Bani-Taraf, which r e v o l t e d and decided t o occupy the 
c i t y of Ahwaz. Sheikh Khaz'al of Muhammara, however, organised an 
army t o p r o t e c t Ahwaz. The B r i t i s h Government had already sent troops 
from I n d i a en route through Bahrain to Basra and Qurnah to f i g h t the 
T u r k i s h troops. The t r i b e s of Bani Ka'ab were i n c i t e d by the Turkish 
emissaries and rose against Sheikh Khaz'al and accused him of being an 
a l l y o f the B r i t i s h Government and of acting against the Muslim Turks. 
According t o the t r e a t y r a t i f i e d between Khaz'al and the 
B r i t i s h Government i n September 1914, the former was to provide a i d t o 
the B r i t i s h troops against the Turks and to r e s i s t any t r i b e s which 
might r e v o l t . H e n c e Khaz'al strengthened his p o s i t i o n by f i g h t i n g 
these t r i b e s and so p u t t i n g an end t o the r e v o l t . 
During the t r i b a l disturbances at Muhammara, Sheikh Mubarak-
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paid a v i s i t t o h i s f r i e n d Khaz'al. When he r e a l i s e d the circumstances 
i n which Khaz'al found himself, he decided t o a s s i s t h i s f r i e n d i n h i s 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . Hence he wrote to h i s son, J a b i r , who was i n charge at 
Kuwait, t o send reinforcements t o support Sheikh Khaz'al. However, when 
Sheikh J a b i r received h i s f a t h e r ' s l e t t e r , he read i t before the people 
of Kuwait. They refused to support Khaz'al on the grounds that he was 
an a l l y o f the B r i t i s h who were f i g h t i n g t h e i r Muslim brothers, the Turks. 
I n f a c t they had already been swayed by the i n v i t a t i o n to f i g h t under the 
Muslim brother which had been issued by r e l i g i o u s people i n I r a q and 
(21) 
Turkey. For t h i s reason they refused to support Khaz'al. 
Sheikh J a b i r was astonished at t h e i r response, since i t was 
the f i r s t time t h a t Kuwait had dared t o disobey Mubarak's orders. When 
J a b i r informed h i s father i n w r i t i n g of what had occurred i n Kuwait, and 
of how the people refused to carry out his orders, Sheikh Mubarak was 
extremely angry and sent a s t r o n g l y worded l e t t e r , i n which he warned 
t h a t anyone found opposing h i s orders would be put t o death. The people, 
however, at f i r s t remained unmoved i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e of disobedience, but 
e v e n t u a l l y , a f t e r long discussions between the dissident f a c t i o n and 
Sheikh J a b i r , they agreed t o send help t o Khaz'al. F i r s t , however, some 
of the leading Kuwaitis went to Muhammara, where they met Sheikh Mubarak 
and expressed t h e i r regret f o r what had happened. They promised him 
t h a t as soon as they a r r i v e d back i n Kuwait they would send the forces 
and equipment needed. When they a r r i v e d i n Kuwait they sent s i x large 
ships, manned by 180 w a r r i o r s , t o Muhammara. 
W h i l s t t h i s correspondence between Mubarak and Jabir was being 
c a r r i e d on, Sheikh Khaz'al suppressed a l l the r e v o l t s and r i o t s w i t h i n 
(22) 
h i s t e r r i t o r y and peace was restored. 
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I I 
ANGLO-KUWAITI RELATIONSHIPS WITH A REFLECTION ON SAUDI-KUWAITI 
RELATIONS 1914-21 
A f t e r the B r i t i s h occupation of Basra and the evacuation of 
the T u rkish forces t h e r e , Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of I n d i a , i n s i s t e d 
on v i s i t i n g the Arabian Gulf and h i s purpose i n undertaking t h i s tour 
was to assess f o r himself the tendencies of the Sheikhs i n the area and 
to sound out t h e i r views concerning the formation of a u n i t e d force 
under t h e i r leadership. 
Accordingly, i n February 1915, he l e f t Bombay w i t h a B r i t i s h 
F l e e t . He v i s i t e d Bahrain, and also Kuwait. Percy Cox came from Basra 
e s p e c i a l l y to attend Hardinge on h i s v i s i t to Kuwait. When Lord Hardinge 
a r r i v e d at the por t o f Kuwait, Sheikh Jabir went t o welcome him, accompanied 
by Cox and Colonel Gray, the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Agent i n Kuwait. 
On the f o l l o w i n g day Mubarak went i n person t o v i s i t Hardinge 
on board the warship, and i n v i t e d him to v i s i t the town. The same 
afternoon, Hardinge repaid the v i s i t by c a l l i n g of Sheikh Mubarak i n his 
palace. I n the course of t h a t v i s i t , Lord Hardinge assured Mubarak h i s 
government would remain on good terms w i t h him f o r as long as Mubarak 
prevented any other powers from i n t e r f e r i n g i n h i s t e r r i t o r y , and that 
his Government would make every e f f o r t t o help him. On the next day, 
Lord Hardinge l e f t Kuwait f o r Basra. 
As we have seen, Sheikh Mubarak's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the B r i t i s h 
were good and he d i d h i s utmost to help them against the Turks i n I r a q 
u n t i l they occupied Basra. As f o r h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Ibn Sa'ud, these 
were also s t i l l very good. When the 'Ajman t r i b e s r e v o l t e d against him 
and threatened Riyadh, he sought help from Sheikh Mubarak, and the l a t t e r 
(23) 
immediately despatched a force t o help "his son" Ibh Sa'ud. The 
Kuwait i force which went out to support Ibn Sa'ud was accompanied by 
Sheikh Salim, Mubarak's second son, and Sheikh Ahmad, his grandson. 
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Ibn Sa'ud and h i s a l l i e s defeated the 'Ajman forces at the 
b a t t l e o f Riyadh which was near Q a t a i f and ra i s e d the seige of Riyadh. 
The 'Ajman were f i n a l l y routed i n September of the same year, and forced 
to withdraw from Nejd. The Sheikh of the 'Ajman t r i b e now asked Sheikh 
Salim t o allow him to take refuge i n the neighbourhood of Kuwait, i n 
accordance w i t h Arab t r a d i t i o n s of h o s p i t a l i t y , and also because Salim 
was on bad personal terms w i t h Abd-al-Azaiz he consented, and t h i s action 
on Salim's part r e s u l t e d i n cooling o f f of r e l a t i o n s between Ibn Sa'ud 
and Kuwait. 
W h i l s t the triumphant army was s t i l l at Riyadh, news came of the 
death of Sheikh Mubarak on the 15th November 1915, and of the succession 
of h i s eldest son, Sheikh J a b i r . Sheikh Jabir was concerned about the 
possible r e a c t i o n from h i s brother Salim, who was h i s j u n i o r by only a 
year or so, and whose f e e l i n g regarding h i s brother's succession were 
un c e r t a i n . Salim a r r i v e d i n Kuwait on the 7th December, and the same 
evening had a long conference w i t h h i s brother and w i t h Sheikh Khaz'al 
Khan, who had always been f r i e n d l y towards him. As a r e s u l t of the 
discussions, Salim agreed to recognise h i s brother as Sheikh and to serve 
him f a i t h f u l l y . 
On the 8th December, L t . Commander B i c k f o r d and Colonel Gray, 
the B r i t i s h Agent at Kuwait, v i s i t e d Salim and J a b i r . They were 
received w i t h great c o r d i a l i t y by both, and each expressed the hope t h a t 
B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Kuwait would be as c o r d i a l during Jabir*s 
(25) 
r e i g n as they had been during the r e i g n of his f a t h e r . I n March 
1916, Lord Hardinge sent a l a t t e r t o J a b i r , congratulating him on his 
succession and assuring him t h a t : "So long as you act up to e x i s t i n g 
arrangements w i t h the B r i t i s h Government you may expect the same support 
as ivas enjoyed by your f a t h e r " . 
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Sheikh J a b i r was a pleasant man whose mildness and a f f a b i l i t y 
were t o make him a popular r u l e r during h i s short r e i g n of rather more 
than a year. 
W h i l s t Sheikh J a b i r was b u i l d i n g up his s t r e n g t h amongst h i s 
tribesmen and c i t i z e n s , Ibn Sa'ud was making a fr e s h endeavour t o sign 
an agreement w i t h the B r i t i s h . Before, however, we discuss the agreement 
we s h a l l give a b r i e f account of when and why t h i s nexv i n i t i a t i v e came 
from Ibn Sa'ud and of what was the basic purpose of h i s request. Probably 
he wanted to p r o t e c t h i s t e r r i t o r i e s from the Turks and from t h e i r a l l y 
Ibn-Rashaid, or from h i s r i v a l Sharaif Husain who, though himself pro-
B r i t i s h i n t h e i r c o n f l i c t w i t h the Turks i n Hejaz, yet had designs himself 
of I b n Sa'ud's t e r r i t o r y i n Nejd. Unfortunately f o r Sharaif Husain, 
circumstances were against h i s ambitions i n Nejd, since Ibn Sa'ud enjoyed 
the f u l l support of h i s powerful t r i b e s . 
I t was f o r t h i s reason t h a t when Turkey sided w i t h Germany 
against B r i t a i n , Ibn Sa'ud was i n c l i n e d to co-operate w i t h B r i t a i n , 
since r e l a t i o n s between the Wahabi movement, w i t h which he was connected, 
and the Turks had not been good i n the past. The Turks had peremptorily 
r e j e c t e d s p i r i t u a l a u t h o r i t y of the movement and t h i s r e j e c t i o n was 
p a r t l y responsible f o r the continual h o s t i l i t y between Ibn Sa'ud and 
al-Rashaid, the Turks' a l l y i n Nejd. 
Early i n 1915, Ibn Sa'ud asked B r i t a i n t o despatch a B r i t i s h 
delegate to Riyadh. The B r i t i s h Government welcomed t h i s p o l i c y of 
rapprochement w i t h Ibn Sa'ud. The reason was t h a t , since Turkey had 
j o i n e d the Central Powers, the B r i t i s h Government were anxious f o r t h e i r 
communications w i t h I n d i a and were conscious of the f a c t t h a t behind the 
Turks stood the Germans. They were theref o r e , keenly seeking new a l l i e s 
i n Turkish Arabia wherever they might be found. Captain Shakespear, who 
had v i s i t e d Riyadh i n March 1914, as a t r a v e l l e r rather than as a 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h i s Government, now became the f i r s t B r i t i s h 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e at the Court of Abd-al-'Azaiz Ibn Sa'ud. Ibn Sa'ud 
received him r e a d i l y since he was w i l l i n g to sign an agreement w i t h 
the B r i t i s h and Shakespear was ready t o negotiate such an agreement. 
Before t h i s mission could bear f r u i t , Shakespear was k i l l e d at the 
b a t t l e o f Jarab between Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Rashaid, e a r l y i n 1915. 
As a r e s u l t of Shakespear's death, the agreement between the 
two sides was delayed f o r some months. I n December 1915, Ibn Sa'ud 
went t o Darain near Q a t a i f where he met Cox and signed w i t h him an 
agreement on the 26th of the month. The terms of the agreement were 
as f o l l o w s : -
(1) B r i t a i n acknowledged Ibn Sa'ud*s a u t h o r i t y over Nejd, Hasa, J u b a i l 
and t h e i r dependencies and t e r r i t o r i e s , the exact nature and extent of 
which were to be discussed and determined l a t e r . She f u r t h e r acknowledged 
t h a t t h e i r p orts from Uqair t o Safaniya on the shores of the Arabian Gulf 
were the possession of Ibn Sa'ud and of his fa t h e r s before him and solemnly 
recognised Ibn Sa'ud and the independent r u l e r thereof and as the absolute 
c h i e f of t h e i r t r i b e s , and li k e w i s e h i s sons and descendents a f t e r him. 
(2) For h i s part Ibn Sa'ud bound himself not to enter i n t o any 
correspondence, agreement or t r e a t y w i t h any f o r e i g n power or nation and, 
f u r t h e r , t o give immediate notice t o the p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s f o r the 
B r i t i s h Government of any attempt on the part of any other power to 
i n t e r f e r e w i t h the above t e r r i t o r i e s . 
(3) Ben Sa'ud undertook not to cede, s e l l , or mortgage, lease or 
otherwise dispose of the above t e r r i t o r i e s or any part of them, or grant 
concessions w i t h i n those t e r r i t o r i e s t o any f o r e i g n power or to the 
subjects of any f o r e i g n power without the consent of the B r i t i s h 
Government. Further, he w i l l f o l l o w B r i t i s h advice unreservedly, 
provided t h a t i t would not be damaging to .his own i n t e r e s t s . 
(4) Ibn Sa'ud undertook t o keep open the roads leading to the Holy 
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places which passed through h i s t e r r i t o r i e s and t o protect p i l g r i m s 
w h i l s t journeying to and from the Holy places. 
(5) Ibn Sa'ud undertook, as h i s f a t h e r had before him, t o r e f r a i n from 
a l l aggression on, or i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the t e r r i t o r i e s of Kuwait, Bahrain 
and o f the Sheikhs of Qatar, and the 'Oman Coast who were under the 
p r o t e c t i o n of the B r i t i s h government, and who had t r e a t i e s w i t h the 
s a i d government. The l i m i t s of t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s were to be determined. 
(6) The B r i t i s h Government and Ibn Sa'ud agreed t o conclude a f u r t h e r , 
(28 ) 
more d e t a i l e d t r e a t y , w i t h regard t o matters concerning the two p a r t i e s . 
This agreement xvas known as the Darain t r e a t y . 
Ibn Sa'ud's r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n were now very good. I n the 
meantime, however, h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Kuwait had become very bad, mainly 
because Sheikh Ja b i r was not i n t e r e s t e d i n desert a f f a i r s , but he spent 
a l l h i s l i f e i n the town. The immediate r e s u l t of Jabir*s urban d i s p o s i t i o n 
was that Ibn Sa'ud found himself master of the desert, and took advantage 
o f h i s nextf influence by endeavouring to persuade the t r i b e s who belonged 
to Kuwait t o j o i n under h i s p r o t e c t i o n . He c o l l e c t e d the "Zakat" from 
them, and soon the 'Awazim and Mutair t r i b e s , which had been reckoned as 
"Kuwaiti t r i b e s " d r i f t e d back t o Ibn Sa'ud. Aft e r a year, a l l the gains 
won by Mubarak f o r Kuwait at great expense and e f f o r t had been l o s t . 
The c h i e f reason f o r the h o s t i l i t y between Kuwait and Ibn Sa'ud 
was, as we have mentioned above, Sheikh Salim's p e r m i t t i n g the 'Ajman 
t r i b e t o take refuge i n Kuwait during h i s father's r e i g n . Ibn Sa'ud 
refused to accept that Salim had the a u t h o r i t y t o grant t h i s permission, 
and put pressure on Sheikh J a b i r t o expel the 'Ajman t r i b e from the 
neighbourhood of Kuwait. Sheikh J a b i r , however, at f i r s t refused to 
e j e c t them, f e a r i n g l e s t , i n so doing, he should d r i v e them i n t o the 
enemy camp. At the same time, he was unable to r e s i s t Ibn Sa'ud, i n 
the event of open h o s t i l i t i e s . F i n a l l y , a f t e r the interference of 
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the B r i t i s h Government, Jabir y i e l d e d i n February 1915 and agreed to 
e x p e l l them i n order t o appease Ibn Sa'ud. The 'Ajman now l e f t the 
neighbourhood of Kuwait. 
On the 5th February 1917, Sheikh J a b i r died, a f t e r a short 
r e i g n over a year. He was succeeded by h i s brother Salim, who was regarded 
as a much stronger character than J a b i r and who, during his f a t h e r ' s l i f e 
time, had had charge of t r i b a l matters w h i l s t J a b i r , who was an amiable 
but weak character and a "bon vi v e u r " , had been Deputy Governor i n Kuwait.^ 3 0^ 
Salim had spent most of h i s l i f e among the Bedouin, and the key to his 
character probably l i e s i n t h i s phase of his career. He l e f t Kuwait 
f o r the desert because he disapproved of Mubarak's l a x i t y i n r e l i g i o n . 
His subsequent experience had a profound e f f e c t on h i s character f o r , 
r a t h e r than y i e l d to h i s f a t h e r and r e t u r n t o the l u x u r i e s of Kuwait, 
he endured the r i g o u r s of desert l i f e f o r 17 years. However, throughout 
t h a t period, Salim enjoyed h i s f a t h e r ' s confidence as the Commander of the 
t r i b a l f o r c e s , i n which capacity he served his f a t h e r w i t h complete l o y a l t y . 
(31) 
This was so i n s p i t e of Mubarak's s t r a y i n g from the path of tru e r e l i g i o n . 
Salim was narrow i n outlook, bigoted i n r e l i g i o u s matters, and t a c t l e s s 
i n h i s personal r e l a t i o n s . However, h i s marked i n d i v i d u a l i t y and strength 
(32) 
o f purpose ensured h i s a u t h o r i t y over both t r i b e s f o l k and town-dwellers. 
By J u l y 1917, Ibn Sa'ud, who had begun to c o l l e c t the "Zakat" 
from the 'Awazim, who were p r a c t i c a l l y a Kuwaiti t r i b e , was i n s t i g a t i n g 
them to leave Kuwait and s e t t l e i n h i s own t e r r i t o r y . At the same time 
Sheikh Salim was beginning to make f r i e n d s i n the desert. N a t u r a l l y 
enough h i s f r i e n d s were from the Shummar and 'Ajman, Ibn Sa'ud's enemies. 
Immediately the 'Ajman, w i t h t h e i r c h i e f , a l - H i t h a i l a n , moved down i n t o 
the neighbourhood of Kuwait, and Salim now r e a l i s e d how t o gain his 
revenge on Ibn Sa'ud. Ibn Sa'ud's p o s i t i o n i n Qasaim could not e a s i l y 
be defended, i n s p i t e o f a t a c i t l y acknowledged truce w i t h H a i l , since 
h i s forces had gone o f f t o t h e i r homes i n the south. For t h i s reason 
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he found i t to h i s advantage to reach an accommodation w i t h the Shammar 
and gave them permission t o enter h i s t e r r i t o r y on condition t h a t they 
(33) 
encampedaround the w a l l s of Artuwiyah. At the same time, he placed 
h i s son T u r k i i n charge of Qasaim, and gave them passes f o r supplies i n 
Kuwait. So, the Shammar obtained t h e i r supplies both i n Qasaim and 
Kuwait. 
During October great changes had taken place both i n Kuwait 
i t s e l f and i n the desert. I n Kuwait, Salim had gained a good deal of 
pr e s t i g e as a r u l e r , and had become a good deal more amiable as his 
p o s i t i o n became more secure. His r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the merchants was. 
good. However, the same could not be said of h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Ibn 
Sa'ud since the l a t t e r was s t i l l c o l l e c t i n g the "Zakat'' from the Kuwaiti 
t r i b e s , and t h i s f a c t rankled w i t h Salim. 
Salim r e a l i s e d from past experience how important i t was f o r 
Kuwait t o maintain c o n t r o l over the t r i b e s , and f o r t h i s reason he 
decided on an attempt t o regain what had been l o s t by sending members 
of h i s f a m i l y to subdue the H i n t e r l a n d . This action d i d not s u i t 
Ibn Sa*u"d at a l l , and at the same time Sheikh Salim protested t o the 
B r i t i s h Agent at Kuwait, Colonel Hamilton. A long correspondence 
between Kuwait and Riyadh now ensued, but t o no a v a i l , since Ibn Sa'ud 
claimed that he was acting w i t h i n h i s r i g h t i n c o l l e c t i n g the "Zakat" 
(35) 
from the t r i b e s , and denied that he had overtaxed them. He refused 
to cease from t a x k i n g them a l t o g e t h e r . 
At t h i s j u n c t u r e , Colonel Hamilton went to Riyadh t o discuss 
the matter w i t h Ibn Sa'ud. At h i s meeting w i t h the Sheikh, Hamilton 
t r i e d t o persuade him t o stop meddling w i t h the t r i b e s . He reminded 
him of h i s good r e l a t i o n s w i t h the B r i t i s h Government, and of the t r e a t y 
which had been signed i n December 1915, with him and Cox. Hamilton also 
brought t o Ibn Sa'ud's a t t e n t i o n the a r t i c l e i n the Darain Treaty 
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concerning Kuwait which r e f e r r e d t o the q u a d r i l a t e r a l behind Kuwait which 
i t had been the custom to regard as Kuwait t e r r i t o r y . I n r e p l y , Ibn 
Sa'ud t o l d Hamilton that the ,'Awazim and Mutair t r i b e s had l e f t Kuwait f o r 
Hasa and had s e t t l e d down the r e ; but since both t e r r i t o r i a l and t r i b a l 
boundaries were acknowledged i n Arabia, he also blamed Salim f o r g i v i n g 
refuge and p r o t e c t i o n t o the 'AJman t r i b e , although he knew that they were 
h i s enemies. Ibri Sa'ud r e a l i s e d , however, that he was i n the wrong, and 
he promised Hamilton t h a t he would send back the t r i b e s which he had 
e n t i c e d away from Kuwait, on c o n d i t i o n that Salim, on h i s p a r t , should 
send away the 'Ajman t r i b e and have no contact w i t h the Shammar, who were 
enemies of Nejd. Hamilton accepted these conditions and promised Ibn 
Sa'ud t h a t he would negotiate w i t h Salim. 
On the 3rd December 1917, Hamilton returned t o Kuwait and informed 
Salim of what had taken place between him and Ibn Sa'ud. Sheikh Salim 
accepted Ibn Sa'ud's poi n t of view and expelled the 'Ajman t r i b e s from his 
(37) 
t e r r i t o r y . 
We now t u r n to Sheikh Salim's r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n . When he 
became Sheikh of Kuwait, the Government of I n d i a forwarded to Cox i t s 
r e c o g n i t i o n f o r presentation t o the new r u l e r , and renewed w i t h him the 
undertaking which had been given t o h i s f a t h e r . However, Salim's p o l i c y 
towards the B r i t i s h d i f f e r e d from t h a t o f h is f a t h e r and brother. He 
was believed to be somewhat a n t i - f o r e i g n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y a n t i - B r i t i s h 
since B r i t a i n was the enemy of Muslim Turkey. At the very outset 
o f h i s r e i g n , he refused t o a s s i s t the B r i t i s h war e f f o r t , and was, i n 
f a c t , s e c r e t l y supporting the Turks. The B r i t i s h Government had been 
gathering i n f o r m a t i o n from which i t appeared that Kuwait was being used 
as a base f o r supplying goods to the Turks and to the t r i b e s which were 
ranged on the Turkish side, and so at the end of 1917, the B r i t i s h navy 
found i t necessary t o e s t a b l i s h a blockade at Kuwait. 
On January 4th, 1918, Sheikh Salim f o r m a l l y agreed to the B r i t i s h 
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Government's e s t a b l i s h i n g a blockade f o r the c o n t r o l of exports to the 
i n t e r i o r , but a few days l a t e r , he withdrew the concession on the grounds 
t h a t his honour and d i g n i t y would be a f f e c t e d by such a blockade. Even 
a v i s i t on the 9th February from the Deputy P o l i t i c a l Resident at Bushire, 
bearing a message from the C i v i l Commissioner, f a i l e d t o change Salim's 
(39) 
a t t i t u d e of uncompromising h o s t i l i t y t o the idea of the blockade. 
I n February, however, Sheikh Salim h e l d a meeting of his f a m i l y 
and leading merchants, which was attended, at the Sheikh's request, by 
the p a r t i c u l a r agent. At the meeting, Salim gave h i s f i n a l r e p l y which 
was that i f he received a formal demand i n w r i t i n g t o allow the blockade 
post as a m i l i t a r y necessity, he would r e p l y i n w r i t i n g s t a t i n g t h a t he 
consented, provided t h a t he should be allowed to v i s i t the B r i t i s h Agent-
f i r s t . Neither Sheikh Salim nor h i s " M a j l i s " put forward any s o l i d reasons 
f o r opposition t o the plan and they seem to have aimed merely t o put o f f 
i t s enforcement f o r as long as possible. Opposition remained f i r m , 
however, and accordingly the B r i t i s h r e s o rted to the measures which had 
been sanctioned by the army Commander. These included:-
(1) A naval demonstration. 
(2) Blockade by sea w i t h n o t i f i c a t i o n of the f a c t t o a l l I n dian and 
Persian ports. 
(3) A request t o the Sheikh t o remove himself to Fao or Basra. This 
l a s t measure could be enforced at the d i s c r e t i o n of the Naval 
Commander i n Consultation w i t h the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
On the 10th February the S.S. Zayani was ordered by the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent, Colonel Hamilton, not to unload her cargo, which was subsequently 
taken on t o Basra. At once the s i t u a t i o n at Kuwait improved and on the 
16th February Sheikh Salim wrote accepting the blockade proposals without 
r e s e r v a t i o n . 
On the 22nd February, a B r i t i s h blockade o f f i c e r , L i e u t . McCollum 
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and four other ranks a r r i v e d i n Kuwait t o c o n t r o l the blockade arrangements. 
This o f f i c e r received no r e a l help and i n f a c t , considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s 
were placed i n h i s way. There was reason t o believe that goods continued 
to leave Kuwait which was f u l l o f f o o d s t u f f s and other p r o v i s i o n s , but as 
the posts were under the c o n t r o l of the Sheikh's f o l l o w e r s no evidence was 
r \u • (41) 
forthcoming. 
On the 15th March, Colonel Hamilton l e f t Kuwait and was replaced 
by Captain P.G. Loch. At the beginning of A p r i l , several large caravans, 
estimated at 4,000 camels, which a l l e g e d l y belonged t o Qasaim and other 
Eastern areas of Ibn Sa'ud's t e r r i t o r y , but which were, i n f a c t , composed 
l a r g e l y of enemy i n f i l t r a t o r s or of merchants who supported the enemy, 
assembled i n Kuwait w i t h a large number of Bedouin w i t h about 3,000'camels 
and requested t h a t the blockade be l i f t e d t o allow the export of an 
abnormally large q u a n t i t y of assorted goods. 
The B r i t i s h Agent contacted Baghdad about t h i s matter but the 
C i v i l Commissioner refused the requests, with the exception of a few which 
could be per m i t t e d , provided that the necessary decla r a t i o n was made. On 
the 10th A p r i l the B r i t i s h Men-of-War "Lawrence" and "Brambie" reached 
Kuwait, and the f o l l o w i n g morning the chiefs of the caravans and t r i b e s 
c a l l e d at the Sheikh's palace to hear the answer to the request f o r permission 
t o export. On the same day the P o l i t i c a l Agent and the blockade o f f i c e r 
met Sheikh Salim and informed him of the abbormal q u a n t i t i e s and types of 
goods to be exported i n the coming 15 months, and pointed out that the r e s t 
of the caravans were s t i l l i n Kuwait. Sheikh Salim h e s i t a t e d to agree t o 
send the caravans away empty handed, but eventually orders were given by 
the P o l i t i c a l Agent, and the Sheikh uras overruled. 
A f t e r t h i s event a l e t t e r was sent to Ibn Sa'ud expl a i n i n g the 
measure, and i n v i t i n g him t o come w i t h Mr. P h i l b y ^ ^ to discuss the f u t u r e 
r e g u l a t i o n of t r a f f i c . i n a d d i t i o n , each caravan leader was given a 
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l e t t e r t o the Sheikh or Governor of h i s d i s t r i c t , explaining why the 
caravan had returned without goods. Before the tribesmen and caravans 
l e f t Kuwait, they had t o pass i n f r o n t of the Agency, so t h a t a check 
could be made to ensure t h a t they were empty and that no goods were being 
taken o u t . As a precautionary measure, i n view of the large number of 
caravans involved, a machine gun was placed on the Agency roof.. 
During the blockade, the B r i t i s h Agent received information t o 
the e f f e c t t h a t one remaining caravan was smuggling i n arms and explosives, 
which were hidden i n the saddles of the camels. A guard of marines and 
blue - j a c k e t s was now landed and i n v e s t i g a t e d the caravan, but without 
success. The operation of passing the caravan proceeded q u i e t l y , and 
a f t e r w a i t i n g a short time to see i f there was l i k e l y t o be a chance of 
g e t t i n g goods out, the caravans returned to Nejd where they complained 
b i t t e r l y to Ibn Sa'ud. 
There was considerable annoyance i n Nejd at what had happened, 
but t h i s died down, and Ibn Sa'ud acted reasonably i n i n s t r u c t i n g h i s 
repr e s e n t a t i v e i n Kuwait t o give guarantees concerning h i s caravans. At 
the same time, i n order to avoid the occupation of Kuwait, and i n an 
endeavour t o s e t t l e the Kuwait problem, i t was decided to buy a l l the 
stocks h e l d i n Kuwait and t o l i m i t imports to prevent t h e i r being replaced. 
On the 4th May, 1918, Sheikh Salim wrote a l e t t e r to the P o l i t i c a l 
Agent asking him to request h i s Government to extend to him the same 
p r o t e c t i o n and f r i e n d s h i p as h i s predecessors had enjoyed. He promised 
t o take complete r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r anything which might happen i n h i s 
r e g i o n , and tha t there would be a s i g n a l improvement i n the conduct of h i s 
o f f i c i a l s . The Sheikh's proposals were submitted t o the B r i t i s h Government 
b u t , because there was some delay i n t h e i r acceptance, the Sheikh grew 
i m p a t i e n t . Accordingly, the P o l i t i c a l Agent was authorised, on the 3rd 
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To a t o t a l value of 
Rs. 26,52,943/12 
June, to inform him t h a t h i s Government were g i v i n g h i s l e t t e r t h e i r 
f r i e n d l y consideration, and t h a t i t was hoped that S i r Percy Cox would 
(44) 
d e l i v e r t h e i r r e p l y on h i s r e t u r n t o Mesopotamia. The purchases on 
behal f o f the B r i t i s h Government amounted t o : 
Rice 56,753 bags 
Wheat 1,640 bags 
Barley 2,900 bags 
Sugar 7,805 bags 
Coffee 10,665 bags 
Pepper 350 bags 
Tea 1,658 cases 
These purchases were, however, stopped on the 2nd June, as a personal 
concession t o Salim i n response t o h i s request t o the Deputy C i v i l 
Commissioner at Basra, and t o the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
I n s t r u c t i o n s were, however, now given i n Indi a i n other Gulf 
p o r t s to replace the stocks bought by the B r i t i s h Government, w i t h the 
r e s u l t t h a t f u r t h e r a c t i o n became necessary, and on the 12th June Sheikh 
Salim was informed t h a t permission could not be given to land these goods 
pending the answer of the B r i t i s h Government t o h i s l e t t e r . Traders were, 
however, t o be given the option e i t h e r of shipping t h e i r goods t o Basra 
under permit, or of s e l l i n g them t o the B r i t i s h " a t cost price plus 5%" on 
any goods which the blockade o f f i c e r considered should not be landed at 
(45) 
Kuwait. On the 26th June, the S.S. "Zayam" was" ordered t o s a i l on 
w i t h her cargo which included more than 21,000 packages, mostly containing 
f o o d s t u f f s f o r Kuwait. 
On the 24th June, 1918, the P o l i t i c a l Agent stated that occupation 
was s t i l l only r e a l s o l u t i o n t o the Kuwait question, but that i f t h a t were 
not f e a s i b l e , the Sheikh's o f f e r should be accepted as a compromise s o l u t i o n . 
Accordingly, on the 28th June 1918, the Government o f I n d i a 
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announced th a t they accepted the Sheikh's o f f e r on c e r t a i n conditions. 
This decision was communicated t o the Sheikh i n the l e t t e r quoted at length 
below. I t was, however, i n s i s t e d upon th a t exports from I n d i a to Kuwait 
were t o be p r o h i b i t e d except under a permit signed by the P o l i t i c a l Agent, 
and t h a t any necessary a c t i o n would be taken to prevent exports entering 
Kuwait from any other Gulf p o r t s . 4 7 ^ The f o l l o w i n g Statement of Policy 
was made:-
"While the Government of India appreciate the d e s i r a b i l i t y of checking 
trade w i t h Kuwait they do not consider t h i s of s u f f i c i e n t importance to 
j u s t i f y the r i s k of an open breach w i t h the Sheikh and the consequent 
necessity of m i l i t a r y occupation w i t h i t s possible f a r reaching e f f e c t 
(48) 
on other parts of Arabia." 
On the 5th July the f o l l o w i n g l e t t e r was handed t o Sheikh Salim 
by the P o l i t i c a l Agent. 
" I n your l e t t e r dated the 4th May i n which you mentioned that since olden 
times there e x i s t e d f r i e n d s h i p f u l l and perfect between the B r i t i s h 
Government and the Rulers of Kuwait i n the time of your l a t e r father and 
bro t h e r , and t h a t you ask the high Government t o extend t h i s f r i e n d s h i p 
and assistance t o you; and t h a t you therefore wrote the above mentioned 
l e t t e r t o say t h a t you were ready t o accept f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on your 
s e l f p ersonally f o r a l l t h a t happened i n Kuwait and i t s t e r r i t o r i e s 
l i k e w i s e and tha t you w i l l not allow any acts t o be done i n Kuwait or 
i t s t e r r i t o r y which may be against the i n t e r e s t s of the Government hy 
any persons, e i t h e r by your subjects men or others who may come i n t o 
your t e r r i t o r i e s , and t h a t you w i l l allow no enemies of the Government 
to come i n t o Kuwait t e r r i t o r y ; and that you w i l l be personally responsible 
t h a t no goods are sent to the enemies of the Government on account of the 
f r i e n d s h i p between you and the Government and you request t h a t the 
Government w i l l give you the assistance of the o f f i c e r now here as 
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blockade o f f i c e r to help you i n dealing w i t h t h i s matter, and that you 
wrote t h i s because you desire that there should be nothing but f r i e n d s h i p 
and r i g h t s of f r i e n d s h i p between the Government and yo u r s e l f . 
Your l e t t e r was communicated to the Government; and S i r Percy Cox was 
expected t o r e t u r n t o I r a q a f t e r a short time and he would then d e l i v e r 
to you the r e p l y of the Government, but he has been delayed and therefore 
the Government have ordered me t o communicate t h e i r reply t o your 
(49) 
Excellency. And i t i s as f o l l o w s : -
The Government have deeply r e g r e t t e d the events of the l a s t two years 
at Kuwait, but they welcome your d e c l a r a t i o n as a f f o r d i n g an opportunity 
f o r the re-establishment of our t r a d i t i o n a l f r i e n d s h i p between themselves 
and %he Rulers of Kuwait and i n order that there may be no misunderstanding 
i n the f u t u r e , they desire t o ex p l a i n t h e i r p o l i c y towards your Excellency. 
On the one hand, should you show to Government the same f r i e n d s h i p and 
assistance which they have experienced from many years i n t h e i r dealings 
w i t h the Rulers of Kuwait they w i l l continue to you the assurances given 
t o your i l l u s t r i o u s f a t h e r , the l a t e Sheikh Mubarak, e s p e c i a l l y that 'the 
town of Kuwait and i t s boundaries likewise belong to Sheikh Mubarak-el-
§abah r u l e r of Kuwait, and h i s h e i r s a f t e r h i m ' . ^ ^ And w i l l extend 
to you the f r i e n d s h i p and p r o t e c t i o n and assistance which they gave t o 
him and f i n a l l y , they hope that you w i l l again r a i s e the name of your 
house o f Kuwait to the high p o s i t i o n which i t held i n the past i n the 
eyes of the B r i t i s h Government, and the people of Arabia. 
On the other hand i t i s the p l a i n duty of the Ruler of a state which i s 
on terms of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h the Government t o prevent a l l acts e i t h e r 
by h i s own subjects or by other persons i n h i s t e r r i t o r y , which may be 
contrary t o the i n t e r e s t s of the Government; and since they know t h a t ; 
i f you wish t o do'so, you have the power t o c o n t r o l your subjects and 
others i n your t e r r i t o r y , the Government w i l l be compelled to h o l d your 
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Excellency personally responsible should any such act u n f o r t u n a t e l y be 
committed i n f u t u r e . They hope you w i l l r e a l i s e t o your r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
as the Ruler of Kuwait towards the Government under whose p r o t e c t i o n and 
f r i e n d s h i p Kuwait has prospered i n the past, and w i l l understand that 
p r o s p e r i t y depends e n t i r e l y on preservation of true f r i e n d s h i p , both i n 
word and deed w i t h Government. The B r i t i s h Government decided t o remove 
the blockade provided t h a t you take measures of your own t o prevent 
supplies being sent t o enemies of the Government and hope th a t i n taking 
these measures you w i l l not h e s i t a t e to consult the P o l i t i c a l Agent and 
L t . McCollum who w i l l remain at Kuwait as his assis t a n t but i n order to 
prevent i l l - d i s p o s e d persons from endeavouring to smuggle goods, no goods 
w i l l be allowed t o leave I n d i a or Kuwait i n f u t u r e by dhow or steamer 
w i t h o u t the production of a permit signed by the p o l i t i c a l Agent or h i s 
d u l y authorised r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . Government desires that f u l l consultation 
should take place between you and the P o l i t i c a l Agent regarding the 
q u a n t i t i e s o f goods r e q u i r e d f o r your t e r r i t o r y so t h a t the l e g i t i m a t e 
needs o f your people w i l l be safeguarded and. permits w i l l also be granted 
by the P o l i t i c a l Agent f o r goods which may be necessary f o r l a w f u l trade 
- (51) 
X T i t h the subjects of the f r i e n d of a l l Sheikh Abd-3l*Azaiz Ben Sa'ud" 
I t appears from the l e t t e r that Salim was made f u l l y aware of a l l 
t h a t was i n v o l v e d i n h i s new r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the B r i t i s h and t h a t , hence-
f o r t h , he \vould have t o accept t h e i r word as law. Salim now issued a 
d e c l a r a t i o n of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h B r i t a i n i n which he stat e d t h a t i f any one 
of h i s subjects disagreed w i t h the B r i t i s h Government i n word or deed, he 
would have h i s property confiscated and he would be expelled from Kuwait. 
Sheikh Salim was a f r a i d of taking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon himself, 
and on the 7th J u l y , he r e p l i e d i n w r i t i n g to t h i s e f f e c t . An i n t e r v i e w 
was now arranged between the P o l i t i c a l Agent and the blockade O f f i c e r , on 
the one s i d e , and a representative of the Sheikh, headed by h i s son Abdullah 
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who had been appointed t o superintend the whole blockade w i t h s p e c i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r land exports on the other. At a meeting i t was decided 
t h a t a cle a r c u t system should be established f o r examining exports by sea, 
and t h a t the examination of exports by land should be continued. Considerable 
pressure was put on Sheikh Abdullah t o go round Kuwait and expel any enemy 
(52) 
i n f i l t r a t o r s i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether or not they had w r i t t e n passes. 
The blockade remained i n force i n Kuwait u n t i l the 3rd November, 
1918, when the General Headquarters of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force 
(53) 
was moved t o Baghdad on the d e c l a r a t i o n of the Armistice w i t h the Turks. 
During the blockade, Kuwait had been i n a c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n and n a t u r a l l y 
she relaxed when the B r i t i s h announced that the blockade on the port was to 
be removed. No sooner had t h i s r e s p i t e been granted, however, than Sheikh 
Salim was faced w i t h another problem concerning the boundaries between h i s 
t e r r i t o r y and t h a t of Ibn Sa'ud. 
I n the past the Sheikhs of Kuwait had considered that t h e i r 
southern boundary ran from a p o i n t nearly 150 miles South of Kuwait town, 
whence i t continued i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e towards the East, ending at a port j 
(54) 
c a l l e d Balbul. I n view of the s i t u a t i o n of Balbul at the end of t h i s 
boundary Sheikh Salim decided t o f i x the boundary towards Kuwait and Hasa. 
I 
The f a c t t h a t a number of Kuwaiti t r i b e s roamed t h i s area f o r camping and | 
grazing land encouraged Sheikh Salim to pursue t h i s scheme, as d i d the 
abundance of d r i n k i n g water and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a s u i t a b l e anchorage. 
Salim, however, decided t o b u i l d a palace there and t o b u i l d a new small 
town there. 
News of t h i s development soon spread across the desert and reached 
the ears of Ibn Sa'ud who, i n h i s anger, wrote a l e t t e r of protest t o Salim 
i n which he claimed t h a t Balbul was w i t h i n his t e r r i t o r y and asked him not t o 
proceed w i t h h i s plan f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a new town there. Salim, however, refused to 
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l i s t e n to Ibn Sa'ud, but wrote t o him i n s i s t i n g t h a t Balbul was i n Kuwait 
t e r r i t o r y and t e l l i n g him t o mind h i s own business. Ibn Sa'ud's next move 
was to w r i t e t o Major Moore, the B r i t i s h Agent i n Kuwait, informing him of 
the misunderstanding between himself and Sheikh Salim, and of Sheikh Salim*s 
claim to Balbul which was part of Q a t a i f and w i t h i n Sa'udi t e r r i t o r y . Major 
Moore only wrote t o Salim asking f o r h i s view of the f a c t s which underlay 
Ibn Sa'ud's l e t t e r and the Sheikh r e p l i e d that he remained adamant that 
Balbul was w i t h i n h i s t e r r i t o r y . I n t h i s connection he c i t e d the Anglo-
T u r k i s h agreement of the 29th J u l y 1913, p o i n t i n g out t h a t i t was very 
l a r g e l y on t h i s agreement that he based h i s claim. I t w i l l be remembered 
that i n t h i s agreement i t was s t a t e d t h a t the boundary l i n e ran from Hafar 
i n the B a t i n through Safa, Qar'a, Haba, Warbah and 'Anta, to the Arabian 
Gulf at Jabal Hanaifah, and i t s distance from Kuwait town as the crow f l i e s 
(55) 
v a r i e d from 135 t o 160. I t seems that t h i s boundary was f i x e d during 
Captain Shakespear's tour of Central Arabia, f o r he submitted a note 
concerning t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n (No.C-62 dated 12th August 1912). He pointed 
out t h a t t h i s was as d e f i n i t e and as definable a boundary l i n e as any which 
one would reasonably expect t o f i n d i n a desert. Owing to the s c a r c i t y of 
w e l l s i n the south i t was a strong one, and a l l the points on which i t was 
based were unquestionably w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of Sheikh Mubarak. 
Shakespear summarised the s i t u a t i o n of the Bedouin i n the desert and the 
problem of c o n t r o l l i n g them i n h i s statement t h a t " A l l the Arab Sheikhs 
base the t e r r i t o r i a l extent of t h e i r power upon t h e i r a b i l i t y t o enforce some 
order over the adjacent t r i b e s , t h e i r power to enforce the payment of "Zakat" 
by Bedouin and t h e i r capacity to prevent and t o avenge outrages and r a i d s 
w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s claimed. Judged by these standards there 
can be no question t h a t Mubarak i s the paramount chief w i t h i n the l i m i t s 
described. He c o l l e c t e d "Zakat" from the *Awazim, who are p r a c t i c a l l y a 
Kuwaiti t r i b e , the whole of the Mutair, except two or three d i s t a n t sections 
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i n Nejd, most of the 'Ajman, the Bani Khalid and, u n t i l l a t e l y , also from 
the D h u f a i r . , , ( 5 6 ) 
By 1918, however, the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n was completely d i f f e r e n t 
from when Captain Shakespear wjpote the l i n e s quoted above, f o r there i s 
simply no comparison between the p o s i t i o n under Salim and that under Mubarak. 
The change had come about as a r e s u l t of the general t r e n d of events such 
as the adoption of'Walihabism" by the Mutair t r i b e . As a r e s u l t of t h i s 
acceptance, the Mutair was bound i n an allegiance t o Riyadh. 
Before we embark on an analysis of the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n at 
th a t time, we s h a l l endeavour to give a b r i e f idea of the nature of the 
Ikhwan movement. The Ikhwan movement had i n i t an element of r e l i g i o u s 
i n t o l e r a n c e , which i t i n h e r i t e d from the Wahabi st a t e i n which i t had i t s 
o r i g i n s . The Wahabis were allowed t o have no t i e s w i t h non-Wahabis, even 
i f r e l a t i v e s were involved. They would not mix w i t h f o r e i g n e r s and had 
s t r i c t moral and e t h i c a l codes which they had t o observe. They were almost 
e n t i r e l y cut o f f from outside i n f l u e n c e . The Ikhwan and t h e i r leaders were 
important i n implementing Ibn Sa'ud's f o r e i g n and domestic p o l i c i e s . He 
b u i l t up h i s army from members of the Ikhwan communities, and used t h i s 
army t o suppress any i n s u r r e c t i o n . Further, w i t h the support of h i s Ikhwan 
troops he fought h i s campaign f o r a u n i t e d Arabia. 
The foregoing i s a summary of the nature and importance of the 
Ikhwan. Now we must r e t u r n to an important t o p i c of the r e l a t i o n s between 
Kuwait and I b n Sa'ud. We mentioned t h a t r e l a t i o n s were s t r a i n e d because 
o f the boundary dispute i n tvhich both claimed that Balbul was w i t h i n t h e i r 
t e r r i t o r y . I t seems tha t Ibn Sa'ud based his claim on the u n w r i t t e n law . 
o f the desert, w h i l s t Sheikh Salim based his on a document i n the manner of 
• A * , (57) a c i v i l i s e d s t a t e . 
I n A p r i l 1920, the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n became c r i t i c a l and 
p o t e n t i a l l y explosive, because Ibn Sa'ud had given orders t o Ben Shuqair, 
the c h i e f of the Mutair t r i b e s , and a l o y a l member of the Ikhwan, to supply 
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money and m a t e r i a l from Hasa and J u b a i l t o b u i l d houses and to s e t t l e 
w i t h h i s f o l l o w e r s at Jaryah, which was to the north-east of Balbul i n 
Kuwaiti t e r r i t o r y , no more than 120 miles south of Kuwait' town i t s e l f . 
When Salim received news of t h i s move, he informed the P o l i t i c a l Agent, 
f e a r i n g t h a t i f such encouragements were made, they would lead to t r o u b l e 
— (58) — between Ibn Sa'ud and himself. At the same time Sheikh Salim had 
already warned Ibn Shuqair to leave Kuwait t e r r i t o r y and t o stop his acts, 
but the l a t t e r had refused and had begun t o set up a few mud huts preparatory 
(5 9) 
to s e t t l i n g r o r the hot seasons. 
Sheikh Salim, however, noiir despatched a force under Sheikh ' A l i 
Ben K h a l a i f a e l - D i ' a i j , who was i n charge of the Sheikh*s f l a g i n the 
desert, w i t h Ahmad Ben J a b i r , against Ibn Shuqair and his f o l l o w e r s who were 
encamped at Jaryah w e l l s . Ibn D i ' a i j and his force encamped at Hemdh, 
south-east of Jaryah. When Ibn Shuqair saw the Kuwait Force he appealed 
to F a i s a l Ibn Diwaish, the c h i e f of the Ikhwan movements, f o r help. Faisal 
h u r r i e d from Nejd to help h i s a l l y , and on the 11th May, while D i ' a i j was 
encamped at Hemdh w i t h his f o r c e , F a i s a l e l Diwaish, the Sheikh of the 
Mutair t r i b e , w i t h a large number of Ikhwan, carrying t h e i r own and Ibn 
Sa'ud's f l a g s , advanced from Jaryah and made a sudden attack w i t h h i s a l l y 
Ben Shuqair on the camp of Ben D i ' a i j . The Kuwaiti force was routed, the 
camp captured, the army scattered and the Ikhwan t r i b e s took a large number 
of camels. Ben D i ' a i j ' s force s u f f e r e d heavy casualt i e s , among them Ben 
D i ' a i j h i m s e l f and Sheikh Abdullah e l - J a b i r , who narrowly escaped capture 
and death by f l e e i n g on horseback t o Shi'aibah. 
Rumour now had i t t h a t an attack on Kuwait was planned and 
t h a t a f orce was already on i t s way from Ibn Sa'ud to c a r r y out the plan. 
The i n h a b i t a n t s of Kuwait were t e r r i f i e d . On r e c e i v i n g news of the 
"debacle" at Hemdh, Sheikh Salim had ordered the bazaar to be closed 
f o r a few days w h i l s t a w a l l and other f o r t i f i c a t i o n s were h a s t i l y 
constructed f o r the defence of the town.^"^ I t was s a i d that between 160 
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and 200 men had been k i l l e d by the Ikhwan and t h a t upwards of 300 camels 
belonging t o the Sheikh and the tribesmen had been c a r r i e d o f f as booty, 
i n a d d i t i o n to large numbers of sheep, t e n t s , e t c . The 'Awazim t r i b e was 
attacked by the Ikhwan on the 2 l s t , but they succeeded i n repressing 
attacks, a f t e r which Ibn Diwaish returned t o Artawiyah, h i s own place, 
leaving I b n Shuqair i n possession of Jaryah. I t was a f t e r these events-
t h a t the people of Kuwait b u i l t the defensive w a l l round Kuwait town. Every 
able bodied person p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the construction of t h i s famous w a l l , 
which took only two months t o complete. 
I t was n a t u r a l that Sheikh Salim should now blame Ibn Sa'ud f o r 
i n c i t i n g I b n Shuqair and Ibn Diwaish t o make an attack on Kuwait, and so 
he informed the B r i t i s h Agent of the f a c t s and asked f o r help. Meanwhile 
he wrote a l e t t e r to Ibn Sa'ud on the 1st June 1920, informing him of what 
Ibn Diwaish and the Ikhwan had done i n the Jaryah i n c i d e n t , and reminding 
him of the close r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two houses of Al-Sahah and A1-
Sa'ud, connected as they were by f a m i l y and r e l i g i o u s t i e s . The g i s t of 
the l e t t e r i s contained i n the f o l l o w i n g question:-
" I n the view of brotherhood of o l d a l l i a n c e between us I report 
occurence t o you and f e e l sure that i t w i l l displease you even more 
than me, i f you once adopt the r e a l f a c t s and are not deceived by 
f a l s e evidence. My request i s tha t you w i l l order Fa i s a l el-Diwaish 
to give back property, and make r e s t i t u t i o n f o r men. I f he w i l l not 
obey you, I cannot excuse you and must appeal to arms." 
When the messengers d e l i v e r e d t h i s l e t t e r to Ibn Sa'ud, he read 
i t then stat e d t h a t he absolutely denied Salim's accusation. However, he 
wrote a l e t t e r t o Sheikh Salim which was entrusted to the messenger. I n 
h i s l e t t e r to Salim he s a i d : 
"You, of course, r e a l i s e t h a t these unfortunate matters which have 
already happened and the consequent disputes and struggles about 
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boundaries and subjects have not been st a r t e d by me at a l l . You alone 
have been the cause, l e t every one remain w i t h i n h i s own boundaries. 
You know t h a t from olden time Al-Sa'ud and Al-Sabah never have they s a i d 
' t h i s i s our boundary, these are our subjects*. 
The Al-Sabah confined themselves t o Kuwait while, the Al-Sa'ud looked 
a f t e r t h e i r own a f f a i r s , n e i t h e r party having any doubt or d i f f i c u l t y . 
I n the past when misfortune came upon Nejd i t was s p l i t up i n t o two 
pa r t s , one going t o the Turks and 'Ajman dominated Hasa and the other 
under Ben Rashaid. I n those days any one who found himself pressed 
upon too hardly or tyrannized over by any of these three took refuge 
i n Kuwait, because i t was a l l one "Tar i f ah" class. Things went on i n 
t h i s way t i l l Muhammad Ben §abah died. A f t e r Mubarak had succeeded t o 
the p r i n c i p a l i t y of Kuwait. I was at Kuwait. He used to give "Zakat" 
to those of the Northern and Southern Arabs who used t o come down to 
him. They used to take refuge a l t e r n a t e l y w i t h him, w i t h Ben Rashaid 
and the Turks. When I occupied Hasa your father was s t i l l paying 
Rs600 t o the Turks i n place of the "Zakat" of the 'Awazim t r i b e . He 
used t o take the "Zakat" from the Mutair, Subai'a and others, who used 
to come down to him and we d i d not object owing to close f r i e n d s h i p 
e x i s t i n g between us. 
I s h a l l know how t o plead by cause, I wish t o assure you tha t a l l I 
have s a i d i n the beginning of t h i s l e t t e r i s correct and t r u e , and I 
am f u l l y confident t h a t i n f u t u r e we s h a l l have no trouble w i t h each 
other, and everything w i l l be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y arranged. You may rest 
assured that I am q u i t e w i l l i n g to meet your wishes i n every way. As 
regards r e s t i t u t i o n of camels and horses, I have sent out men t o go 
round and c o l l e c t them. As soon as the points at variance are s e t t l e d 
everything w i l l be a v a i l a b l e , both what belongs t o you and out of our 
own property. I am sending w i t h your deputation my uncle Nasir Bin 
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Sa'ud i n the hope of gaining your goodwill as I am anxious to come to 
an agreement. 
I advise you to accept my ultimatum and sign the attached paper, 
(64) 
otherwise I s h a l l attack you when you next annoy me." 
When the deputation, w i t h Nasir al-Sa'ud, Ibn Sa'ud's delegate, 
reached Kuwait i n J u l y , they handed the l e t t e r t o Sheikh Salim. A f t e r 
reading the l e t t e r , Salim refused t o sign the paper which Ibn Sa'ud had 
sent as the basis f o r an agreement between them. He d i d , however, w r i t e 
a f r i e n d l y l e t t e r t o Ibn Sa'ud i n which he informed him of h i s r e f u s a l to 
sign but sai d t h a t , l i k e Ibn Sa'ud, he also wished f o r a resumption of the 
former f r i e n d s h i p of t h e i r two houses. He urged him to order r e s t i t u t i o n 
to be made f o r the Jaryah a f f a i r s , but made no reference t o a f r o n t i e r 
between them.^"*^ He sai d i n h i s l e t t e r ; -
"Regarding the signing of the paper; I must ask you to t h i n k the matter 
over c a r e f u l l y and I am sure you w i l l see the r i g h t and b e n e f i t of 
remaining as we were i n the past. I t r u s t you w i l l abandon the things 
which annoy me and please our enemies, and please God, you w i l l only 
see a good r e s u l t which w i l l reference to Diwaish, as I t o l d you before, 
I cannot take a c t i o n against him without l e t t i n g you know, as he i s of 
no importance, though, by the grace of God, I could i n every way. I 
have received the camels, r i d i n g camel and horse, which you sent w i t h the 
envoys, and I t r u s t you w i l l now order the r e t u r n of the r e s t of the 
property. I hope you w i l l not make any obje c t i o n to t h i s , as i t i s a 
t h i n g f o r which I can not hold you excused." 
On r e c e i v i n g t h i s l e t t e r , Ibn Sa'ud r e a l i z e d that the time had come 
f o r him t o i n i t i a t e h o s t i l i t i e s against Sheikh Salim, since i t was obvious 
t h a t the l a t t e r ' s obstinacy would thwart any attempt at reaching a 
negotiated settlement. Accordingly, he urged Ibn Shuqair to continue t o 
erect houses at Jarayah and ordered Faisal-el-Diwaish to proceed towards 
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Subaihiya. The l a t t e r move was intended on the one hand t o provoke the 
Kuwaiti t r i b e s and on the other t o b r i n g forces i n t o a s u i t a b l e p o s i t i o n 
from landing an attack on Jaryah. 
Sheikh Salim now found himself i n a c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n as Ibn 
Sa'ud s t a r t e d to urge h i s enemies t o take action against him. He eventually 
decided that a s o l u t i o n could only be reached w i t h the aid of the B r i t i s h 
Government, which enjoyed f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h both sides. Hence he 
asked Major Moore i f h i s Government could f i n d a s o l u t i o n , reminding him 
t h a t the B r i t i s h Government promised t o give him every possible help, i n 
accordance w i t h the agreement of 1899. Meanwhile, he rested h i s case 
on the f a c t t h a t , according t o the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1913, the disputed 
t e r r i t o r y was h i s . Unfortunately f o r Salim, the B r i t i s h Government now 
informed him t h a t the Anglo-Turkish agreement had been superseded by the 
agreement t h a t the B r i t i s h had signed w i t h Ibn Sa'ud on the 26th December 
1915 at Darain. From t h a t date the Anglo-Turkish agreement had ceased t o 
be i n f o r c e . 
This i n f o r m a t i o n came as a b i t t e r blow t o Salim, whose p o s i t i o n 
was s t i l l c r i t i c a l . L a t e r , however, B r i t a i n intervened to calm the 
s i t u a t i o n by n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h each of them separately. A f t e r a long 
correspondence between Ibn Sa'ud, Sheikh Salim and Sir Arnold Wilson, the 
C i v i l Commissioner i n Baghdad, a settlement was reached on the basis of a 
B r i t i s h agreement to appoint an a r b i t r a t o r . I n agreeing to do t h i s B r i t a i n 
made a c o n d i t i o n that Ibn Sa'ud and Salim each gave a w r i t t e n assurance 
beforehand t h a t he and his people would abide by the a r b i t r a t o r ' s decision, 
which would be given at the end of August. I n connection w i t h the 
settlement made before a r e a l peace was concluded, Sheikh Salim mentioned 
the f o l l o w i n g grievances which he had:-
(1) The Jaryah a f f a i r s , and the question of r e s t i t u t i o n f o r l i v e s and 
property l o s t . 
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(2) Ibn Sa'ud's act i o n i n c o l l e c t i n g "Zakat" from the •Awazim. 
(69) 
(3) The r a i d s Bin Sa'ud's t r i b e s made on his t e r r i t o r y . 
As we mentioned above, correspondence passed to and f r o between 
the B r i t i s h Government, Ibn Sa'ud and Salim. A telegram dated 2nd September 
reached the C i v i l Commissioner at Baghdad from the P o l i t i c a l Resident i n 
Bushire, s t a t i n g as f o l l o w s : 
"As the boundary dispute o r i g i n a t e d i n Jaryah a f f a i r s I t h i n k t h i s w i l l 
have to be included i n the a r b i t r a t i o n . I n regard t o (2) "Zakat", I 
believe the custom i s f o r Bedouin t r i b e s to pay "Zakat" to someone who 
i s poxverful enough to levy i t , or has s u f f i c i e n t prestige to secure i t s 
payment wit h o u t having recourse to f o r c e . I t t h i s i s c o r r e c t , I do not 
see how the question of "Zakat" can be included i n the A r b i t r a t i o n . 
As regards ( 3 ) , r a i d s and counter-raids are the order of the day i n 
Arabia, and I do not see how any a r b i t r a t i o n can stop them." 
A f t e r r e c e i v i n g t h i s telegram the C i v i l Commissioner i n Baghdad i n s t r u c t e d 
the B r i t i s h Agent i n Kuwait to inform Sheikh Salim of the views of the 
Resident at Bushire concerning the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n c o l l e c t i n g the 
"Zakat" from the t r i b e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y of the f a c t t h a t the B r i t i s h 
could not guarantee his s e c u r i t y i n t h i s matter. On the 8th September, 
the B r i t i s h Agent passed on t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n t o Sheikh Salim. 
On the 17th September, Sheikh Salim wrote a l e t t e r to the B r i t i s h 
Agent concerning his disputes w i t h Ibn Sa'ud. I n his l e t t e r he stated 
t h a t he agreed w i t h the B r i t i s h Government's view that i t was impossible 
(71) 
t o include the question of "Zakat" i n the agenda f o r the a r b i t r a t i o n . 
Sheikh Salim enclosed i n h i s l e t t e r the agreement comprising four Appendices:-
(1) He agreed, on behalf of himself and on behalf of his own people t h a t 
he would abide by the decision of the a r b i t r a t o r , when the B r i t i s h Government 
would appoint to decide upon the f r o n t i e r now at issue between Ibn Sa'ud 
and himself, and on any other question r e l a t i n g to i t , and he promised t o 
give e f f e c t there to as long as he l i v e d . I n the meantime, he would do 
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a l l i n h i s power t o keep the peace, and would neither commit nor 
- (72) countenance any sort of aggression against Ibn Sa'ud or h i s f o l l o w e r s . 
(2) The second Appendix which dealt w i t h the question of Salim's boundaries 
s t a t e d t h a t they were as f o l l o w s : on the south - Jazai r a t el-*Amayir, i . e . 
the i s l a n d of Musallamiyah and Jinnah. From the coast, west of the i s l a n d 
of Jinnah, the l i n e extends westwards to the v i l l a g e of 'Anata, and from 
there through the w e l l s of W&r-bah, Habah and Qar'ah to Safa, and thence 
north-west t o Ha f a r - a l - B a t i n . From there the l i n e runs north-east, passes 
to the south of the w e l l s of Safwan, Jabal Sanam and Umm Qasar and Bubiyan 
and t o the i s l a n d of Warbah and the sea. The grounds on which he based 
h i s claim were as f o l l o w s : - Jazairat-el-'Amayir had f o r years been 
frequented by Kuwaiti p e a r l d i v e r s , and might w e l l be described as t h e i r 
p o r t . I t had been counted as belonging t o the r u l e r of Kuwait up t o the 
year 1902, when the Turks placed a m i l i t a r y detachment there. 
Regarding *Anata, he sai d " I t s i n h a b i t a n t s always re s o r t to 
Kuwait, they engage i n p e a r l - d i v i n g w i t h the people of Kuwait, and a l l 
t h e i r work i s connected w i t h Kuwait. The t r i b e s which d r i n k from the 
we l l s of Warbah, Habah and a l l the others mentioned above want me, and not 
Ibn Sa'ud. U n t i l the present dispute arose between Ibn Sa'ud and myself 
and trade was stopped, caravans from Kuwait were under my p r o t e c t i o n u n t i l 
they a r r i v e d at these w e l l s . At the. time when the dispute, arose between 
ourselves and the T u r k i s h Government; when the l a t t e r were s t i l l i n 
Mesopotamia and Hasa, and the B r i t i s h Government intervened i n a f r i e n d l y 
manner regarding Kuwait, the above f r o n t i e r - l e s s Jazairat-el-'Amayir, i n 
which there was a Turkish post was that a l l o t t e d to Kuwait. Ibn Sa'ud 
was i n Nejd at the time and had not yet conquered Hasa, but he conquered 
i t afterwards w i t h our help, as i s w e l l known." 
Sheikh Salim mentioned the correspondence which had passed between 
himself and Ibn Sa'ud concerning the Hemdh r a i d of the 17th May 1920, i n 
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which he asked Ibn Sa'ud t o order r e s t i t u t i o n to be made f o r the property 
which Diwaish and h i s f o l l o w e r s had seized, and f o r the people whom they 
had k i l l e d w i t h o u t j u s t cause. He added t h a t , i n r e p l y , Ibn Sa'ud had 
sent 165 camels and r i d i n g camel and a mare, and t h a t at the same time he 
had prepared a document s t i p u l a t i n g t h a t i f Sheikh Salim signed i t , he 
would r e t u r n the r e s t of the property. Sheikh Salim, however, refused t o 
s i g n . I n t h i s he wrote out a d r a f t f o r a t r e a t y which he hoped to make 
w i t h Ibn Sa'ud. I t was phrased as f o l l o w s : 
"We, 'Abdal-Azaiz Ibn Sa'ud on the one p a r t , and Salim Ben Mubarak el~Sabah 
on the other p a r t , do hereby acknowledge and sign t h i s t r e a t y , and agree 
to the conditions set f o r t h be low:-
(1) The boundary between the t e r r i t o r i e s of Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn SabSh i s 
th a t which has now been f i x e d by the a r b i t r a t o r appointed f o r the purpose 
by the B r i t i s h Government. 
(2) Each o f the two r u l e r s accept f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the s e t t l e d 
i n h a b i t a n t s , "Hadhar" l i v i n g w i t h i n h i s boundaries. 
(3) The Bedouin t r i b e s are at l i b e r t y t o give t h e i r "Zakat" to whom they 
i t f i l l , but the r u l e r , who takes i t , accepts r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r th a t t r i b e 
u n t i l such time as i t gives t o enter the other r u l e r ' s t e r r i t o r y , except 
w i t h the l a t t e r ' s concurrence. 
(4) I n the event of anything happening i n the nature of raids or aggression 
at the hands of the subjects of one r u l e r , whether s e t t l e d i n h a b i t a n t s or 
tribesmen, w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y of the other r u l e r , the two r u l e r s w i l l 
s e t t l e the matters between themselves by means of f r i e r i d l y correspondence, 
and should any misunderstanding remain a f t e r such correspondence, they w i l l 
r e f e r the matters t o Government, through the P o l i t i c a l Agent at Bahrain and 
Kuwait. 
(5) There w i l l be intercourse of trade between the people of Nejd and those 
of Kuwait. 
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These Appendices were submitted t o the B r i t i s h Agent at Kuwait 
by Sheikh Salim, as a summary of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Ibn Sa'ud. The 
guarantees r e q u i r e d by the B r i t i s h Government before beginning a r b i t r a t i o n 
were also given. 
As f o r Ibn Sa'ud, he wrote to the B r i t i s h Agent i n Bahrain, 
informing him of h i s acceptance of B r i t i s h a r b i t r a t i o n and of h i s w i l l i n g n e s s 
to give the required guarantee. He said i n h i s l e t t e r of September, 1920:-
" I undertook beforehand t o accept the f o l l o w i n g conditions:-
(1) That I should accept during the whole of my l i f e t i m e on behalf of myself 
and my people the decisions which w i l l be passed by the a r b i t r a t o r appointed 
by His Majesty's Government. 
(2) As regards my informing you as a preliminary t o negotiations of any 
marks, w e l l s , mountains or a feature such as grazing grounds e t c . , my answer 
i s that I do not recognize that Ibn Sabah had any boundaries i n the Hi n t e r l a n d , 
neither mountain nor land-marks nor do I recognize t h a t he has any shore i n 
the H i n t e r l a n d or Kuwait, beyond the surrounding w a l l s of Kuwait town and 
t h i s has been the s i t u a t i o n from the days of h i s f o r e f a t h e r and mine. I f 
Salim has any proofs to the contrary l e t him produce them i n order that I 
may admit or deny same. Any desert Arab you w i l l know these f a c t s and 
(74) 
w i l l be w i l l i n g t o give evidence to the above e f f e c t . 
As regards the conditions t h a t I should guarantee that His Majesty's 
Government undertake to s e t t l e the matter, namely that no h o s t i l e act should 
be committed or any kind of aggression against the t e r r i t o r i e s of Ibn Sabah 
by any of my troops or tribesmen (except I am attacked by the other p a r t y ) 
I undertake on behalf of myself and a l l who are under me t h a t t h i s s h a l l be 
complied w i t h . 
I would f u r t h e r inform your Honour that I have equipped a party 
under the command of one of my sons to guard my northern f r o n t i e r , they 
have orders to r e s i s t any sort of aggression on the part of the tribesmen 
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of Ibn Sabah; should any o f the tribesmen of Ibn Sabah commit a h o s t i l e 
* • • • 
act, and get punished f o r his a c t i o n , I fear i t may create some d i f f i c u l t y 
f o r His Majesty's Government. Hence i f His Majesty's Government are 
w i l l i n g t o go guarantee f o r Ibn Sabah's actions whether l i t t l e or great 
(as they apparently are) from today I would request that Ibn Sabah be ordered 
to c a l l back h i s r a i d i n g party which i s at Jahara under the command of 
D a ' a i j . I f t h i s i s done I w i l l also r e c a l l the party i n charge of my 
(75) 
o f f i c i a l ; I request your Honour t o inform me of the r e s u l t . " 
W h i l s t the negotiations between B r i t a i n , Sheikh Salim and Ibn 
Sa'ud, concerning the boundary question, were i n progress, orders were given 
by the l a t t e r to Ibn Shuqair t o b u i l d a f o r t at Jaryah. Meanwhile Sheikh 
Salim received l o c a l i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t F a i s a l el-Diwaish was on h i s way to 
Subaihiya w i t h a large force marching openly w i t h torches. I t was obvious 
t h a t he had been ordered t o do so by Ibn Sa'ud. Sheikh Salim now protested 
at these h o s t i l e moves, e s p e c i a l l y since Ibn Sa'ud had ostensibly accepted 
the c o nditions f o r the a r b i t r a t i o n , which were l a i d down by the B r i t i s h 
Government. Ibn Sa'ud's moves caused great resentment i n Kuwait. When 
the news o f Ibn Diwaish's march reached Kuwait, the i n h a b i t a n t s became 
extremely nervous, expecting an attack i n the near f u t u r e , possibly on 
Jahara, though they continued also t o f o r t i f y Kuwait town. 
On the 8th October i t was reported by one of Salim's spies that 
a large force of Ikhwan had l e f t Wafrah f o r Subaihiya on the previous 
evening. This info r m a t i o n was confirmed on the f o l l o w i n g day by a member 
of a Bedouin p a t r o l which had been captured by the Ikhwan near Wafrah two 
days e a r l i e r . He had been l e f t f o r dead by the Ikhwan but, despite h i s 
wounds, managed to reach Kuwait. A r e p o r t of the Ikhwan movement was sent 
to Salim, who was at Jahara i n v e s t i g a t i n g a report of a h o s t i l e concentration 
at the Tawal w e l l s t o the west, and he immediately began to make defensive 
preparations. 
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The v i l l a g e o f Jatiara, i n c l u d i n g i t s gardens, farms, a rough 
parallelogram whose maximum length i s about 1,300 yards. To the south-
east very close at hand, i s the f o r t , which i s about 80 yards square w i t h 
w a l l s f i f t e e n f e e t high and four f e e t t h i c k (at the base - the thickness 
decreases t o about two f e e t at the t o p ) . The doors and corners have 
towers, which give a rudimentary f l a n k defence. The v i l l a g e i t s e l f i s 
i n t e r s e c t e d by numerous mud w a l l s which give cover from view and, to some 
i 
e x t e n t , from f i r e . 
When the b a t t l e commenced at 6 a.m. on October 10th, the Kuwaiti 
f o r c e was holding the south-west face of the v i l l a g e and was flanked by Ibn 
Tawalah and his mounted Sfaummar to the r i g h t and by Da'aij's horsemen to 
the l e f t . The Ikhwan concentrated t h e i r attack on the Jahara v i l l a g e r s 
and, a f t e r r o u t i n g Ibn Tawalah, turned the p o s i t i o n from the north-west. 
D a ' a i j , who was cut t o f f by a body of mounted Ikhwan, found himself unable 
to render assistance to the Kuwaiti contingent, w i t h the r e s u l t that they 
were forced to r e t r e a t and t o re-form t o the r i g h t . By nine o'clock the 
e n t i r e v i l l a g e was i n the hands of the Ikhwan, most of the Kuwaiti force and 
t h e i r supporters had scattered and Sheikh Salim, w i t h the other Sheikhs and 
about 600 men had taken refuge i n the f o r t , where they remained despite 
o f f e r s o f a peace settlement from Diwaish, and despite three determined 
attacks during the n i g h t . 
At least 3,000, and possibly as many as 4,000, Ikhwan were involved 
i n the b a t t l e , and of these about 800 were k i l l e d and another 800 so severely 
wounded. A Kuwaiti who v i s i t e d Subaihiya stated that h a l f of the l a t t e r 
d ied before reaching Subaihiya. Hence, on reaching Subaihiya t h e i r e f f e c t i v e 
s t r e n g t h was hardly more than 1,500. However, they found 300 reinforcements 
awaiting them there, and were subsequently j o i n e d by 200 more. 
The Kuwaiti force i s said to have l o s t only about 200 k i l l e d , 
very few of whom were actual i n h a b i t a n t s of Kuwait. The great di f f e r e n c e 
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i n numbers k i l l e d i s due t o the f a c t t h a t the Ikhwan attacked across a 
broad f r o n t and showed considerably less regard f o r t h e i r own safety than 
d i d the Kuwaitis. 
The defeat at Jahara threw the i n h a b i t a n t s of.Kuwait i n t o a state 
of great confusion and w i l d rumours were r i f e . An attack on the town was 
expected at any moment and every a v a i l a b l e man was sent t o man the w a l l s . 
Meanwhile, on October 11th, Sheikh Ahmad a l - J a b i r despatched a r e l i e f force 
numbering about 600 t o Jahara by sea. At the same time, Ibn Tawalah, who 
had f l e d t o Kuwait on the previous day set o f f by road. 
Before the reinforcements a r r i v e d , however, Ibn Diwaish sent an 
"' A l i r n " Ibn Sulyman w i t h d e f i n i t e proposals f o r peace. Ibn Sulyman said 
t h a t the Ikhwan had been surprised t o hear the g a r r i s o n of the f o r t praying 
l i k e Muslims since they had been led to suppose t h a t the Kuwaitis were 
i n f i d e l s . I f they were t r u e Muslims, he added, there should be no d i f f i c u l t y 
i n reaching a peaceful settlement. The Ikhwan demanded that Salim put down 
the vices of smoking, d r i n k i n g , gambling and p r o s t i t u t i o n i n Kuwait, to 
which the l a t t e r r e p l i e d t h a t , though he too disapproved of these things 
and was prepared t o p r o h i b i t h i s subjects from p r a c t i s i n g them openly, he 
could not be responsible f o r what Kuwaitis d i d i n p r i v a t e , o r . f o r the 
actions of f o r e i g n e r s i n Kuwait. A f t e r t h i s the question of the camels 
and other l o o t arose, Salim promising, not to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the Ikhwan i f 
they l e f t behind everything which they had taken. Ibn Sulyman r e p l i e d 
t h a t they were s p o i l s of war and t h a t there was, t h e r e f o r e , no o b l i g a t i o n 
to leave them behind. He promised, however, to discuss the matter w i t h 
Ibn Diwaish, t o whose tent he now withdrew. Shortly afterwards the Ikhwan 
withdrew, taking everything w i t h them and without any f u r t h e r f i g h t i n g . 
On the f o l l o w i n g day they reached Subaihiya. 
On the 14th October, Ibn Diwaish sent a l e t t e r to Salim asking 
t h a t H i l a l a l - M u t a i r i , one of Kuwait's leading merchants, should be sent 
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t o Subaihiya to discuss a peace settlement. Salim refused, i n s i s t i n g t h a t , 
i f there were to be any discussions, a member of the Diwaish f a m i l y should 
be sent t o Kuwait. On the 18th October, Diwaish sent envoys to Kuwait to 
discuss terms f o r a settlement of the dispute. Their terms leaked out 
before the o f f i c i a l discussions took place, and i t was known that they 
would be q u i t e unacceptable to Salim, since what they amounted to was a 
demand t h a t Kuwait should become Ikhwan f o r t h w i t h . At t h i s point there 
seemed to be no a l t e r n a t i v e to war, and an attack on Kuwait was thought to 
be imminent. A representative of Salim who had v i s i t e d Subaihiya estimated 
the e f f e c t i v e s trength of the Ikhwan at 500 horse and at l e a s t 3,000 f o o t . 
Large reinforcements were said t o be coming. 
There seemed l i t t l e t hat anyone could do now. Ibn Sa'ud was 
too f a r away to intervene even i f Ibn Diwaish had acted contrary to h i s 
wishes. Jahara had been evacuated and Kuwait was v i r t u a l l y under siege 
on the land side. The Kuwaitis were nervous, expecting an attack and 
wondering how the Bedouin w i t h i n t h e i r w a l l s would react. They were also 
suspicious of the Nejdis, and there was a c e r t a i n amount of b i t t e r n e s s 
towards the B r i t i s h , who were blamed f o r honouring Ibn Sa'ud and f o r supplying 
him w i t h money and w i t h arms which he was using against Kuwait. There was 
also constant questioning as to when the B r i t i s h a r b i t r a t i o n over the 
boundary question, i n which the Kuwaitis saw t h e i r best chance of peace 
w i t h Ibn Sa'ud, would take place. 
On the 24th October, Sheikh Salim met the delegates from Ibn 
Diwaish. The meeting was attended by the B r i t i s h Agent i n Kuwait, Major 
Moore, who warned the Ikhwan t h a t B r i t a i n was prepared t o intervene to 
p r o t e c t Kuwait f o r as long as Sheikh Salim adhered to the agreement of 1899. 
He added t h a t , since the B r i t i s h Government had r e c e n t l y signed an agreement 
w i t h Ibn Sa'ud, one of the terms of which was t h a t the l a t t e r should under-
take not t o commit any h o s t i l e act against Kuwait, i t was clear that the 
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a c t i o n taken by the Ikhwan was contrary t o Ibn Sa'ud's wishes and orders. 
He requested the delegates to t e l l t h e i r f o llowers t o withdraw from 
Subaihiya unless they wished to be exposed to harrassment by B r i t i s h a i r c r a f t . 
On the f o l l o w i n g day the delegates l e f t Kuwait f o r Subaihiya, 
accompanied by a representative of Sheikh Salim. The l a t t e r handed a l e t t e r 
to Ibn Diwaish from Sheikh Salim i n which the demands o f the Ikhwan were 
refused. On the 28th October the representative returned t o Kuwait, 
b r i n g i n g a l e t t e r from F a i s a l el-Diwaish. The l e t t e r said t h a t F a i s a l 
had believed the promises which Sheikh Salim and Ibn Sulyman had made at 
Jahara. He had, t h e r e f o r e , not taken any h o s t i l e a c t i o n , and he had even 
t r i e d t o r e s t r a i n I bn Sa'ud's forces. However, F a i s a l went on t o say t h a t 
he now saw how Sheikh Salim had deceived him and had not kept h i s promise. 
For t h i s reason the truce was over. 
The c a r r i e r who brought the l e t t e r said that when he l e f t Subaihiya, 
the Ikhwan had been preparing to leave on the 26th f o r Al-Safa, where they 
expected t o receive supplies and ammunition. This report was correct i n 
t h a t the Ikhwan did move on t o al-Safa. I t i s probable t h a t the presence 
(77) 
of B r i t i s h ships and planes i n Kuwait influenced F a i s a l i n h i s withdrawal. 
On the 30th October, the High Commissioner, S i r Percy Cox, made 
i t clear t o Sheikh Salim that he considered i t a matter of urgency t h a t 
f u r t h e r bloodshed be prevented u n t i l a settlement could be reached between 
the Sheikh and Ibn Sa'ud. He h i n t e d f u r t h e r t h a t the w e l l s at Subaihiya 
were to be l e f t alone by both sides or the R.A.F. would intervene. This 
message was also conveyed t o Ibn Sa'ud by way of Bahrain. 
I n February 1921, Sheikh Khaz'al Khan sent h i s eldest son Qasib 
and Sheikh Salim's nephew, Sheikh Ahmad, to Nejd to t r y and arrange a truce. 
They reached Ibn Sa'ud's camp at al-Khaf, north of Riyadh on the 2nd March, 
and s t a r t e d back f o r Hasa on the 5th March. On the 4th March news of 
Sheikh Salim's death reached them. He had been taken i l l on the 23rd 
February at Jahara and had di e d on the 27th. 
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Before news a r r i v e d , Ibn Sa'ud said that he f e l t nothing but 
f r i e n d s h i p towards the Kuwaiti people and the Sabah f a m i l y , w i t h the 
exception of Salim. Salim had brought a l l h i s recent troubles on himself 
by d e c l a r i n g war on the Mutair. Ibn Sa'ud desired nothing more than peace 
between Nejd and Kuwait, but Salim was a great obstacle t o his achieving 
t h i s end. He thought peace possible, however, i f Ahmad e l - J a b i r would act 
f o r Salim i n a l l dealings w i t h Ibn Sa'ud. 
Ibn Sa'ud showed Ahmad e l - J a b i r a document concerning the f r o n t i e r 
of Kuwait which he sai d he would recognise at once. I n t h i s document 
"Maqt'a" stream, which flows i n t o the Arabian Gulf seventy-five miles south-
east of Kuwait, formed p a r t of the boundary l i n e s , but the extent of the 
boundary l i n e t o the west i s not known. 
On r e c e i v i n g news of Salim*s death Ibn Sa'ud tore up the paper and 
s a i d t h a t the two houses of Sa'ud and Sabah were once again u n i t e d i n perf e c t 
f r i e n d s h i p and tha t there was no longer any necessity f o r a boundary between 
them. Sheikh Ahmad agreed and said that he was, so t o speak, Ibn Sa'ud's 
(78) 
son. 
Sheikh Ahmad a r r i v e d i n Kuwait on the 24th March and was given a 
tremendous re c e p t i o n . He was accepted as Salim's successor by the Sabah 
f a m i l y on the same day, and on the 25th March he summoned a meeting of the 
notables of the town, who also accepted him. Peace now returned t o Kuwait 
and r e l a t i o n s w i t h Riyadh took a d i s t i n c t t u r n f o r the b e t t e r . 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
Although Kuwait was nominally an independent p r i n c i p a l i t y , the 
Turks exercised considerable influence there, especially after Mubarak 
assumed power i n 1896, through the assassination of his brothers. 
For the f i r s t three years of his rule the Sublime Porte asserted 
a shadowy suzerainty over the area, but i t was Mubarak*s aim to preserve 
Kuwait*s independence from both the Turks and from the claims of his 
dispossessed nephews. This brought him into c o n f l i c t with the Turkish 
authorities at Basra on the one hand and with Ibn Rashaid, Emir of H a i l , 
on the other, as he gave asylum to the Wahabi supporters of Ibn Sa*ud 
whom Ibn Rashaid had put to f l i g h t from Nejd. 
When Hamdi Pasha became the Wali of Basra he t r i e d to induce 
the Porte to take action against Mubarak and i n addition supported Mubarak*s 
nephews w i t h both arms and men for their attacks on Kuwait. Under t h i s 
pressure Mubarak appealed for B r i t i s h protection as a way of severing his 
last t i e s w i t h the Ottoman Empire. 
I t was only after a careful study of the strategic situation of 
Kuwait and her possible use as a base for B r i t i s h interests i n the Gulf 
that protection was granted. The main factor influencing B r i t a i n i n 
t h i s decision was the Berlin-Baghdad Railway project. As a result of 
this then B r i t a i n signed a secret agreement with Mubarak i n 1899 that he 
should not cede, s e l l , lease or contract with any foreign power except 
B r i t a i n . 
The Turks t r i e d to reassert t h e i r control of Kuwait only to 
meet with s t i f f opposition from Mubarak, who remained true to the secret 
agreement. Things became p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t after a German company 
received a concession from the Porte f o r a railway. The mission sent to 
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Kuwait to offer a concession for i t s terminus and a port were rejected by 
Mubarak, and the Porte was persuaded by the Germans to send an expedition 
to Kuwait to enforce th e i r authority. Only the presence of a B r i t i s h 
gunboat i n the Arabian Gulf convinced them to hold back. 
As a man with a clear perception of the r e a l i t i e s of power Mubarak 
saw the need to come to terms w i t h both the B r i t i s h and the Turks, and he 
therefore decided to negotiate with each of them separately. Thus, 
although he had a secret agreement with the B r i t i s h , he denied i t and 
declared that he was subject only to the Sublime Porte. On the other hand, 
he publicly renounced his allegiance to the Sultan and permitted a B r i t i s h 
agent to reside i n Kuwait and a B r i t i s h Post Office to be established. 
Thus the B r i t i s h Government gained th e i r f i r s t foothold i n 
Turkish t e r r i t o r y through the consent of Skeikh Mubarak. The Turks 
protested against B r i t i s h interference and t r i e d to maintain their position. 
B r i t a i n now had to decide whether advantage lay i n strengthening or 
weakening the Turkish authorities i n Mesapotamia and Kuwait, and f i n a l l y 
i n 1913, after some hesitation, entered into an agreement with the Turks 
concerning the a f f a i r s of Arabia, including Kuwait. However, the agreement 
was never r a t i f i e d . 
I n 1914 Turkey entered World War I on the side of the Central 
Powers. Turks thus became the a l l i e s of Britain's r i v a l s i n the area and 
the option of agreement with Turkey to secure B r i t i s h interests was no 
longer open. B r i t a i n was thus obliged to choose alliance with local 
leadership, and after contact had been made with Kuwait by the B r i t i s h 
P o l i t i c a l Resident at Bushire, Great B r i t a i n declared Kuwait to be an 
independent p r i n c i p a l i t y under B r i t i s h protection. At the same time she 
declared protection over the Sheikh of Muhammara. 
This was i n direct contradiction to Mubarak's previously declared 
137. 
policy of co-operation with Turkey. To preserve Kuwaiti independence 
from the Turks he had paid the price of losing some of that same 
independence to the B r i t i s h . He thus f o r a while lost control over 
his people who revolted against his pro-British policy, but subsequently 
managed to overcome the revolutionaries. 
I n 1915 Mubarak died and his death at such an early stage i n the 
war was a severe blow to B r i t a i n . He was succeeded by his son Jabir, 
who himself only ruled one year before he died, to be replaced by his 
brother Salim. Salim was a conservative, whose dislike of change 
prevented him f u l l y understanding the sit u a t i o n , and caused him to lose 
much of the power and influence previously accruing to his father. 
During the \*ar Salim secretly gave support by supplying food, 
to the Turks, and as a r e s u l t , when the B r i t i s h discovered t h i s , a 
blockade was thrown around Kuwait. Sheikh Salim i n i t i a l l y resisted t h i s 
measure, but f i n a l l y had to submit to i t and the B r i t i s h set up a Blockade 
Office and appointed an o f f i c i a l to supervise a l l trade to or from Kuwait. 
This blockade made the situation i n Kuwait c r i t i c a l . Anglo-
Kuwaiti relations became very cool and strained . with the B r i t i s h Government's 
insistance on t h i s policy, and were worsened when Salim received a long 
l e t t e r from B r i t a i n threatening him should he impede i t s implementation. 
The blockade was accepted only with very bad grace by Kuwait. 
The l a t t e r period of Sheikh Salim's reign was marked by 
increasingly tense relations with Ibn Sa*ud, over questions of boundaries 
and t r i b a l a f f a i r s . This tension ultimately resulted i n war, for which 
Kuwait had to pay dearly. The basis of disagreement was the boundaries 
which Salim t r i e d to f i x between Kuwait and Hasa. A number of Kuwaiti 
tribes had already settled i n t h i s area for grazing their herds. Ibn 
Sa*ud sent a protest and asked that plans to f i x the boundaries on t h i s 
basis should not continue. While Ibn Sa«ud based his claims on the 
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unwritten law of the desert and t r i b a l power, Salim based his on a 
document i n the more modern manner of settled peoples. 
The B r i t i s h intervened as arbitrators i n the dispute, i n an 
attempt to put an end to c o n f l i c t . They negotiated with both contenders 
separately, but t h i s did not help as Ibn Sa*ud did not honour his 
undertaking to B r i t a i n that he would end h o s t i l i t i e s . Instead he 
declared war on Kuwait and sent the Ikhwan to beseige Jahra. 
At Jahra a battle took place, and both sides suffered heavy 
losses. The Ikhwan withdrew from the area when B r i t a i n threatened them 
with a e r i a l harrassment. Sheikh Khaz'al of Muhammara then intervened 
sending his son Qasib and Sheikh Ahmed a l Jabir to Nejd to t r y to bring 
about a settlement. 
While negotiations were under way news reached the delegates 
that Salim had died. Ibn Sa»ud immediately concluded peace with Kuwait 
and recognised Sheikh Ahmed as successor to Salim. Bonds of friendship 
between the two families were renewed as before. 
During Sheikh Salim»s r u l e , from 1917-1921 therefore, Kuwait had 
passed through a very c r i t i c a l period and found herself i n some d i f f i c u l t y 
over her relations with both B r i t a i n and Sa'udi Arabia. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Exclusive Agreement: The Kuwaiti sheikh and B r i t a i n 23 January 1899. 
Translation of Arabic Bond.^ 
Praise be to God alone ( l i t . i n the name of God Almighty) ("Bissim I l l a h 
Ta'alah Shanuho".) 
The object of w r i t i n g t h i s lawful and honourable bond i s that 
i t i s hereby covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm 
John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty*s P o l i t i c a l Resident, on behalf 
of the B r i t i s h Government on the one part, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh 
S?abah, Sheikh of Kuwait, on the other part, that the said Sheikh Mubarak-
bin>-Sheikh Stabah of his own free w i l l and desire does hereby pledge and 
bind himself, h i s heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or 
Representative of any power or government i n Kuwait, or any other place 
w i t h i n the l i m i t s of his t e r r i t o r y , without the previous sanction of the 
B r i t i s h Government, and further binds himself, h i s heirs and successors 
not to cede, s e l l , lease, mortgage, or give f o r occupation or for any 
other purpose any portion of his t e r r i t o r y to the government or subjects 
of any other power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's 
Government f o r these purposes. This engagement is also to extend to any 
portion of the t e r r i t o r y of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be i n 
the possession of the subjects of any other government. 
In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, 
Lieutentant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's 
P o l i t i c a l Resident i n the Persian Gulf, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh 
§abah, the former on behalf of the B r i t i s h Government and the l a t t e r 
on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors do each, i n the presence 
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of witnesses, a f f i x t h e i r signatures on t h i s , the tenth day of Ramazan 
1316, corresponding with the twenty-third day of January 1899. 
(sgd) M.J. Meade, 
P o l i t i c a l Resident i n the Persian Gulf. 
(sgd) Mubarak-Al-Sabah (L.S.) 
Witensses:-
(sgd) B. Wickham Hore, 
Captain, I.M.S. 
(sgd) J. Calcott Gaskin 
(sgd) Muhammad Rahim bin Abdul nebi Saffer (L.S.) 
Footnote 
(1) C.U. Aitcheson, "Collection of Treaties etc., "Volume 
X I I , Calcutta, 1893, p. 262 
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APPENDIX TWO 
B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Representation i n the Persian Gulf:- (1890-1921) 
BUSHIRE: 
1. Col. Talbot, March 1891-1893 
2. Captain Godfrey ( i n temporary charge) 
3. Major H. Sadler (June and July 1893) 
4. M. A. Crawford (July-December 1893) 
5. Major H. Sadler, December 1893-January 1894 
6. Col. Wilson, 1894-97 
7. Lieut.-Col. Meade, 1897-1900 
8. Lieut.-Col. Kemball, 1900-1904 
MUSQAT: 
1. Major Yate, 16 December 1889-March 1890 
2. Lieut.-Col. Modeler, December 1890-October 1891 
3. Major Sadler, November 1892-April 1895. 
4. Captain J.F. Whyte, May 1895-November 1895 
5. Major Sadler, November 1895-1896 
6. Captain F.A. Be v i l l e , A p r i l 1896-June 1897 
7. Major Fagan, September 1892-September 1899 
8. Major P. Cox, Octoher 1899-vJanuary 1904 
9. Major W.G. Gray, 1904-1908 
10. R.E. Holland, 1908-1910 
11. Major S.G. Knox, 1911-1913 
12. Lieut.-Col. R.A.E. Benn, 1913 
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BAHRAIN: 
1. Haji Muhammad Amin, March 1892-November 1893 
2. Agha Muhammad Rahim, November 1893-February 1900 
3. Mr. J.C. Gaskin, February 1900-October 1904 
4. Captain F.B. Prideaux, 1904-1909 
5. Captain C.H. Mackenzie, 1909-1911 
6. Major S.G. Knox, 1911 
7. Captain D.L.R. Lorimer, 1911-1913 
8. Major A.P. Trevor, 1913 
BASRA: 
1. Lieut. S.G. Knox, 1894-1895 
2. Captain J.F. Whyte, 1895-1897 
3. Major C.G.F. Fagan, 1897 
4. Captain I.A. Forbes, 1897-1898 
5. Captain Ramsay, 1898 
6. A.C. Wratislaw, 1898-1903, H.M. Consul. 
7. F.E. Crow, 1903-1916 
THE POLITICAL RESIDENT AT BAGHDAD: 
1. Col. Mckler, Novemner 1891-April 1897 
2. Major P.J. M e l v i l l , A p r i l 1897-March 1899 
3. Lieut-Col. W. Loch, 1897-1898 
4. Major P.J. M e l v i l l , 1897-1899 
5. Lieut-Col. W. Loch, 1899 
6. M e l v i l l , 1899-1902 
7. Col. L.S. Newmarch, 1902-1906 
8. Major J. Ramsay, 1906-1909 
9. J.G. Lorimer, 1909-1914 
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KUWAIT: 
h Haji A l i Bin-Ghulam Riza, August 1899-August 1904 
2. Major S.G. Knox, 1904-1908 
3. Captain W.H.I. Shalcespear, 1909-1915 
4. Major W.G. Grey, 1915-1917 
5. Captain Hamilton, 1917-March 1918 
6. Captain W. Loch, March 1918-August 1918 
7. Colonel MacCullum August 1918-1920 
8. Major Nore, 1920 + 
+ Appointment continuing past 1920 
Footnote 
(1) Lorimer Gazetteer, Persian Gulf, Vol. I I (Historical) and also 
Local Staff of the P o l i t i c a l Agency, Kuwait, R/15/4/1/21, 
India Office Library. 
144. 
APPBNDIX THREE 
The United Kingdom's recognition of Kuwait as an Independent State under 
B r i t i s h Protection. 3 November 1914. 
I n continuation of the previous l e t t e r ^ intimating the outbreak 
of war between the B r i t i s h Government and Turkey, I am ordered by the 
B r i t i s h Government to convey to Your Excellency gratitude for your loyalty 
and your offer of assistance, and request you to attack Umm Qasr, Safwan 
and Bubiyan and to occupy them. You should endeavour, afterwards, i n 
co-operation with Sheikh Khaz'al Khan, Emir Ibn Sa'ud and other reliable 
Sheikhs to liberate Basra from Turkish possession. Should t h i s prove to 
be beyond your a b i l i t y , you should make arrangements, i f possible, to 
prevent Turkish reinforcements from reaching Basra or even Qurhah u n t i l 
the a r r i v a l of the B r i t i s h troops whom we shall send, please God, as soon 
as possible. I also hope that two of our men-of-war w i l l reach Basra 
before the a r r i v a l of your troops there. And though i t should be your 
highest aim, i n t h i s connection, to liberate Basra and i t s people from 
Turkish r u l e , s t i l l we request that you should use your utmost endeavour 
i n preventing troops and others from plundering the merchandise belonging 
to B r i t i s h merchants i n Basra and i t s dependencies, to protect the European 
residents of Basra and to safeguard them from loss and oppression. In 
return for your valuable assistance i n t h i s important matter, I am ordered 
by the B r i t i s h Government to promise to your Excellency that i f we succeed 
therein - and we shall succeed therein, please God - we w i l l not return 
Basra to the Turkish Government and we w i l l not surrender i t back to them 
at a l l . Furthermore I make to you on behalf of the B r i t i s h Government 
certain promises concerning your Excellency personally. Viz:-
(1) That your gardens which are now i n your possession, v i z . , the date 
gardens situated between Fao and Qurnah shall remain i n your possession 
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and i n possession of your descendants without being subject to the payment 
of revenue or taxes. 
(2) That i f you attack SafwAn, Umm Qasr and Bubiyan and occupy them, the 




1. The B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident i n the Persian Gulf addressed a 
note to Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait, concerning the above declaration. 
2. Diplomacy i n the Near and Middle East. "A Documentary Record, 
1914-1956" by J.C. Hurewitz, Vol. I I , p. 4 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
B r i t i s h Treaty with Ibn Sa'ud, 26 December 1915. "Ratified by the 
Viceroy of India simla, 18 July 1916" 
(1) The B r i t i s h Government do acknowledge and admit that Najd, Al 
Hasa, Qatif and Jubail, and their dependencies and t e r r i t o r i e s , 
which w i l l be discussed and determined hereafter and their ports 
on the shores of the Arabian Fulf are the countries of Ibn Sa'ud 
and of his fathers before him, and do hereby recognise the said 
Ibn Sa*ud as the Independent Ruler thereof and absolute Chief of 
their t r i b e s , and after him his sons and descendants, by inheritance; 
but the selection of the individual shall be i n accordance with the 
nomination "by the l i v i n g Ruler" of his successor; but with the 
proviso that he shall not be a person antagonistic to the B r i t i s h 
Government i n any respect; such as for example i n regard to the 
terms mentioned i n this Treaty. 
(2) I n the event of aggression by any Foreign power on the t e r r i t o r i e s 
of the countries of the said Ibn Sa*ud and his descendants without 
reference to the B r i t i s h government and without giving her an 
opportunity of communicating with Ben Sa'ud and composing the matter, 
the B r i t i s h Government w i l l aid Ben Sa'ud to such extent and such 
a manner as the B r i t i s h Government after consulting Ibn Sa»ud may 
consider most effective for protecting his interest and countries. 
(3) Ibn Sa»ud hereby agrees and promises to re f r a i n from entering i n t o 
any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any Foreign power or 
nation and further to give immediate notice to the P o l i t i c a l 
authorities of the B r i t i s h government of any attempt on the part 
of any other power to i n t e r f e r e with the above t e r r i t o r i e s . 
04) Ben Sa»ud hereby undertakes that he w i l l absolutely not cede, s e l l , 
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mortgage, lease or otherwise dispose of the above t e r r i t o r i e s or 
any part of them, or grant concessions within those t e r r i t o r i e s 
t o any foreign power or to the subjects of any foreign power 
without the consent of the B r i t i s h Government. And that he w i l l 
follow her advice unreservedly provided that i t 9 b e not damaging 
to his own i n t e r e s t . 
(5) Ben Sa*ud hereby undertakes to keep open wi t h i n his t e r r i t o r i e s 
the roads leading to the Holy Places and to protect pilgrims on 
their passage to and from the Holy Places. 
(6) Ibn Sa'ud undertakes as his father did before him to r e f r a i n from 
a l l aggression on, or interference with the t e r r i t o r i e s of Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and of the sheikhs of Qatarand the Oman coast, who are 
under the protection of the B r i t i s h Government, and who have treaty 
relations with the said government; and the l i m i t s of their 
t e r r i t o r i e s shall hereafter be determined. 
(7) The B r i t i s h Government and Ibn Sa'ud agree to conclude a further 
(1) 
detailed treaty i n regard to matters concerning the two parties. 
Footnote 




(1) India Office Records, London:-
1. P o l i t i c a l and secret Department. Home Correspondence. L/P&S/3 
2. P o l i t i c a l and Secret Department, Despatches to India. 1890-1896 
3. P o l i t i c a l and Secret Files. 1902-1913. L/P&S/10 
4. Persian Gulf Files (Kuwait P o l i t i c a l F i l e s ) . R/15 
5. P o l i t i c a l and Secret Memoranda. L/P&S/18 
6. P o l i t i c a l and Secret Department Library. L/P&S/3 
7. P o l i t i c a l and Secret 
(2) Foreign Office (Public Office Records):-
Foreign Office Files, series:-
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